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Abstract
This thesis investigates the optimal provision of incentives when employment rela-
tionships are characterised by moral hazard and individuals have relative income
concerns. In contrast to the existing literature, it is assumed that workers’ social
comparisons are not limited to others within the firm, but extend to larger groups
in society.
The thesis is organised into three chapters. The first chapter provides a com-
prehensive survey of the literatures which study incentive contracting when par-
ties’ preferences are characterised by the related concepts of inequity aversion or
loss aversion. The chapter discusses the similarities between the two literatures,
highlights some results which are relevant for both preference specifications and
establishes the context in which the subsequent analysis should be placed.
The second chapter examines a firm’s optimal choice of contract for a worker
whose preferences exhibit relative income concerns. This is formalised through
use of a stylised model, in which workers have an aversion to falling behind the
economy’s average income. In this framework, it is shown that the optimal con-
tract takes either a binary or ternary form and that firms benefit from the social
comparisons of workers. In addition, there is an interdependence between the con-
tracting of firm-worker pairs which results in an externality effect, so that firms
could gain from collective decision making. Moreover, relative income concerns
imply a lower economy-wide average wage, as well as a reduced level of inequality
as measured by the Gini coefficient.
The third chapter extends the foregoing analysis to an environment featuring
a frictional labour market and unemployment; this allows for an investigation into
how dismissal can be used by firms to create effort incentives. Dismissing workers
for poor performance is shown to act as a substitute for explicit incentive pay,
allowing firms to reduce wage costs. Some implications for labour market policies
are derived. Increases in the minimum wage are found to aid the creation of
incentives, lowering the bonus payment necessary to implement effort. In contrast,
increases in unemployment benefits have a negative impact on incentives. These
effects are shown to be stronger and more pronounced when workers have relative
income concerns.
Overall, the thesis provides several predictions and insights aimed at impro-
ving the understanding of incentive contracts, their structure and their effects on
individual behaviour.
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Introduction
Behavioural contract theory studies how modifications to preferences — specifi-
cally, deviations from the classical approach supported by psychological evidence
— influence contracting between economic actors.1 One particular insight of this
line of research is that individuals are not purely self-interested, as is commonly as-
sumed, but typically care about how their payoffs relate to those of others around
them. For instance, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) document substantial empirical
and experimental evidence for individuals having concerns over the fairness of
outcomes. In experimental games, some subjects have been shown to consistently
reject outcomes characterised by large inequalities, even if they personally lose
out as a result of this. Similarly, many individuals have shown a willingness to
forego income in order to impose costly punishments on others whose behaviour
does not comply with social norms. In recent years, a number of studies have
investigated how the optimal provision of incentives within firms is affected by
these preferences for fair and equitable outcomes (e.g. Bartling and von Siemens,
2010b). A hallmark of this literature is that the inequity concerns of individuals
are limited to other workers within the firm.
While there is evidence that such intra-firm wage comparisons can be im-
portant (see e.g. Card et al., 2012), there are many studies which suggest that
workers may also compare their incomes to others outside of the firm. One par-
ticular candidate for income comparisons is “people like me”; i.e. those with
similar characteristics such as age, education, location and occupation. For in-
stance, Clark and Oswald (1996) use British data to construct a reference wage for
each individual, corresponding to the predicted earnings of a worker with the same
characteristics, and show that there is a negative relationship between this refe-
rence wage and job satisfaction. Along similar lines, Cappelli and Sherer (1988)
find that an individual’s pay satisfaction is negatively correlated with the average
1Throughout, the word ‘classical’ is used to refer to models which make traditional assump-
tions about the nature of individual preferences: namely, that they are self-focused and that
utility is determined solely by outcomes themselves, rather than in relation to any beliefs, ex-
pectations or reference points. See the summary articles of Rabin (1998) and DellaVigna (2009)
for evidence of psychological phenomena that motivates studying deviations from the classical
model and Ko˝szegi (2014) for a recent survey of the behavioural contract theory literature.
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wage paid to comparable workers by other firms in the same industry. Taking a
geographical approach to reference group formation, Luttmer (2005) provides evi-
dence from US data that, controlling for several characteristics including income,
an individual’s happiness is negatively correlated with the incomes of others in the
local area. Moreover, an increase in the earnings of neighbours and a decrease in
one’s own income are each associated with a similar sized reduction in happiness.
Comparable findings have been reported from studies of households in Canada
(Helliwell and Huang, 2010), 18 Latin American countries (Graham and Felton,
2006) and rural China (Knight et al., 2009). The lattermost study is particularly
interesting since relative income is shown to have a strong impact on happiness
even in regions with high levels of poverty.
In this thesis, we study the optimal provision of incentives when workers’
reference groups extend beyond the firm, to larger groups in society. Specifically,
we assume that individuals have an aversion to falling behind the average wage
in an economy, or a desire to keep up with the Joneses.2 We begin by providing
a comprehensive survey of the existing relevant literature. Next, assuming that
employment relationships are characterised by moral hazard, we investigate a
firm’s optimal choice of contract when they have access to a rich performance
measure and examine the impact of workers’ relative income concerns. We also
extend our analysis to allow for unemployment and discuss some implications for
labour market policies. The thesis therefore provides a number of predictions and
insights which aim to improve our understanding of the structure of incentive
contracts and their effects on individual behaviour.
The first chapter of the thesis provides an extensive review of the literatures
which study incentive contracting when parties’ preferences are characterised by
either inequity aversion or loss aversion. The purpose of this survey is threefold.
First, we provide an in-depth analysis of the similarities between the two specifi-
cations of preferences and their implications for incentive contracting. Intuitively,
since in both cases individuals are assumed to make comparisons — either to re-
ference points or reference groups — and have an aversion to falling behind, the
utility associated with outcomes which result in relatively low wage payments is
reduced in comparison to the standard case. We show that, as a result, there are
comparable implications for optimal incentive contracts. Presentation of the two
literatures together therefore allows for further insights as well as an analysis of
some results which are relevant for both preference specifications.
Second, since our formalisation of relative income concerns also shares similari-
ties with these models of preferences, the literature review establishes the context
2The terminology ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ to describe preferences which include relative
income concerns has previously been applied to numerous economic contexts; see for instance
Dupor and Liu (2003).
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in which the analysis contained in the subsequent chapters of the thesis should
be placed. Third, we additionally identify some promising avenues for future
research.
This first chapter begins by initially considering the standard model of incen-
tive contracting in the presence of moral hazard and presenting the key results of
this literature. Next, we outline the basic models of inequity averse and loss averse
preferences, while additionally discussing some issues regarding their application
to incentive contracting. We then survey the relevant literature and show that
aversion to either inequity or losses typically has a positive impact on incentives,
while reducing the expected utility of workers. The key issue in the inequity aver-
sion literature has been the extent to which a worker’s wages should depend on
the performance of others in the reference group. In contrast, many papers which
consider loss aversion have instead focussed on the optimal contractual structure
in the presence of a rich performance measure. We also study the impact of these
preference models for tournament schemes and team production.
The second chapter of the thesis investigates the optimal design of incentive
contracts when workers have relative income concerns and employment relati-
onships are characterised by moral hazard. Specifically, we introduce a stylised
model where workers have an aversion to falling behind a reference wage, which,
in equilibrium, is assumed to be determined by the average income in a replica
economy populated by a continuum of firm-worker pairs.
The first part of the chapter examines the contracting problem of a single
pair who take the reference wage as given. Solving for the wage scheme which
minimises the firm’s costs of implementing a given effort level, the optimal contract
is shown to be simple, taking either a binary or ternary form. In addition, we find
that the firm benefits from the worker’s relative income concerns, since aversion
to falling behind the reference wage has a positive impact on incentives.
We next embed this model of contracting into an economy where all firms and
workers are assumed to be identical. In order to further the notion of relative
income concerns, we let the reference wage be determined endogenously by the
average income of workers. In this environment, we show that the optimal contract
is ternary and establish some additional comparative static results, before using
a series of numerical examples to examine how changes in the parameters of
the model affect the economy’s equilibrium. We discuss an externality effect,
whereby each firm ignores the implications of their contracting decision for the
economy’s average payment, which affects the employment relationships of others
via the reference wage. Finally, we find that higher relative income concerns are
associated with a lower average wage, as well as a reduced level of inequality as
measured by the Gini Coefficient.
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In the third chapter of the thesis, we extend this model to allow for unemploy-
ment. One possible interpretation of our result that the optimal contract can take
a ternary form is that the wage scheme is binary, with the additional option of
dismissal for poor performance. Such a contract is then perceived by the worker
as ternary, since there are three distinct possible outcomes: dismissal and a base
wage; retention and a base wage; retention, a base wage and a bonus payment.
However, it is clear that dismissal can only create additional incentives if workers
anticipate a reduction in expected utility following termination of the employment
relationship. This is the case if, for instance, workers are unemployed for a long
period of time and lose a significant amount of income. With this in mind, we
consider a dynamic environment featuring labour market frictions, as formalised
using the standard model of job matching (Pissarides, 2000).
Assuming that, as before, workers have relative income concerns and are averse
to falling behind the average wage in the economy, we first examine the contracting
problem of a single firm-worker pair. We show that when deciding on the pro-
bability of dismissal, the firm takes into account two distinct effects. First, by
dismissing the worker for poor performance, the firm can create incentives to un-
dertake effort, allowing for a reduction of the bonus payment and lower expected
wage costs; this increases current period profits. Second, the possibility of dis-
missal means there is a positive probability that the employment relationship is
terminated at the end of each period. Due to the frictional nature of the labour
market, in this case the firm can spend several periods searching for a new ma-
tch, resulting in a loss of profits. The firm then trades off these two effects when
deciding the frequency with which the worker is dismissed.
Clearly, the extent to which the firm can use dismissal as a device to cre-
ate incentives will depend on the underlying conditions of the labour market.
Accordingly, when evaluating labour market policies which impact the payoffs
of both employed and unemployed workers, it is important to additionally take
into account their effects on employment relationships and the ability of firms
to provide effort incentives. To explore this issue, we use a series of numerical
examples to examine the impact of changes in the minimum wage and unem-
ployment benefits on the probability of dismissal, the optimal contract and the
steady-state equilibrium labour market outcomes. This is in line with Ko˝szegi’s
(2014) recommendation that, when studying contract-theoretic models with non-
standard preferences, analysis should extend beyond the effects of the behavioural
parameters, to variables which are fundamentally of more economic interest.
We show that, in our framework, the minimum wage acts as an efficiency wage
which increases an employed worker’s utility relative to unemployment, creating
larger incentives to undertake costly effort. It follows that dismissal is more
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effective following a raise in the minimum wage and is therefore used more often.
This reduces the size of the necessary bonus payment, although the firm’s overall
wage costs increase. Additionally, we show that the steady-state unemployment
level increases, since existing matches are terminated with higher probability and
lower profits push some firms out of the market.
In contrast, an increase in unemployment benefits lowers the relative utility of
an employed worker, reducing effort incentives. The threat of dismissal therefore
becomes less effective and is used less often. Accordingly, firms must increase
the size of the required bonus payment, leading to higher wage costs and lower
profits. We also find that a rise in unemployment benefits induces opposing effects
on unemployment: while existing matches last for longer on average, the decrease
in profits implies that some firms will exit the market.
Moreover, while the foregoing effects exist for the case where workers are self-
interested, we show that they are stronger and more pronounced when workers
have relative income concerns. Our analysis therefore highlights the importance
of considering the implications for incentives in employment relationships when
evaluating labour market policies.
In the conclusion to the thesis, we briefly summarise the key results of our
analysis and explore how they relate to the existing literature. We discuss some of
the assumptions made throughout, in particular with respect to our formalisation
of relative income concerns and comment on some possible alternative modelling
choices. Finally, we outline some of the ways in which our analysis could be
extended and offer some thoughts on the future directions of the literature.
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
The classical approach to economic theory assumes a highly simplified model of
human behaviour. Individuals are assumed to be hyperrational: their preferen-
ces are self-focused, time-consistent and utility is determined solely by outcomes
themselves, rather than in relation to any beliefs, expectations or reference points.
While it has been long known that this approach neglects important aspects of hu-
man behaviour, its simplicity has allowed for tractable models which have enabled
economists to make invaluable predictions, insights and real-world interventions
regarding economic phenomena. Nonetheless, in many — if not all — areas of
economics, allowing for more accurate descriptions of how individuals behave can
lead to significant developments in our comprehension of important economic is-
sues. With this in mind, the behavioural economics literature has both examined
the ways in which economic agents consistently violate the assumptions of the
classical approach and, following this, developed theoretical models which can
capture this behaviour.1 These models have then been applied to a variety of
different topics, resulting in further insights and predictions.
One such topic is the the provision of incentives in the presence of moral
hazard. In many environments, incentive contracts will be designed by one party
specifically in order to optimally influence the behaviour of another. Accordingly,
the structure of these contracts is typically sensitive to variations in the underlying
preferences of parties. Due to the ubiquitous nature of contracts which — to at
least some extent — are designed in order to provide incentives, it is important
to understand both their composition and their impact on the behaviour of the
economic actors involved. There is by now a substantial body of work which
attempts to explore these issues by assuming that preferences are non-standard.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a survey of a particular subset of this
literature. Specifically, we shall discuss incentive contracting when preferences
1This literature is vast and as such is not covered in detail here; Rabin (1998) provides a
survey while DellaVigna (2009) considers evidence from the field.
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deviate from the classical model in two particular ways.
The first deviation relates to individuals who care about the payoffs of others.
There is a wealth of evidence that economic agents are not purely self-interested,
as is assumed by the standard theory; instead, their preferences have a social
aspect and as such their behaviour will vary as the payoffs of others change. In
particular, individuals often demonstrate a desire for fair or equitable outcomes.
Such preferences are captured by Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity
aversion, which also retains a high degree of tractability and is therefore well-
suited to economic applications.
The second deviation we consider is reference-dependent preferences and loss
aversion. As first documented in the economics literature by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), individuals have a tendency to evaluate outcomes not in isolation,
but relative to some subjectively determined reference point. Moreover, deviations
below the reference point (losses) typically lead to variations in utility which
are greater in magnitude than equal sized deviations above the reference point
(gains). This is the key feature of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect
theory, which has been successfully applied to several economic topics and can
help explain many results which are inconsistent with the standard model (see
Barberis, 2013). There have also been a number of subsequent formalisations of
reference-dependence preferences, which attempt to sharpen the foregoing insights
while remaining widely applicable.
This chapter provides a review of how inequity aversion and loss aversion have
been applied to the study of incentive contracting. Throughout, we shall follow
the literature and predominantly consider the provision of incentives within orga-
nisations. Besides providing a natural context in which to discuss the findings of
the literature, labour contracts will typically involve parties whose preferences are
likely to coincide with the aforementioned deviations from the classical approach.2
First, since organisations are social in nature, coworkers represent a natural
reference group with whom employees are likely to make wage comparisons.3 In-
deed, there exists evidence both that job satisfaction depends on such relative
pay comparisons (Card et al., 2012) and that firms view the need to maintain
equality as an important constraint on their internal wage structures (Agell and
Lundborg, 1995). Second, a central theme of the literature on contracting in the
presence of moral hazard has been the trade-off between incentive provision and
the income-risk which this entails. Since a worker’s wage is likely to constitute
a significant portion of his earnings, it is particularly important to account for
2It should be emphasised, however, that many of the literature’s findings will extend to other
environments which feature moral hazard.
3This point is further discussed in Section 3.1.3. Moreover, contracts which condition on
the performance of coworkers are likely to further induce such comparisons, by increasing social
proximity (Bartling, 2012a).
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risk preferences when studying the optimal form of labour contracts. As noted by
Barberis (2013), prospect theory is widely considered to be the most accurate des-
cription of decision making under risk currently available, so that its application
seems particularly relevant for models of incentive contracting in the workplace.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, Section 2 introduces the standard
model of incentive contracting in the presence of moral hazard. We present the
basic setup and discuss possible modelling choices, before presenting the key insig-
hts of the classical literature.4 Throughout, we utilise a series of formal examples
in order to illustrate these results, which then serve as a benchmark for later
comparisons.
Next, in Section 3, we outline the basic models of inequity aversion (3.1) and
reference-dependent preferences (3.2), while exploring some details regarding their
application to economic environments and in particular to incentive contracting.
For the former model, it is important to specify the relevant reference group with
whom individuals undertake comparisons as well as the exact nature of these
comparisons; that is, how do we define an individual’s ‘payoff’? For models
of reference-dependence, the most important issue when considering applications
relates to the correct definition of an individual’s reference point. We conclude the
section (3.3) by comparing the two theories, discussing some important similarities
and arguing that in many environments they can lead to similar predictions.
Section 4 then provides a survey of the relevant literature. We first consider the
case in which a firm employs workers who compare their wages with one another
and dislike inequalities (4.1). The firm then faces a trade-off, since wage inequality
can be an effective way to create incentives, but also reduces the expected utility of
workers so that compensation may need to be increased in order to guarantee that
the contract is accepted. The key issue in this literature is the extent to which the
remuneration of one worker should depend on the performance of others. Through
the design of wage schemes, firms are able to either exacerbate or eliminate wage
inequality such as to minimise their costs; as we shall see, aversion to inequity
then has a significant impact on the composition of the optimal contract. We also
explore alternative specifications, such as the case where workers compare their
wages to their superiors, rather than coworkers.
Next, we discuss incentive contracting when workers are averse to losses (4.2)
and find that such preferences induce a similar trade-off to the aforementioned
case of inequity aversion — the firm must then decide the extent to which they
wish to expose workers to potential losses. The main focus of this literature has
been the structure of the optimal wage scheme when the firm has access to a rich
4We do not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the moral hazard literature when
parties have classical preferences. For that purpose, see Gibbons (1998), Prendergast (1999),
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) or Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo (2018).
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performance measure, with reference-dependence and loss aversion implying key
differences to the standard case. The remainder of the section then considers the
implications of inequity and loss aversion for two common alternative organisatio-
nal forms: tournament schemes (4.3) and team production (4.4). Finally, Section
5 concludes the chapter by discussing the key results of these literatures and offers
some thoughts on future directions.
While the majority of the existing literature is covered, this survey is not inten-
ded to be exhaustive and as such some papers have been excluded. Throughout,
we limit attention to studies which are primarily theoretical in nature, rather
than considering empirical or experimental contributions. Moreover, in both our
review of the literature and our formal examples, we typically omit technical dis-
cussions regarding issues such as the existence or uniqueness of equilibria, instead
focussing on the literature’s important results and their associated intuitions.
There exist a number of related works which also survey the literature on in-
centive contracting when parties have non-standard preferences. Englmaier (2005)
reviews the early literature on incentive contracting with social preferences, but
does not cover reference-dependence or loss aversion. Ko˝szegi (2014) surveys
the broader behavioural contract theory literature, which addresses additional
deviations from the standard model of preferences (e.g. time inconsistency) as
well as alternative forms of informational asymmetries (e.g. adverse selection).
However, the impressive scope of his paper precludes a detailed analysis of any
one specific area, so that much of the material presented here is not covered.
Similarly, Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo (2018) consider the application of
non-standard preferences to models of moral hazard, but only briefly discuss a
selection of key results.
2 Moral Hazard and Incentive Contracting
2.1 The Basic Framework
The standard model of incentive contracting under moral hazard features a wor-
ker (the agent) who is hired to exert costly effort a ∈ A on behalf of a firm
(the principal) in return for a wage payment w. The agent’s preferences over
wage payments and effort can be represented by a separable utility function,
U(w, a) = u(w) − c(a). The first term u(w), which captures the agent’s prefe-
rences over money and risk, is assumed to be an increasing and (weakly) concave
function. As we shall see, the nature of the agent’s risk preferences has impor-
tant implications for the outcome of contracting under moral hazard. The second
term, c(a), is an increasing and strictly convex function representing the agent’s
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costs of undertaking effort.5 The agent is under no obligation to participate in the
relationship and has access to an outside opportunity which offers utility U , while
we assume that the principal always wishes to participate. Effort creates output
for the principal, the value of which is denoted by the increasing concave function
v(a). The principal is assumed to be risk neutral, so that her payoff function is
given by Π(w, a) = v(a)− w.
We first consider the full information benchmark, in which a is observable
and verifiable for all parties. In order to ensure participation, the agent must be
compensated for both his effort costs and outside utility. The principal’s problem
is therefore:
max
a,w
v(a)− w (1)
s.t. u(w)− c(a) ≥ U (2)
Since the wage w enters negatively into the principal’s objective function (1), the
participation constraint (2) will bind. Accordingly, u(w) = c(a)+U . Substituting
this into (1), the principal then solves for the optimal effort level to be induced:
max
a
v(a)− u−1 (c(a) + U) (3)
The argument which maximises (3) is often referred to as the first-best effort level
(i.e. the outcome in the absence of any informational asymmetries) and denoted
by aFB. For instance, if the agent is risk neutral so that u(w) = w and A = R+,
the solution is implicitly defined by v′(a) = c′(a). Since the agent’s action is
observable, the principal can then implement the desired effort level aFB using a
number of wage schemes which condition on a.6 One simple example is as follows:
wFB(a) =

u−1
(
c(aFB) + U
)
a ≥ aFB
−∞ a < aFB
(4)
5For technical reasons we further assume that c(0) = 0, with lima→0 c′(a) = 0.
6Note that in our framework, we have assumed that the agent’s effort has a deterministic
impact on the output accrued to the principal. A common alternative approach is to model
effort as influencing the probability distribution over different levels of output, which then acts
as a signal of effort provision (e.g. Holmstro¨m, 1979). Technically, the principal’s output function
is then v(x) = x, rather than v(a). Nonetheless, since the principal still wishes to design the
contract as to minimise her costs of implementing effort, the majority of key results can be
derived in either framework. In the full information case, when output is stochastic, the optimal
wage scheme must allocate risk efficiently between parties; a risk averse agent is then fully insured
by the wage scheme and receives a fixed payment, regardless of the output level.
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Moral hazard obtains when effort is either unobservable or unverifiable, in
which case effort incentives must be provided by conditioning the agent’s wage on
some performance measure. Formally, we assume that there exists a number of
signals x ∈ X , which are observable and verifiable for all parties. The agent’s effort
then influences the probability distribution over these signals, so that varying
payment depending on the signal observed will impact the agent’s effort choice.
The moral hazard literature then aims to analyse the outcome of contracting
between the parties, with a particular emphasis on the nature of the resulting
wage scheme.
It is standard to assume that the principal has all of the bargaining power in
the relationship. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal offers a
take-it-or-leave-it contract to the agent, who either accepts or rejects. In the case
of rejection, each party receives their respective outside utilities. If the contract is
accepted, the agent chooses an effort level a to undertake. Next, the uncertainty
in the environment is resolved and both parties observe a single signal x ∈ X .
Finally, the principal pays the wage w to the agent as specified by the contract.
The principal’s aim is to design the wage scheme which implements the pro-
fit maximising effort level at the lowest possible cost, while simultaneously gua-
ranteeing that the agent participates in the contract. Formally, the principal’s
problem becomes:
max
a,w(x)
v(a)−E [w(x)|a] (5)
a ∈ arg max
aˆ∈A
E [u(w(x))|aˆ]− c(aˆ) (6)
E [u(w(x))|a]− c(a) ≥ U (7)
Since effort is unverifiable, the agent is free to choose the value of a which he finds
most beneficial. Accordingly, the incentive compatibility constraint (6) requires
that the principal’s desired effort level maximises the agent’s expected utility
among all other possible effort levels in A. The participation constraint (7) requi-
res that the agent’s expected utility is sufficiently large to induce him to accept
the contract. Finally, some models feature a limited liability constraint (8), which
imposes a lower bound (often zero) on the available wages which can be paid to
the agent.
w(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X (8)
The main source of variation in models of moral hazard is the structure of the
sets A and X . We briefly consider each of these modelling choices in turn. The
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set A is often assumed to take one of two possible forms:
1. Discrete; A = {a1, ..., an} for some n ∈ N.
2. Continuous; A = [a, a] ⊆ R+.
The discrete approach typically simplifies analysis since the incentive compatibi-
lity constraint reduces to a finite number of inequalities which must be satisfied.
In fact, it is common to assume that A = {aL, aH} with aL < aH , so that effort is
binary and there is only one inequality to be satisfied. In such cases, the princi-
pal’s problem becomes designing the wage scheme which implements effort aH at
the lowest cost.7 In contrast, assuming that A is continuous involves taking the
first-order approach, whereby (6) is replaced by its first-order condition. Letting
A be continuous can be advantageous, since it allows for an analysis of how the
principal’s optimal effort choice changes with the parameters of the model. Ho-
wever, ensuring concavity of the agent’s problem often requires placing restrictive
conditions on the performance measure.
Next, we outline three common approaches to modelling the performance me-
asure:
1. Discrete; X = {x1, ..., xn} for some n ∈ N. The probability of observing a
particular xi is then given by p(xi; a), with
∑n
i=1 p(xi; a) = 1, ∀a ∈ A.
2. Continuous;
(a) X = [x, x] ⊆ R. In this case, the random variable x ∈ X is distributed
according to the function F (x; a) with associated density f(x; a).
(b) X = (−∞,+∞), with x = a+, where the random variable  ∼ (0, σ2)
according to the distribution function G(x; a).
The simplest possible approach is to assume a binary performance measure, so
that X = {xL, xH}. This allows for an examination of the fundamentals of the
moral hazard problem, while significantly simplifying analysis. Indeed, many of
the important findings of the literature can be illustrated within this basic fra-
mework. However, since the number of possible payments a wage scheme can
specify is limited by the cardinality of X , the contract offered by the principal
in this case will necessarily be binary. This precludes an investigation into the
optimal contractual form in a given environment. For this purpose, many authors
assume that the performance measure is either discrete with an arbitrary (but
finite) number of possible realisations, or continuous with outcomes being distri-
buted over an interval. However, while these assumptions allow for a derivation
7Note that since aL minimises the agent’s effort costs here, it can be implemented by paying
a constant wage.
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of many interesting properties of the optimal wage scheme, they tend to require
strong assumptions regarding the distribution of outcomes and typically one is
still unable to solve for general explicit solutions.
The final approach we consider therefore assumes a continuous measure of
performance but imposes further structure by specifying that x = a + , where
 is a random error term which is often assumed to be normally distributed.
By making further assumptions, such as constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
utility and restricting attention to linear contracts, authors can then derive closed-
form solutions. This is particularly useful for extensions and applications, such
as contracting in the presence of multiple agents or multitasking.
In the remainder of this section, we first consider the basic model when the
agent is risk neutral and has unlimited liability. We then move onto two key
insights of the literature: the rent vs. efficiency trade-off when the agent is
financially constrained and the insurance vs. efficiency trade-off when the agent
is averse to risk.
2.2 Risk Neutrality and Unlimited Liability
Consider a model in which effort is continuous, with A = R+, while the perfor-
mance measure is binary so that X = {xL, xH}. The probability of xH being
realised is denoted by the increasing concave function p(a), with p(0) = 0, so that
the agent’s effort-choice problem is concave in a and the first-order approach is
valid. Let wH and wL respectively denote the wage to be paid when the signals
xH and xL are realised. The principal’s problem then becomes:
max
a,wH , wL
v(a)− p(a)wH − [1− p(a)]wL (9)
a ∈ arg max
aˆ
p(aˆ)wH + [1− p(aˆ)]wL − c(aˆ) (10)
p(a)wH + [1− p(a)]wL − c(a) ≥ 0 (11)
where we have assumed U = 0 for simplicity. Setting the derivative of (10) equal
to zero and rearranging yields:
wH − wL = c
′(a)
p′(a)
(12)
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Next, note that the principal wishes to set wL as low as possible while still ensuring
the agent’s participation; this implies that (11) will bind, so that:
wL = c(a)− p(a) c
′(a)
p′(a)
(13)
Letting wL = wL(a), note that our restrictions on c(·) and p(·) imply that wL(0) =
0 and w′L < 0, so that this fixed payment becomes negative for positive effort
levels.8 Inserting (12) and (13) into the principal’s objective function (9) then
yields the following simplified problem:
max
a
v(a)− c(a) (14)
so that the principal’s costs of implementation are equal to the effort costs of the
agent, identical to the full information case. Intuitively, the principal is able to
provide appropriate effort incentives by making the wage spread sufficiently large.
Holding this wage spread constant, since there are no restrictions on the available
wage payments, the principal can reduce the lower payment until the expected
wage is exactly equal to the agent’s effort costs (plus any outside option). A
risk neutral agent does not need to be compensated for wage uncertainty and is
therefore still willing to accept the contract. Clearly, since the principal’s costs
of implementing any effort level are equal to those of the full information case,
first-best effort aFB will continue to be induced.
Before we continue, we pause to make two remarks regarding the performance
measure. First, note that while it seems intuitive that the principal will benefit
from access to ‘better’ signals, our analysis implies that in this environment she
can achieve her first-best profit level using any binary signal which satisfies our
restrictions, regardless of how weakly related it is to the agent’s effort provision.9
Second, in environments where the performance measure has many realisations,
our analysis also implies that the principal cannot improve her payoff by offering
a contract with more than two possible wages.10 As we shall see shortly, this is
no longer the case when the agent is risk averse.
8Taking the derivative of (13) yields:
dwL
da
= c′
pp′′
p′p′
− c′′ p
p′
< 0
9One way to formalise this analysis would be to consider the effort elasticity of p(·), as in
Demougin and Fluet (2001). One can show that even as this elasticity tends to zero, the first-
best can still be implemented. However, the wage spread required to induce the desired effort
becomes unbounded, so that wL → −∞.
10In fact, in such environments the principal’s optimal contract can usually take many different
forms. See also Demougin and Fluet (1998).
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2.3 Risk Neutrality and Limited Liability
We now consider our previous example, but further assume that the agent is fi-
nancially constrained so that the principal can only offer non-negative wages. In
our environment, the additional constraint (8) then takes the form: wH , wL ≥ 0.
Since the incentive compatibility constraint is unchanged, we proceed as before
and solve for the necessary wage spread to induce effort a, which again yields (12).
The principal again wishes to set wL as low as possible while ensuring participa-
tion. However, we previously found that (13) becomes negative for positive effort
levels, which violates the limited liability constraints. Accordingly, the principal
sets wL = 0, meaning that the agent’s participation constraint will no longer
bind.11 Substituting into (9), the principal’s problem then becomes:
max
a
v(a)− c′(a) p(a)
p′(a)
(15)
The principal’s costs of implementing effort a with a financially constrained agent
are therefore represented by the second term in (15), c′(a) p(a)p′(a) . The difference
between these costs and the agent’s effort costs represents a rent paid to the agent,
which we denote by R(a) = p(a) c
′(a)
p′(a) − c(a). It is straightforward to show that
this rent is both positive for a > 0 and increasing in effort.12 Accordingly, in
the presence of limited liability, there is a divergence between the agent’s effort
costs and the principal’s costs of implementing this effort. When deciding on
the effort level to be induced, the principal must now take into account not only
the marginal effort costs c′, but also the marginal rent R′ which must be paid
to the agent. Typically, this trade-off between efficiency and rent leads to an
underprovision of effort relative to the first best level, with the solution to (15)
referred to as the second-best effort level and denoted by aSB.
2.4 Risk Aversion
The study of incentive provision with risk averse agents has received significant
attention in the moral hazard literature. As an introduction, we consider the
foregoing environment with continuous effort and a binary performance measure,
although we only provide an informal analysis. We revert to our original assump-
tion that the principal faces no constraints on the wage payments that can be
offered.
11Note that this is not necessarily the case if the agent’s outside option is sufficiently large.
12To see this, first note that R(0) = 0 due to our restrictions on p(·) and c(·). Next, taking
the derivative yields:
R′ = c′′
p
p′
− c′ pp
′′
p′p′
> 0
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Since under moral hazard the performance signal is imperfectly correlated with
effort, the provision of incentives necessarily introduces risk into the agent’s wage.
While we found that this was not an issue when the agent was risk neutral, this is
no longer the case with risk aversion. Intuitively, in order to induce participation,
the principal must pay an expected wage which covers not only the agent’s effort
costs and outside option, but also his costs of bearing risk. Typically, since the
wage spread between the payments wH and wL is increasing in the amount of
effort to be induced, this so-called risk premium will also be increasing in a.
Accordingly, when deciding on the effort to be implemented, the principal must
take into account the marginal effects on both the agent’s effort costs and risk
premium. Similar to the foregoing case with limited liability, this creates a trade-
off between efficiency and insurance which will typically lead to the underprovision
of effort.
We next turn our attention to a more complex environment, with a continuous
performance measure so that X = [x, x]. It is assumed that x is distributed
according to the function F (x; a), with associated density f(x; a). The principal’s
optimisation problem then becomes:
max
a,w(x)
v(a)−
∫ x
x
w(x)f(x; a) dx (16)
a ∈ arg max
aˆ
∫ x
x
u(w(x))f(x; aˆ) dx− c(aˆ) (17)
∫ x
x
u(w(x))f(x; a) dx− c(a) ≥ U (18)
As previously discussed, it is standard to replace the agent’s optimisation problem
(17) with its first-order condition:∫ x
x
u(w(x))fa(x; a) dx− c′(a) = 0 (19)
However, this method is generally invalid unless we place some restrictions on
the distribution function F (x; a). Rogerson (1985) shows that two conditions in
particular are sufficient to guarantee validity of the first-order approach. First,
the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) requires that:
∂
∂x
[
fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
]
> 0, ∀x ∈ (x, x) (20)
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Second, the strict Convexity of the Distribution Condition (CDFC) states that:
Faa(x; a) > 0, ∀x ∈ (x, x) (21)
We assume that F (x; a) satisfies both of these properties and, as such, replace (17)
with its first-order condition (19).13 Pointwise optimisation of the Lagrangian
associated with the principal’s maximisation problem yields the following first-
order condition with respect to w(x):
1
u′(w(x))
= λ
fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
+ µ (22)
where λ and µ are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the incentive compa-
tibility and participation constraints, respectively. Holmstro¨m (1979) shows that
both constraints will bind, so that λ, µ > 0. The optimal wage scheme is then
characterised by (22) for all x ∈ [x, x], along with (18) and (19). Our assumption
of MLRP guarantees that the RHS of (22) is strictly increasing in x. This, along
with risk aversion of the agent (u′′ < 0), implies that the optimal wage scheme also
is strictly increasing in x, so that outcomes which are indicative of higher effort
are rewarded with strictly larger payments. In fact, while we have only considered
a single performance measure here, the optimal contract will condition payments
on any signal which reveals information about the agent’s effort. As such, the
wage scheme should be contingent on many different variables if they are each
able to improve estimates of effort provision. This finding, which is perhaps the
most important in the moral hazard literature, is known as the sufficient statistic
result (Holmstro¨m, 1979).
Intuitively, conditioning payment on some relevant piece of information allows
for a better estimate of the agent’s effort and therefore reduces the risk inherent
in the relationship, allowing for a lower risk premium. Accordingly, optimally
filtering out risk requires making wages contingent on all such information. In
the limit, as the inclusion of a large number of variables allows the principal to
infer the agent’s effort with certainty, the required risk premium reduces to zero
and the first best effort can be implemented at no extra cost (Macho-Stadler and
Pe´rez-Castrillo, 2018).
2.5 Risk Aversion and Multiple Agents
The sufficient statistic result has particularly interesting implications for incentive
provision when a principal employs multiple agents. The central question here
relates to whether incentive payments to an individual should depend on the
13MLRP and CDFC are strong conditions and as a result it is difficult to find distribution
functions which satisfy both properties. See LiCalzi and Spaeter (2003) for some examples.
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performance of other agents, as well as his own. Moreover, if so, should wages be
increasing or decreasing in the performance of others?
To explore these issues, we consider a continuous effort environment (A = R+)
in which a principal wishes to employ two identical agents, denoted by 1 and 2,
to undertake a specific effort level a. The principal has access to a performance
measure for each agent i = 1, 2, which takes the form xi = ai + i, where i
is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and a variance of σ2.
In addition, the covariance between the two error terms, 1 and 2, is denoted
by σ12.
14 The utility functions of agents are now assumed to take the constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) form:
U(w, a) = −e−ρ[w−c(a)] (23)
where ρ > 0 is the agent’s coefficient of risk aversion. Finally, we restrict our
attention to wages which are linear in performance measures for each agent:
wi = η + γxi + δxj (24)
Given these assumptions, maximisation of expected utility is equivalent to
maximisation of the certainty equivalent, which can be expressed as:
CEi(ai) = η + γai + δaj − c(ai)− ρ
2
[
γ2σ2 + δ2σ2 + 2γδσ12
]
(25)
where the final term measures the agent’s disutility from exposure to risk.15 The
agent will choose the effort level ai which maximises (25). Rearranging the first-
order condition yields γ = c′(ai); by assuming that c(·) takes a specific functional
form we can therefore obtain an explicit solution for γ. Note that compensating
the agent based on the performance of others has no impact on incentives. In fact,
since participation can be ensured by appropriately adjusting the fixed payment
η, the principal will set δ with the sole objective of minimising the agent’s risk
exposure in order to relax the participation constraint. Accordingly, minimisation
of the final term of (25) yields:
δ = −γ σ12
σ2
(26)
Since γ, σ2 > 0, δ will take the opposite sign to σ12. We first consider the case
where σ12 > 0, so that the error terms of Agents 1 and 2 are positively correlated,
14Note that our analysis considers an informational linkage between the performance of agents,
since error terms are correlated. A different rationale for remunerating agents based on the per-
formance of others occurs when there is a technological linkage, so that one agent’s performance
depends upon the effort provision of another. See Holmstro¨m (1982) and Mookherjee (1984).
15See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a detailed derivation in a similar model.
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in which case δ < 0 and an agent’s wage is therefore decreasing in the perfor-
mance of the other agent. This is known in the literature as relative performance
evaluation (RPE). Intuitively, observing a high measure of performance for Agent
1 suggests that the error term 1 is positive. Since σ12 > 0, it is then likely that
2 is also positive. Similarly, a low measure of performance for Agent 1 is sug-
gestive of a negative 2. The sufficient statistic result therefore implies that the
realisation of x1 should be incorporated into the wage scheme of Agent 2, since
it is informative about 2 and can therefore be used to improve the estimate of
Agent 2’s effort provision. By penalising Agent 2 as the performance of Agent 1
increases, but rewarding him as it decreases, the principal is able to reduce the
variance of Agent 2’s wage and therefore reduce the necessary risk premium. In
fact, in the limit as ρ → 1 and the two error terms become perfectly correlated,
each agent’s performance becomes affected by a single, common source of noise;
by filtering out this shock the principal is able to eliminate exposure to risk and
thus approximate first-best incentives.
The above discussion therefore highlights that the benefit of RPE is not to
induce competition between agents, but to reduce the risk inherent in the rela-
tionship, as argued by Holmstro¨m (1982). Indeed, when ρ = 0, the optimal δ
is also equal to zero and wage schemes become independent. In this case, since
there is no correlation between error terms, conditioning an agent’s remuneration
on the performance of others would actually increase risk exposure and therefore
provides no benefit. Finally, there may also exist environments in which ρ < 0 so
that error terms are negatively correlated, in which case δ > 0 and, for similar
reasons, a form of team contracting in which agents are rewarded for the high
performance of coworkers becomes optimal.16
3 Behavioural Models
3.1 Other-Regarding Preferences and Inequity Aversion
3.1.1 Introduction
The notion that preferences typically feature a social component is perhaps best
illustrated by experimental findings from two simple, two-player games: the ul-
timatum game and the dictator game. In both games, one player (the proposer)
decides how a fixed surplus should be shared between the two players. In the
former game, the other player (the responder) faces a choice between accepting
16Our analysis considered the optimal contract required in order to induce a given effort level,
a. However, by reducing the risk exposure of agents, basing remuneration on the performance
of others can mitigate the insurance vs. incentives problem considered previously and lead the
principal to implement higher levels of effort.
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the proposed division or destroying the entire surplus so that both players have
a zero payoff. In the latter game, the offer can only be accepted. The classical
approach predicts that in both games the proposer will end up with (almost) the
entire surplus.17 However, experimental evidence from several different countries,
with stakes of various magnitudes, have found the following consistent regulari-
ties. First, in the ultimatum game, low offers are often rejected by the responder,
demonstrating a willingness to forego individual wealth in order to reduce the
payoff of the opponent. Perhaps in anticipation of this, low offers are rare, so
that proposers often offer high shares of the surplus. Second — and perhaps even
more surprisingly — in the dictator game, some proposers offer positive shares;
that is, they are willing to reduce their own income in order to increase the payoff
of their opponent.
Beyond these two games, there is a large amount of additional evidence —
both experimental and empirical — that individuals care about the payoffs of
others.18 In response, economists have developed a number of theoretical models
in order to formalise such preferences. Loosely speaking, they can be separated
into two distinct classes of models.19
The first class contains models of intentions-based reciprocity, whereby indivi-
duals care about the intentions of others. In this approach, agents who feel that
they have been treated kindly by a peer wish to return the favour, while those
who feel they have been treated poorly prefer to hurt the peer. Such models
therefore account for the intricate nature of social concerns. However, since an
agent’s utility then depends on their beliefs about the intentions of others, the
reciprocity approach must utilise psychological game theory, as developed by Gea-
nakoplos et al. (1989), rather than employing standard game theoretical tools. As
such, these models become fairly complex even in simple environments, generally
feature multiplicity of equilibria and are therefore often ill-suited for predictive
purposes or economic applications (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
In the second class of models, those which consider social preferences, an
individual’s utility function is assumed to depend directly on both their own payoff
and the payoffs of others within some relevant reference group. Different models
of social preferences vary in the way in which the individual’s utility depends on
17This is clear in the dictator game, since offers cannot be rejected and therefore a purely
self-interested individual should choose to claim the entire surplus. For the ultimatum game,
depending upon the specifics of the environment, the responder will either i) accept all offers or
ii) accept all offers weakly above the lowest possible strictly positive offer,  > 0. The proposer
should therefore offer either 0 or  to the responder; see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for a more
detailed discussion.
18See for example the survey article of Fehr and Schmidt (2006), who also discuss neuroeco-
nomic evidence.
19Fehr and Schmidt (2006) consider a third class of models, in which individuals have social
preferences which vary depending on the reference group with which they interact.
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the outcomes of others. For instance, models of altruistic agents assume that an
individual’s utility is always increasing in the payoffs of others, whereas the utility
of spiteful agents is always decreasing in these payoffs (see for example Levine,
1998). We will focus on one model of social preferences in particular: inequity
aversion, as developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in which individuals have a
preference for fair and equitable allocations.20 This implies that an agent’s utility,
in contrast to the aforementioned models, can either be increasing or decreasing
in the payoffs of others, depending on whether these changes move the resulting
allocation closer to or further away from the equitable ideal. As shown by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), even a simple formalisation of such preferences allows for a
unifying explanation of a wide range of seemingly contradictory phenomena.
In this subsection, we briefly present the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequity
aversion before discussing two issues which are particularly important when con-
sidering other-regarding preferences within firms.21 First, what is the relevant
social reference group for an individual within an organisation? Second, do com-
parisons focus only on monetary outcomes, or should they also incorporate the
extent to which agents undertake productive effort?
3.1.2 The Fehr and Schmidt Model of Inequity Aversion
Let us initially consider an environment which features two agents, i and j, each
of whom have incomes which are denoted by wi and wj respectively. The Fehr
and Schmidt specification assumes that Agent i’s preferences can be represented
by the utility function:
ui(wi, wj) = wi − αi max {wj − wi, 0} − βi max {wi − wj , 0} (27)
The first term measures standard consumption utility, where risk neutrality is
assumed for simplicity. The second and third terms measure the disutility from
disadvantageous and advantageous inequity, respectively. Agent i’s income is
compared with that of Agent j. If wj > wi, then Agent i is behind and suffers
from disadvantageous inequity, or feelings of envy. The utility loss is equal to
the size of the difference in incomes, multiplied by the coefficient of envy, αi ≥ 0.
Incorporation of this term into the utility function can account for the rejection
of positive offers by the responder in the ultimatum game: while accepting the
20A similar model is presented by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), although there are some key
differences. Models of this type are sometimes referred to as inequality aversion, reflecting the
notion that in many environments the most fair or equitable allocation involves equality between
the payoffs of individuals. An axiomatic foundation to the Fehr and Schmidt model is provided
by Neilson (2006).
21Throughout, we slightly abuse terminology and interchangeably use the terms inequity averse
and other-regarding to describe preferences which are characterised by envy, compassion, status-
seeking, or some combination of these.
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Figure 1: The variation in the function ui(wi, wj), as defined by (27), as wi and
wj change (LHS and RHS, respectively). When wi = wj = w, there is no loss in
utility from inequity and u(w,w) = w.
offer would increase the responder’s income and associated monetary utility, the
resulting allocation may result in feelings of envy which make rejecting the offer
preferable.
Alternatively, if wi > wj , then Agent i is ahead and experiences feelings of
advantageous inequity or compassion.22 Similarly, βi ≥ 0 is the coefficient of
compassion, which is multiplied by the income difference to yield the utility loss in
this case. The inclusion of compassion into the utility function can explain positive
offers by the proposer in the dictator game, since the inequality associated with
claiming the entire surplus leads to a utility loss which can outweigh the increase
in utility from a higher payoff. Clearly, when incomes are equal and wi = wj = w,
then the second and third terms are both zero and ui(w,w) = w. Figure 1 plots
(27), showing how utility changes with variations in both wi and wj .
The functional form proposed by Fehr and Schmidt is designed to capture ine-
quity concerns in the simplest possible way. In the literature, several authors have
either extended or modified (27) in order to provide a more realistic description
of individual preferences. It is straightforward to allow for classical risk aversion
by replacing the first term in (27) with m(wi), where m(·) is an increasing con-
cave function as standard. In addition, the assumption of piecewise linearity for
inequity concerns can often cause the model to make extreme predictions. For
instance, in the dictator game, an individual with β < 0.5 will choose to take the
entire surplus while an individual with β > 0.5 will choose to equally divide the
surplus. Hence all offers are either very fair, or very unfair; the intermediate offers
which are often observed in the data are ruled out. As noted by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), this can be remedied by assuming that inequity concerns are captured by
a non-linear function, an approach which is furthered by several authors in the
22Various terminology has been utilised in the literature to denote advantageous (compassion,
guilt, empathy) and disadvantageous (envy, jealousy) inequity concerns. For consistency and
simplicity, we use the terms envy and compassion throughout, but emphasise that this usage
is not intended to convey any connotations regarding the underlying source of the emotions
associated with a distaste for inequitable outcomes.
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literature.23
The Fehr and Schmidt model implies that social comparisons enter into the
utility function ex post, so that an agent only suffers if any potential inequity
actually arises. Some authors deviate from this and model inequity concerns as
entering ex ante. Intuitively, this implies that agents suffer from the exposure to
the possibility of inequity, even if such outcomes are not actually realised. For
instance in the framework of Bartling (2011), such an approach allows for risk
aversion over wages but risk neutrality over inequity, which he notes that, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, is a possible modelling choice.
It makes sense to impose some restrictions on βi, the coefficient of compassion.
Suppose that wi > wj ; an agent with βi > 1 would prefer in this situation to
dispose of or burn money in order to reduce inequity, since compassion in this
case is a stronger motivator for the agent than income. This seems unrealistic.
Accordingly, Fehr and Schmidt assume that βi ≤ 1 throughout, so that in all
cases the marginal utility of money will be (at least weakly) positive.24 They
also assume that βi ≤ αi, so that an individual’s inequity concerns are at least
as pronounced when they are behind as when they are ahead. There is strong
evidence for the validity of this assumption, which implies that individuals are
loss averse in social comparisons (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). An upper bound for
the coefficient of envy αi is not imposed, however, and they suggest that some
individuals may have preferences which are most consistent with αi ≈ 4 or higher.
While it is explicitly assumed that βi ≥ 0, Fehr and Schmidt do note that
there will be some situations whereby βi < 0, so that individuals gain utility
from advantageous inequity and actually prefer to be ahead of others. We follow
the literature — in which such cases are often allowed for — and refer to these
preferences as status seeking.25 Frank (1985) provides extensive evidence that
individuals care deeply about which positions they occupy in income hierarchies,
while more generally Fershtman (2008) surveys the role of social status within
economics. Fershtman et al. (2012) find evidence that the norms induced by the
environment will typically influence whether people like or dislike advantageous
inequity.
The above discussion highlights two more general points. First, Fehr and
Schmidt emphasise that the extent of inequity aversion will be heterogeneous be-
tween individuals and provide some examples of possible distributions (see also
23Note that this approach can also eliminate the non-differentiability of the function when
wi = wj , simplifying applications of the model.
24Note that in this situation, while an agent with 0.5 < βi < 1 would not wish to burn money,
they would be willing to transfer some of their payoff to the other agent in order to reduce
inequality. Accordingly, some authors make the stronger assumption that βi ≤ 0.5.
25Alternative terminology for such preferences found in the literature includes competitiveness,
spitefulness and pride.
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Fischbacher and Gachter, 2010 and the references therein). In fact, evidence sug-
gests that there may be systematic differences in aversion to inequity depending
on characteristics. Numerous papers have shown that Western Europeans have a
stronger preference for more equal income distributions compared to the United
States (see for instance Alesina et al., 2004), while Kuhn and Villeval (2015) find
evidence consistent with women having stronger dislike of advantageous inequity
than men. Second, the strength and nature of an individual’s social preferences
cannot be thought of as fixed values which are robust to all situations and envi-
ronments. As we will discuss subsequently, evidence suggests that an individual’s
aversion to inequity will vary depending on factors such as the social context and
the composition of the reference group.
We now consider the more general case of an environment with N agents in
the reference group. Let the income vector of all other agents be denoted by w−i;
the utility function of Agent i then takes the following form:
ui(wi, w−i) = wi − αi 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max {wj − wi, 0}
− βi 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max {wi − wj , 0} (28)
Agent i makes a pairwise comparison of his income with each other agent in
the reference group. When he is ahead of another agent, he experiences compas-
sion; when he is behind, he experiences envy. The overall loss from utility will
encompass a mix of these feelings. Notably, the agent’s inequity is self-centred
in the sense that he does not care about inequitable outcomes between others in
the reference group, but solely on how his own payoff compares to those of ot-
hers. Alternative approaches have been explored in the literature. For example,
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) present a model of inequity aversion in which agents
prefer to be as close as possible to the average of all other agents in the reference
group. This can lead to conflicting predictions between the two models. Sup-
pose that N = 3 and the payoff vector is (w1, w2, w3) = (0, 100, 50). Under Fehr
and Schmidt preferences, Agent 3 suffers disutility both from being £50 ahead
of Agent 1 and from being £50 behind Agent 2. In contrast, under the Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) specification there is no utility loss, since Agent 3’s payoff
is exactly equal to the average payoff of Agents 1 and 2. Engelmann and Strobel
(2004) design a series of experiments to compare the models and find that the
Fehr and Schmidt specification generally outperforms that of Bolton and Ocken-
fels, while Buckingham and Alicke (2002) find evidence that social comparisons
with individuals are stronger than those with averages.
There are, of course, alternatives. For example, agents might limit their com-
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parisons to salient others within the reference group, such as those who have the
highest or lowest payoffs; in this case it is the maximum level of inequity between
an agent and others in the group which is important.
While there is little evidence of which specification is generally most appro-
priate, the modelling choice will often have important implications for economic
applications. However, for our purpose, the vast majority of papers in the litera-
ture study simplified models in which the reference group is made up of two single
agents. Accordingly, each individual compares their payoff to that of one single
other, so that all the previously mentioned specifications become qualitatively
similar.
Finally, note that inequity concerns in the Fehr and Schmidt model are weig-
hted by the term 1N−1 , so that the overall coefficient of disutility from inequity
remains constant as the reference group expands or contracts. There is very little
evidence regarding the accuracy of this assumption, with some authors taking an
alternative approach (e.g. Goel and Thakor, 2006).
3.1.3 What is the correct reference group?
In many situations, it is not exactly clear how the relevant reference group should
be defined. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that it will depend upon factors such
as the social context, the saliency of particular individuals and social proximity.
The institutional environment in which interaction takes place is also likely to play
a key role. In the context of a labour relationship, there are numerous possible
candidates. Within the firm, a worker might compare their wage with others in
the same team, others who have a similar role or with all workers at a comparable
level. They may even make vertical pay comparisons with either management
or subordinates. Beyond the firm, the reference group might include those in
similar roles at different firms, friends, family or neighbours. Workers may even
be interested in their wage relative to industry-wide or national averages.
Several authors have noted that there is scarce scientific evidence on this is-
sue. Experimental evidence provides little guidance here, since in the laboratory
reference groups will be largely determined by the experimental design. However,
the question is important in our context since there are subtle implications for
principal-agent models. For instance, in the standard approach to incentive con-
tracting, it is common to model an agent’s outside utility as being exogenously
given and fixed. When agents have other-regarding preferences, however, this
assumption essentially implies that the agent no longer makes social comparisons
when he is not employed by the firm.26
26This is particularly important when undertaking a comparative static analysis. To see this,
note that for a given contract, an increase in the strength of an agent’s other-regarding preferences
will often ceteris paribus lead to a loss in utility. In cases where the outside utility is exogenously
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The prevailing approach in the literature has been to continue to make this
assumption and therefore assume that the reference group is limited to cowor-
kers.27 There are some arguments to support this approach. Festinger (1954)
develops a theory of social comparison in which the tendency of individuals to
compare themselves to others becomes stronger as the relevant referents become
more similar. Accordingly, given a range of possible referents, individuals will tend
to choose those who are considered to be equals. A similar argument has been
made specifically with respect to envy; Elster (1991) quotes Aristotle (Rhetoric,
1388a), who argues that “we envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or
reputation.” Both Adams (1963) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988) have noted that
coworkers will often satisfy this criteria better than others. The issue has also
received significant attention in the organisational psychology literature, where
the related matter of information availability has also been explored (Kulik and
Ambrose, 1992). Intuitively, the extent of comparisons with others will necessarily
depend on how much of the relevant information is available to an individual.
Some interesting empirical support comes from cases of mergers and acquisi-
tions, where expansions in the boundary of the firm can lead to changes in the
relevant reference group. Both Williamson (1985) and Kole and Lehn (2000) pro-
vide case studies of mergers which failed in part due to the need to ensure internal
equity between newly integrated workforces. Similarly, Demougin et al. (2006)
document initial difficulties in the merger between Daimler Benz and Chrysler
Corporation due to pay disparity between senior executives, necessitating signifi-
cant pay increases in order to reduce inequalities. While most of these intra-firm
social comparisons are assumed to be horizontal (i.e. with comparable coworkers
such as members of the same team), there is also some evidence for vertical com-
parisons, whereby workers show concern for the pay of managers. For example,
Englmaier and Wambach (2010) describe the unrest at American Airlines in 2003
when large wage cuts were imposed upon workers in order to avoid bankruptcy,
but the pay of executives was left unchanged.
Despite the prevalence of the assumption that the reference group is limited
to those within the firm, there does exist some evidence to suggest that this may
not always be the case. Clark and Oswald (1996) provide empirical evidence that
happiness at work is significantly negatively correlated with a comparison income,
calculated by predicting the typical income of someone with the individual’s obser-
vable characteristics. Similarly, Luttmer (2005) finds that self-reported happiness
is decreasing in the earnings of neighbours, defined as those who live in the same
given and the participation constraint is initially binding, this utility loss implies that the agent
now prefers to reject the contract. However, this is not necessarily the case if the agent’s outside
utility also varies with the parameter(s). Accordingly, the impact on the principal’s costs can
depend upon which modelling specification is chosen.
27A notable exception is Goel and Thakor (2006).
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locality, each of which has a population of 150,000 on average. Surprisingly, the
findings suggest that similar sized increases in own earnings and reductions in the
earnings of neighbours each lead to a fall in happiness of approximately the same
magnitude.28 Babcock et al. (1996) provide evidence that during the course of
wage bargaining between teacher’s unions and school boards, parties make use of
reference wages from schools in comparable districts.
A common justification for assuming that the reference group is limited to
comparisons within the firm comes from the survey evidence of Bewley (1998,
2004), which suggests that employees know little about pay rates at other com-
panies. However, lacking knowledge of the wages of others does not preclude
comparisons based on estimations. Moreover, while information about wages at a
particular firm may indeed be sparse, individuals may have reasonable knowledge
of industry averages, especially if labour unions promote awareness of pay rates in
order to stimulate the interest of members (Bewley, 2004). Additionally, in recent
years there has been a movement towards wage transparency (Mas, 2017).
Finally, even if we are able to pin down exactly which others will constitute the
reference group in a given environment, its composition may have a significant im-
pact on concerns for inequity. Loewenstein et al. (1989) provide evidence that the
degree of inequity aversion shown by individuals varies both with the relationship
to the relevant other (positive, neutral or negative) and the social context of the
interaction (business or personal). Casciaro and Lobo (2008) document psycholo-
gical evidence on the reciprocity of perceived liking; similarly, it is likely that the
extent to which individuals exhibit other-regarding preferences (and compassion
in particular) will depend in part upon how they feel this would be reciprocated
following alternative, counterfactual outcomes. Different corporate cultures and
hiring policies will thus also contribute to variations in the prevalence of inequity
concerns between organisations (Englmaier and Wambach, 2010).
3.1.4 What is the correct comparison?
In the Fehr and Schmidt model, agents make unidimensional comparisons of mo-
netary payoffs with one another. However, when studying incentive contracting,
there is the possibility that agents incorporate effort provision when considering
equitable outcomes. The approaches in the literature we review are varied. Some
authors model agents as simply comparing wages with one another, while others
assume that the comparison is between wages net of effort costs, so called net
wages.
Evidence suggests that the latter specification may be more realistic in at least
28See also the studies discussed in the introduction to this thesis; Clark et al. (2008) offer a
survey of this literature.
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some environments. Equity Theory is a social psychological theory of fairness
which has its roots in the work of Aristotle and proposes that the fair or equitable
ratio of outcomes is proportional to the ratio of inputs (Konow, 2003). Adams
(1965) argues that feelings of inequity arise when an individual perceives their
ratio of outcomes and inputs to be unbalanced relative to others, resulting in
unpleasant emotional states such as dissatisfaction, anger or guilt. In our context,
this theory suggests that individuals will take both wages (outcomes) and effort
(inputs) into consideration when making social comparisons.
Experimentally, in dictator games in which the surplus to be divided is de-
pendent on production in a prior stage, researchers have found that proposers
offer more to those who were more productive and as such contributed more to
the surplus (see for instance Frohlich et al., 2004). Further evidence comes from
Abeler et al. (2010), who conduct a gift-exchange experiment in which a principal
observes the effort of two agents and decides on appropriate wage payments. They
find that effort provision is substantially lower when the principal must pay equal
wages, compared to the case where wage differentiation is allowed. In the case
of imposed wage equality, agents who initially undertake higher effort than their
coworker get discouraged and subsequently reduce their effort, consistent with the
notion that workers perceive equal pay for unequal work as being unfair.
However, the nature of comparisons may be context dependent. Researchers
in social psychology have found evidence which suggests that the way in which
individuals compare tends to be biased in a self-serving manner. For instance,
workers who exert higher effort than others will compare net wages and also view
wages proportional to effort as being fair. In contrast, those who exert lower effort
than others will compare only wages and believe that a fair wage pays workers
equally (see Neilson and Stowe, 2010 and the references therein). In addition,
when comparisons are multidimensional — such as wages and effort, or wages
and job perks — agents may focus on the dimension in which they are worse off
(Goel and Thakor, 2006).
As a final remark, one might also question the extent to which workers are
able to make any form of wage comparisons with colleagues, since many firms have
wage secrecy policies. However, in these cases there is evidence to suggest that
individuals continue to make comparisons based on estimations, with a tendency
to overestimate the wages of others resulting in heightened perceptions of inequity
(see for instance Mahoney and Weitzel, 1978). With respect to effort considerati-
ons, clearly comparisons will be easier (and therefore likely be more salient) when
individuals work closely with one another and can readily observe each other’s
behaviour. It follows that the majority of papers which consider team production
model agents as incorporating both wages and effort into their comparisons.
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3.2 Prospect Theory, Reference-Dependent Preferences and Loss
Aversion
3.2.1 Introduction
To this day, the most commonly applied model of decision making under risk in
economics is expected utility theory, despite there existing a wealth of laboratory
evidence that people’s behaviour systematically violates its predictions. In re-
sponse to some of these inconsistencies, Kahneman and Tversky in their seminal
1979 paper developed a new model of decision making named prospect theory,
which was able to explain much of this evidence and remains widely seen as the
best available description of risk preferences (Barberis, 2013).29 Prospect theory
has four key features which distinguish it from the standard model:
i) Reference-dependence. Individuals are assumed to evaluate outcomes rela-
tive to some reference point r, so that we have u(w; r).
ii) Loss aversion. Individuals are more sensitive to losses (outcomes below the
reference point) compared to gains (outcomes above the reference point) of
the same magnitude.
iii) Diminishing sensitivity. Individuals are much more sensitive to variations
in outcomes when they are close to the reference point. Mathematically,
this implies that marginal utilities are decreasing as we move further away
from the reference point. Accordingly, the utility function is convex in the
loss region and concave in the gain region. Individuals are then risk seeking
for losses, but risk averse for gains.
iv) Probability weighting. Individuals do not weight outcomes by their objective
probabilities, but rather by transformed subjective probabilities or decision
weights. In particular, they tend to overweight low probability events, while
underweighting high probability events.
The first three of these features represent a departure from the utility function of
standard economic theory, which is usually considered to be reference independent
and everywhere (weakly) concave.30 The fourth feature implies a movement away
from the linear probabilities of expected utility theory. Together, these properties
29For a more detailed description, see the original 1979 article or the updated version of the
model, also known as Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Barberis
(2013) provides a simple introduction, before reviewing some of the ways the ideas of prospect
theory have been applied to economic settings.
30It is noteworthy that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory as having a
value function, often denoted v(·), rather than a utility function denoted by u(·). This convention
is largely followed in much of the following literature. For the sake of clarity, however, we continue
to use the terminology utility function and as such use the notation u(·).
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can account for a number of results which are inconsistent with the classical
model. For instance, Rabin (2000) shows that the standard theory cannot explain
observed attitudes to risk over small-stake gambles. Suppose an individual turns
down a 50-50 bet between losing £100 and gaining £110. Under the standard
model, aversion to risk arises solely due to diminishing marginal utility, leading to
concavity of the utility function. Since the aforementioned gamble has a positive
expected value, rejection implies that there is a significant degree of local curvature
around the current level of wealth. Now further suppose that the individual would
continue to turn down this gamble for all initial wealth levels. In this case, Rabin
(2000) shows that the classical theory implies 50-50 bets between losing £1000 and
gaining any sum of money would also be turned down. Intuitively, rejection of the
gamble at all wealth levels implies that the aforementioned significant curvature
is present everywhere, resulting in massive curvature when we begin to consider
large-stake gambles.
A similar argument comes from a famous observation by Samuelson (1963),
who offered a colleague a 50-50 bet between losing $100 and gaining $200. The
colleague rejected the bet, but claimed that if it was offered 100 times then he
would accept. Samuelson (1963) proved that such behaviour is inconsistent with
expected utility theory: an individual who rejects a given gamble would also reject
an aggregate gamble in which the bet is independently played multiple times. As
noted by Rabin (2000), however, the preferences of Samuelson’s colleague seem
very plausible. Many would reject the single bet. Yet the aggregate bet has an
expected value of $5000 with negligible risk of losing any money at all (1/700), so
that most individuals would surely accept it. A direct explanation for the modest
scale risk aversion described here comes from loss aversion, which can reconcile
significant levels of aversion to risk over small-stakes while maintaining plausible
degrees of risk aversion over larger stakes.
Beyond explaining attitudes toward risk, reference-dependent preferences have
been used to analyse topics such as the endowment effect (whereby there is a dis-
parity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a good; Kahneman
et al., 1991), the famous paradoxes of Allais (1953) (see Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) and negative wage-elasticities for labour supply decisions (Camerer et al.,
1997).31
In this subsection, we first explore the ways in which economic applicati-
ons have modelled the ideas of prospect theory, before considering a question of
key importance: in a given environment, how is an individual’s reference point
determined? Finally, we present the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) model of
31For surveys of applications of prospect theory and reference-dependent preferences to vari-
ous economic phenomena, see Camerer (2000), Barberis (2013) and O’Donoghue and Sprenger
(Forthcoming).
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Figure 2: The function u(w; 0) as defined by (29), with α = 0.5 and λ = 2.25.
expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, a recent development which
has received significant attention in the literature and inspired several important
economic applications.
3.2.2 Models of Reference-Dependent Preferences
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) use experimental evidence to provide an example
of a possible utility function for preferences under prospect theory. They first
assume that r = 0, which is consistent with the reference point being determined
by the status quo: all outcomes which leave the individual with higher wealth are
gains while all those which leave him with lower wealth are losses. Next, they
impose the functional form:
u(w; 0) =

−λ(−w)α w < 0
wα w ≥ 0
(29)
and estimate α = 0.88 and λ = 2.25. Figure 2 plots this function, with α = 0.5
chosen in order to accentuate the curvature below and above the reference point.
The parameter λ captures loss aversion and it is clear from the figure that
the function is steeper immediately below zero compared to immediately above.
Diminishing sensitivity is captured by α < 1; as we move further away from
the reference point in either direction, it can be seen that marginal utility is
diminishing, so that the function is convex below the reference point but concave
above. Kahneman (2003) argues that preferences can generally be approximated
fairly well by a function which takes the form of (29).
Most other studies which attempt to estimate the utility function under pro-
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spect theory use either experimental evidence, or evidence from field experiments
such as game shows as in Post et al. (2008). Estimations can take either a pa-
rametric or non-parametric approach; see the discussion in Booij et al. (2010)
for a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of each, as well as further
references to the literature. As noted by Abdellaoui et al. (2007), estimations in
particular for the coefficient of loss aversion λ are further complicated by the lack
of a commonly agreed definition in the literature. Most, however, relate to the ra-
tio of marginal utility for losses over the marginal utility for gains for one or many
outcomes and usually suggest that the utility function is between 1 and 3 times
steeper for outcomes below the reference point (see Table 1 in Abdellaoui et al.,
2007), with λ ≈ 2.25 often cited as being a reasonable approximation (Wakker,
2010). However, loss aversion is not homogeneous among individuals and some
studies suggest that those with certain characteristics will tend to be more averse
to losses. For instance, Booij and Van de Kuilen (2009) find that women and
those with lower levels of education are significantly more loss averse. Moreover,
as noted by Wakker (2010), loss aversion is volatile and depends heavily on fra-
ming. Accordingly, λ = 2.25 should not be viewed as a universal constant which
will prevail in any given situation. In fact, there is recent evidence to suggest that
loss aversion is by no means a universal trait: Goette et al. (2018) classify only
36% of their subjects as loss averse, with the remainder being either loss neutral
or loss loving.
While there is by now a large amount of evidence for each of the features of
prospect theory, there have been surprisingly few applications to economics. Bar-
beris (2013) argues that this is because it is difficult to know exactly how to apply
the theory, since it is not ready-made for such applications. Firstly, in many situ-
ations it is often not clear how exactly the reference point should be determined.
We shall return to this issue shortly. Secondly, application of the theory introduces
unwelcome additional mathematical complexity to economic models, for instance
due to the presence of both convexity and concavity, or due to the lack of diffe-
rentiability at the reference point. Accordingly, many of these applications limit
attention to specific features of the theory. For example, the incentive contracting
literature which we review subsequently entirely ignores the issue of probability
weighting. Instead, these applications focus solely on reference-dependence and
loss aversion, with some additionally considering diminishing sensitivity.
The most basic possible form assumes a utility function which is piecewise
34
Figure 3: The function u(w; r) as defined by (30), with λ = 2.25.
linear around the reference point:
u(w; r) =

λw − (λ− 1) r w < r
w w ≥ r
(30)
as is plotted by Figure 3. While this specification still suffers from the lack of
differentiability at r, it is everywhere (weakly) concave and the piecewise linear
structure significantly reduces mathematical complexity. This form can be ex-
tended by further assuming classical risk aversion (see for instance de Meza and
Webb, 2007), so that the function is everywhere strictly concave but still kinked
at the reference point.
The fact that this approach ignores diminishing sensitivity should not neces-
sarily be considered a limitation. Since convexity over the loss region is at odds
with the concavity implied by the standard economic argument of diminishing
marginal utility, such a function is not expected to describe preferences for losses
that are large relative to total assets (Kahneman, 2003). Wakker et al. (2007)
argue that a compromise in which utility for losses is mildly convex and closer
to linear than for gains may be more appropriate. For sufficiently large gam-
bles, however, the diminishing marginal utility effect will dominate, resulting in
a concave utility function once more. It is unclear which functional form is more
appropriate for the incentive contracting applications which we consider. While
real-world incentive payments can indeed be significant, especially in the case of
CEO compensation, such contracts do not typically feature outcomes for which
the individual is left in ruin. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to
guide us here.32
32More generally, testing for risk preferences over high monetary stakes has proven difficult.
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An alternative approach to modelling reference-dependent preferences involves
separation of the utility function into two components. For example, Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) present a model in which the utility function has the form:
u(w; r) = m(w) + ηµ (m(w)−m(r)) (31)
which is additively separable in two terms.33 The first, m(·), represents the stan-
dard economic notion of intrinsic consumption utility and is therefore assumed to
be everywhere increasing and weakly concave. The second, µ(·), captures both
reference-dependence and loss aversion. One possible simple formalisation is as
follows:
µ(x) =

λx x ≤ 0
x x > 0
(32)
so that µ(·) is piecewise linear.34 The parameter η then measures the relative
strength of gain-loss utility in the agent’s preferences, with the standard model
being captured as a special case when η = 0.
Their theory also allows for stochastic reference points; let R be a gamble with
k outcomes and let each of these outcomes and their associated probabilities be
denoted by ri and qi respectively for i = {1, ..., k}. The utility associated with
the monetary outcome w is then:
u(w;R) = m(w) + η
k∑
i=1
qi · µ (m(w)−m(ri)) (33)
Intuitively, if an individual’s reference point is a gamble between £0 and £100,
then actually receiving £50 feels like a gain relative to £0, but a loss relative to
£100. The overall sensation is then a mix between these two feelings, weighted
Since most evidence is experimental in nature — and since researchers are limited in the money
available to them — investigation of this issue is challenging. One approach is to perform
experiments in developing countries so that the monetary stakes are large in real terms (see
Kachelmeier et al., 1992), while an alternative is to use data from field experiments such as game
shows (see Post et al., 2008). One noteworthy study comes from Pope and Schweitzer (2011),
who use data from professional golf and find evidence suggesting that loss aversion persists with
high stakes, intense competition and experienced agents.
33While Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) formalise a model of consumption across multiple dimen-
sions, the simplified version presented here follows Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) by assuming that
individuals have one-dimensional utility over monetary outcomes.
34Since the argument of µ(·) depends on the function m(·), note that this formalisation entails
a strong link between standard consumption utility and gain-loss utility. While we have imposed
that µ(·) is piecewise linear, Ko˝szegi and Rabin allow for more general forms, including those
which feature diminishing sensitivity so that µ(·) satisfies the same conditions as prospect theory’s
value function. In this case, whether u(·) is convex or concave over losses will depend on the
trade-off between the functions m(·) and µ(·). Most applications, however, assume this piecewise
linear form.
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by the appropriate probabilities. Larsen et al. (2004) provide evidence suggesting
the existence of such mixed feelings in the context of expectations acting as a
reference point.
Finally, an agent’s ex ante expected utility for a risky gamble is then calcu-
lated as usual, by summing over ex post utilities weighted by their respective
probabilities. Individuals are assumed to process these probabilities objectively,
so that the Ko˝szegi and Rabin model does not feature the probability weighting
component of prospect theory.
3.2.3 What Determines the Reference Point?
As noted by Barberis (2013), one of the main obstacles to applications of prospect
theory relates to the determination of the reference point. In any given environ-
ment, it is often unclear what exactly constitutes the reference point and therefore
whether a particular outcome should be defined as a loss or a gain. Kahneman
and Tversky offered relatively little guidance here. In their original 1979 article,
they state (p. 286) that:
“So far in this paper ... the reference point was taken to be the status
quo, or one’s current assets. Although this is probably true for most
choice problems, there are situations in which gains and losses are
coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from
the status quo.”
Similarly, in Tversky and Kahneman (1991, pp. 1046-47), they write:
“Although the reference state usually corresponds to the decision ma-
ker’s current position, it can also be influenced by aspirations, expec-
tations, norms, and social comparisons.”
The question of what determines the reference point has been a major topic of dis-
cussion in the literature, especially since the existing evidence is scarce. While an
individual’s current wealth level (the status quo) seems appropriate for the sim-
ple experimental gambles which are often studied in the context of loss aversion,
the determinants of reference points in more complex environments are much less
obvious. Evidence from the psychology literature indicates that, as suggested by
the above quotations, reference points may be influenced by various phenomena
other than the status quo. While not discussed in detail here, goals (Heath et al.,
1999), aspirations (Payne et al., 1980), social comparisons (Schwerter, 2016) and
foregone alternatives (Mellers et al., 1997) have all been found to play a role.
In the specific context of wages, there is some evidence that an individual’s
existing wage acts as a reference point. For instance, several authors have docu-
mented changes in behaviour following pay cuts, which may be indicative of loss
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aversion with respect to the status quo wage. Lord and Hohenfeld (1979) analyse
falls in the performance of professional baseball players who, due to a change in
regulations, experience a substantial reduction of their salary, while Greenberg
(1993) describes a field experiment in which employee theft significantly increa-
sed following a wage cut. In addition, reference points being determined by an
individual’s existing wage is also related to the habit formation literature (see for
instance Bowman et al., 1999), one feature of which is an aversion to reductions
in current consumption levels.
In the case of variable pay, it seems likely that in many cases the base wage
becomes salient. Brink and Rankin (2013) assert that the base salary tends to be
interpreted by employees as a guaranteed amount, while Luft (1994) goes further,
suggesting that it may be viewed by workers almost as an entitled wage. Howe-
ver, de Meza and Webb (2007) argue that the reference point may be impacted by
the wage schedule, so that it becomes determined endogenously by the contract.
Suppose for instance that a manager’s contract offers a base salary, with a 90%
chance of receiving an additional bonus for good performance. In such a case,
it seems likely that the manager is disappointed when receiving only the base
salary, so that this particular outcome is perceived as a loss. This would occur if,
for example, the manager’s reference point was determined by the mean or the
certainty equivalent of the income distribution implied by the contract. de Meza
and Webb (2007) pursue this approach, but also note that neither formalisation
seems applicable to all situations. Let us now suppose that the manager receives
the bonus with a probability of only 1%, so that 99% of the time the base salary is
paid. The latter outcome is unlikely to cause the manager too much disappoint-
ment, yet would be seen as a loss under either formulation. With this in mind,
de Meza and Webb (2007) additionally consider the median as a reference point.
There is even evidence to suggest that in some environments individuals com-
pare outcomes to multiple points of reference (Copeland and Cuccia, 2002; Koop
and Johnson, 2012). For example, a worker’s satisfaction with a particular wage
payment may simultaneously depend on comparisons to last year’s income, to ot-
her possible unrealised wage payments, to the worker’s own goals and the wages
of salient others such as coworkers. As is noted by O’Donoghue and Sprenger
(Forthcoming), the development of models which incorporate multiple reference
points has the potential to help explain various real-world phenomena and as such
represents an important research agenda for the future.
The foregoing discussion emphasises that in any given environment, the re-
ference point can often be defined in several different plausible ways. This has
lead to a pervasive criticism of applications of reference-dependent preferences:
without a consistent approach to reference point determination, models benefit
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from an extra degree of freedom which can potentially accommodate a range of
different behaviours across various environments (Pesendorfer, 2006).
In recent years, some authors have therefore turned their attention to develo-
ping disciplined models with a consistent approach to defining the reference point.
In one prominent example, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) present a model of
reference-dependent preferences in which the reference point is determined by an
individual’s expectations, whereby agents are assumed to be fully rational in the
sense that they are able to perfectly predict both their environment and their
behaviour in this environment.35
This approach has several advantages. First, expectations acting as a reference
point has an intuitive appeal. For example, an individual who is expecting to
receive a payment of £100 will likely feel dissatisfaction if they actually receive
only £50. Yet, since current wealth has increased, the lesser payment would still
be interpreted as a gain were the reference point to be defined by the status quo.
Second, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) note that virtually all of the existing evi-
dence which equates the reference point with the status quo comes from contexts
where people plausibly expect to maintain the status quo, so that this evidence
is also consistent with expectations determining the reference point.
Third, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) go on to argue that there are several economic
environments in which expectations differ from the status quo and, in addition,
reference points determined by expectations generally make better predictions
in such environments. Consider for instance a consumer who plans to purchase
a ticket for a particular concert, but finds that tickets are sold out. While it
is likely that the consumer experiences negative feelings as a result of this, his
current endowment of concert tickets is identical to that of someone who did not
plan to purchase a ticket, so that equating the reference point with the status quo
predicts identical gain-loss utility of zero in these situations.
Finally, since gain-loss utility and the reference point can both be derived from
consumption utility and the economic environment, their formalisation represents
a step closer to a universally applicable, zero degrees of freedom theory.
The Ko˝szegi and Rabin model has received substantial attention in the recent
literature and has been used to analyse various topics of economic importance,
such as labour supply (Crawford and Meng, 2011), job search (DellaVigna et al.,
2017), optimal provision of incentives (Herweg et al., 2010) and monopoly pricing
(Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2014).36 The model itself will be presented in detail
shortly. However, we first pause to consider some of the evidence for expectations
35Earlier models of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences include Bell (1985),
Loomes and Sugden (1986) and Gul (1991). See O’Donoghue and Sprenger (Forthcoming) for
an overview.
36See O’Donoghue and Sprenger (Forthcoming) for a review.
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acting as a reference point as outlined by their model, which is currently an
ongoing discussion within the literature.
Empirical support has come from a variety of contexts: American Football
games and domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2011); casino slot machines (Lien
and Zheng, 2015); the labour supply of taxi drivers (Crawford and Meng, 2011
and the literature therein); professional golfers (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011); po-
lice performance (Mas, 2006) and labour supply decisions in developing countries
(Spears, 2012). There has also been experimental evidence, in contexts such as
consumption decisions (Karle et al., 2015); the endowment effect (Knetsch and
Wong, 2009); auctions (Banerji and Gupta, 2014) and risk preferences (Sprenger,
2015).37 However, several other studies find evidence which is inconsistent with
reference points being determined by expectations as outlined by the Ko˝szegi and
Rabin model, such as Heffetz and List (2014), Smith (2012), Ma¨rz (2016), Goette
et al. (Forthcoming) and Senn (2015).
There is some particularly relevant experimental evidence in the context of
effort provision. Abeler et al. (2011) conduct a real effort experiment in which
subjects are paid a piecerate for undertaking a tedious and repetitive task. After
each repetition of the task, they decide whether to stop working or carry on.
When they finally stop, their remuneration is decided in the following way: with
equal probability they receive either their piecerate earnings, or a predetermined
fixed payment instead. Varying the fixed payment between treatments allows for
manipulation of participants’ expectations. Classical economic theory suggests
that effort provision should be independent of the fixed payment: agents should
decide by trading off the marginal costs and benefits of an additional unit of
effort. Similarly, theories which assume the status quo as a reference point do
not predict differences in effort provision, since the status quo is not influenced
by the magnitude of the fixed payment. In contrast, when expectations act as
a reference point, agents are predicted to match their piecerate earnings with
the fixed payment in order to minimise the scale of potential losses, so that effort
provision increases as this payment is raised. The authors find evidence consistent
with both of these predictions.
A similar experiment comes from Gill and Prowse (2012), who study com-
petition between participants in a two-player sequential tournament featuring a
leader and a responder. The game is designed such that the marginal impact
of the responder’s effort on their probability of winning does not depend on the
effort provision of the leader; accordingly, the classical theory predicts that the
responder’s effort should be invariant to how hard the leader worked. However,
the authors find evidence of a discouragement effect, whereby the responder shies
37See also Ericson and Fuster (2011), Fehr and Goette (2007) and Song (2016).
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away from working when the leader’s effort provision is high, but works hard when
it is low. They argue that this is consistent with reference points determined by
expected payoffs which adjust instantaneously to effort choices.
There has also been conflicting evidence. Gneezy et al. (2017) are able to
replicate the findings of Abeler et al. (2011), discussed above, by showing that
increasing the fixed payment results in higher effort provision. However, they also
find that decreasing the fixed payment to zero also causes subjects to work harder,
so that effort provision is non-monotonic in payments; this is at contrast with the
predictions of the theory. They also find similar violations when manipulating
probabilities, suggesting that fixed payments and expectations influence reference
points in more complex ways than the theory predicts.
As such, at the present moment, overall evidence for expectations acting as re-
ference points as predicted by the Ko˝szegi and Rabin model is mixed, with some
authors turning their attention to possible explanations for this. For instance,
Goette et al. (2018) propose that heterogeneity in loss aversion may be respon-
sible. They gather experimental evidence which at the aggregate level shows no
support for the predictions of models of expectation-based loss aversion, but does
so once the authors control for variations in attitudes towards loss among sub-
jects. Alternatively, Heffetz (2018) offers a possible explanation relating to the
nature of how expectations adjust. Future research will continue to shed light on
this issue, allowing for improvements in the understanding of how best to apply
expectations-based models of reference-dependent preferences.
Finally, to conclude our discussion of how reference points may be determined,
we briefly turn our attention to a related question. Even in situations where we
can identify a single plausible reference point, if the environment is dynamic we
must also consider if and how it may change over time. While evidence here is
also scarce, there is a small experimental literature which attempts to explore this
issue in the context of financial decision making. Gneezy (2005) finds evidence
that in an environment where the price of an asset changes over time, individuals
tend to focus on the peak price, which then acts as a reference point. This is
in contrast to Baucells et al. (2011), whose findings suggest that it is the initial
and most recent prices which are most salient, with intermediate prices being less
influential. In a similar setting, Arkes et al. (2008) find evidence to suggest that
the reference point adjusts asymmetrically: the upward movement after a gain
is larger in magnitude than the downward movement after an equal sized loss.
The authors suggest that this may be due to hedonic considerations, whereby
individuals adjust their reference points in such a way as to improve their overall
feelings about a situation. A subsequent study finds similar results, but also
evidence to suggest that there are cross-cultural differences in the adjustment
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process (Arkes et al., 2010).
In the expectations-based approach, the relevant question relates to the speed
of adjustment of the recently held beliefs which determine the reference point.
Studies by Gill and Prowse (2012), Smith (2012) and Song (2016) suggest that
there is a quick or even instantaneous adjustment, while conflicting evidence comes
from Post et al. (2008) and Card and Dahl (2011). Heffetz (2018, p.5) argues that
it is not time, but accustomisation, which is important:
“Under our hypothesis, what moves the reference point is not the
passage of time per se, but some sense of internalization of, or getting
used to, the new expectations—which we refer to as sink-in. It is not
inconceivable that sink-in takes as little as a few minutes in a low-
stakes, no-prior-expectations lab experiment, but takes much longer
in a higher-stakes, long-held-expectations setting.”
Finally, there is evidence that individuals tend to underestimate the extent to
which their preferences will change over time (Loewenstein et al., 2003). This
so-called projection bias would then suggest that individuals are unable to per-
fectly anticipate adjustments in the reference point, leading to suboptimal decision
making (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006).
3.2.4 The Ko˝szegi and Rabin Model of Expectations-Based Reference-
Dependent Preferences
The Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) model of reference-dependent preferences
assumes that individuals evaluate outcomes relative to their expectations. More
specifically, the reference point is defined as the agent’s probabilistic beliefs held
in the recent past about outcomes. Intuitively, consider an individual who learns
that they will not receive a long-expected payment five minutes before it was due
to be paid. While their expectations will adjust immediately, it is likely that five
minutes later they will still assess receiving zero money as a loss; accordingly,
preferences are dependent on lagged rather than current expectations. Since in
many environments expectations are likely to feature uncertainty, the reference
point will often be stochastic, with the individual’s utility function taking the
form outlined by (33).
The model also requires a description of how expectations themselves are
formed. Ko˝szegi and Rabin assume that individuals are extremely rational in
this regard: they perfectly anticipate both the environment that they face and
their own behaviour in this environment, with beliefs then reflecting the true
probability distribution of outcomes. They argue that this captures, albeit in an
extreme way, the plausible notion that individuals have some ability to predict
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their own future behaviour. For the purpose of applications, the model offers two
distinct solution concepts depending on the temporal proximity between decisions
being made and outcomes being realised.
First, when decisions are made shortly before outcomes are realised, the refe-
rence point will be fixed by past expectations and as such cannot be influenced by
the individual’s choice. Accordingly, the individual maximises utility taking the
reference point as given, with the assumption of perfect rationality requiring that
agents can only expect a certain decision if they are willing to follow through with
it, given a reference point generated by the expectation to do so. This is known
as an unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE), in which the utility maximising
choice given certain expectations actually induces these same expectations. Ty-
pically, in any given environment, multiple UPEs may exist. As an equilibrium
selection device, Ko˝szegi and Rabin argue that since an individual can make any
plan that is rational, in the sense that they know they will follow it through, agents
will choose their preferred UPE, or the one which yields highest ex ante expected
utility.38 It is important to note however, that a UPE will often not maximise ex
ante expected utility among choices available to the individual, as expectations
are taken as given and not internalised when undertaking the decision.
Second, when outcomes are realised a long time after all decisions have been
made, the expectations relative to which outcomes are evaluated will be formed
after these decisions and will therefore incorporate their implications. For these
cases, the appropriate solution concept is a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium
(CPE): a decision which maximises expected utility given that it determines both
the outcome and the expectations which dictate the reference point. In contrast
to a UPE, a CPE will always maximise ex ante expected utility, since the effects
of decisions on expectations are internalised. CPE seems appropriate for the
incentive contracting applications we later consider, where the outcome of the
performance measure is often realised some time after effort has been undertaken.
In order to aid our discussion of the Ko˝szegi and Rabin model, we consider
the following simple example. Suppose an individual faces a gamble between
receiving a high payment wH with probability p and a low payment wL < wH
with probability 1 − p. This gamble, which we denote by W , then acts as a
stochastic reference point for the individual. Suppose for simplicity that the agent
38This is because there may be multiple self-fulfilling expectations. For instance, consider a
consumer who formulates a purchasing plan in the presence of price uncertainty and ex ante
expects to purchase a good when faced with a price £x. In this case, when they are actually
faced with £x, they may indeed prefer to follow through on their plan and make the purchase.
However, it is also possible that in the alternative case, where they had initially expected not
to buy when faced with the price £x, that similarly they would again prefer to follow through
on these expectations and decline to purchase. Accordingly, both scenarios are equilibria in this
environment. PPE then predicts that the actual decision will be the UPE which maximises ex
ante expected utility.
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is risk neutral so that m(w) = w, while µ(·) is given by (32). Then ex post utility
when the actual outcomes are wH and wL is respectively given by the following
equations:
u(wH ;W ) = wH + ηp (wH − wH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+η (1− p) (wH − wL) (34)
u(wL;W ) = wL + ηλp (wL − wH) + η (1− p) (wL − wL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(35)
The first term in (34) represents consumption utility, while the remaining terms
capture gain-loss utility: the actual outcome wH is compared with the expected
outcomes wH and wL, weighted by their respective ex ante expected probabilities
p and (1− p). Since the actual outcome coincides with the expected outcome in
the former case, this particular comparison induces gain-loss utility of zero so that
the second term of (34) vanishes. The utility associated with the outcome wL,
(35), can be explained in a similar way. However, the key difference is that the
comparison of the actual outcome wL with the expected outcome wH corresponds
to a loss for the agent and is weighted by the parameter λ accordingly.
Calculating ex ante expected utility then yields:
U(W ;W ) = p · u(wH ;W ) + (1− p) · u(wL;W ) (36)
= pwH + (1− p)wL − η (λ− 1) p (1− p) (wH − wL) (37)
The first two terms in (37) represent expected utility from consumption as usual;
in this case, the expected value of the gamble. The third term captures gain-loss
utility. Let us pause to make some remarks. First, note that since loss aversion
implies λ > 1, the addition of gain-loss utility entails a reduction of expected
utility when outcomes are uncertain, even in the case of risk neutral standard
consumption utility. Second, fixing outcomes at wH and wL, the utility loss from
uncertainty is weighted by the term p(1 − p), which is inverse U-shaped in p
and attains a maximum when p = 0.5. Third, as η (λ− 1) becomes large, the
individual’s main concern becomes avoiding potential losses. As a result, they
may obtain higher utility from a gamble where p is low compared to a gamble
where p ≈ 0.5. That is, under this preference specification individuals may prefer
a stochastically dominated gamble, since raising expectations of a gain makes an
outcome of no gain feel more painful. Under CPE, since the individual’s choice
also influences expectations, this implies that in some cases they would in fact
choose, when offered two gambles, the one which is stochastically dominated.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) argue that this is not necessarily a weakness of the
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model and may be consistent with real-world preferences in some environments,
citing Frederick and Loewenstein’s (1999) discussion of a prisoner who is made
worse off by a negligible chance of early release. In contrast, this type of behaviour
cannot occur under UPE, since the expectations which determine the reference
point are fixed.
In order to now consider the behaviour of individuals, we extend the envi-
ronment by assuming that the probability of receiving the high payment is now
dependent on a costly action a ∈ R+, so that p = p(a) with p′ > 0, p′′ < 0 and
lima→∞ p(a) = 1. Moreover, let the cost of the agent’s action be denoted by the
increasing convex function c(a), with c(0) = c′(0) = 0.39 One interpretation of
this environment is an agent’s choice of effort when faced with a simple incentive
contract, similar to those discussed in Section 2.
We first consider the case where the individual’s choice of a is made shortly
before the uncertainty is resolved, so that the reference point is fixed by past ex-
pectations. These expectations are defined uniquely by the expected action, which
we denote by a˜. The individual’s problem of maximising utility then becomes:
max
a
p(a) [wH + η(1− p(a˜)) (wH − wL)]
+ (1− p(a)) [wL + ηλp(a˜) (wL − wH)]− c(a) (38)
The terms in square brackets represent the ex post utility associated with
receiving wH and wL respectively, and comparing the relevant outcome with the
expectations induced by a˜; to see this, compare these terms with (34) and (35).
Taking the derivative and rearranging, the optimal effort level is implicitly defined
by the following equation:
p′(a) [wH − wL + η [1− p(a˜) + λp(a˜)] (wH − wL)] = c′(a) (39)
By also requiring that a˜ = a, a UPE in this environment is then characterised by
the following condition:
p′(a) [wH − wL + η [1− p(a) + λp(a)] (wH − wL)] = c′(a) (40)
Next, consider the case where the individual commits to a certain action long
before the uncertainty is resolved. Since the choice of action then also determines
39Strictly speaking, the introduction of a costly action undertaken by the agent should induce
additional gain-loss utility, depending on whether effort costs are higher or lower than expected.
For simplicity, however, we restrict attention here to reference-dependence over monetary out-
comes only and ignore this additional dimension.
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the reference point, the relevant utility maximisation problem becomes:
max
a
p(a) [wH + η [1− p(a)] (wH − wL)]
+ [1− p(a)] [wL + ηλp(a) (wL − wH)]− c(a) (41)
Taking the derivative and rearranging, a CPE is defined by:
p′(a) [wH − wL + η (1− λ) [1− 2p(a)] (wH − wL)] = c′(a) (42)
Note that decision making will typically vary under the different solution concepts
of UPE and CPE; this can be seen in our example by comparing (40) and (42).
By defining the reference point as an individual’s expectations, combined with
the restriction that beliefs must be formed rationally, the Ko˝szegi and Rabin model
provides a consistent and disciplined approach to modelling reference-dependent
preferences. This goes some way to addressing the aforementioned criticism rela-
ting to the extra degree of freedom which such models often benefit from, since,
given a full specification of µ(·), both the reference point and gain-loss utility
follow directly from consumption utility and the economic environment. Howe-
ver, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) caution that some judgement is still required when
applying the model. Indeed, O’Donoghue and Sprenger (Forthcoming) note that
the existence of multiple solution concepts provides some freedom which can be
exploited, with CPE being used more often in applications due to its tractability
even in situations where it may not be appropriate.
Finally, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) develop a similar model of reference-dependent
preferences which allows for anticipatory utility, whereby individuals derive ple-
asure from anticipating future consumption. An individual’s utility function is
assumed to be made up of three components: i) standard consumption utility, ii)
contemporaneous gain-loss utility, derived from differences between current con-
sumption and recent prior expectations of current consumption and iii) prospective
gain-loss utility, resulting from changes in current beliefs over future consumption.
Two properties of prospective gain-loss utility are particularly noteworthy. First,
individuals are loss averse in comparisons so that bad news about future con-
sumption is more painful than good news is pleasant. Second, individuals are
more sensitive to changes in beliefs about imminent outcomes compared to dis-
tant outcomes. As before, beliefs are required to be formed rationally based on
credible plans for future behaviour. The model seems particularly relevant for
applications to multi-period incentive contracting, a direction which is pursued
by Macera (2018a).
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3.3 Discussion
There is by now a vast body of evidence, from both the laboratory and the
field, that the preferences of individuals often exhibit both inequity aversion and
reference-dependence. Additionally, incorporating these concerns into economic
applications has improved the accuracy of predictions and lead to many valuable
insights.
So far, inequity aversion and reference-dependence have been presented as
distinct concepts. However, they share certain similarities: in both cases outcomes
are compared with referents (relating to either a reference group or a reference
point) and in both cases outcomes below the referent lead to relatively larger
impacts on utility. These common features can lead to similarities in the utility
functions which are used to represent such preferences and, as we shall see in
the next section, also to comparable implications for economic applications. This
is especially true when a loss averse individual’s reference point is influenced by
social considerations, which is natural in many environments.40
In fact, the two concepts are very closely related. Studies of the behaviour
of capuchin monkeys have provided evidence for both inequity aversion (Brosnan
and De Waal, 2003) and loss aversion (Chen et al., 2006), which suggests that such
preferences have a biological component and are (at least to some degree) innate
to humans. Chen and Santos (2006) propose that the evolutionary origins of ine-
quity aversion, in both humans and other species, may lie in tendencies to make
comparisons with social reference points. An organism which observes the payoffs
of other individuals living in the same environment can gather valuable informa-
tion, beyond that which is amassed from simply focussing on its own experiences.
That is, even in the absence of any social interaction, attending to the payoffs
of others may confer selective advantages. For example, in foraging animals, the
40Schwerter (2016) provides experimental evidence for social reference points when individuals
undertake risky decisions. Each lab session consists of two subjects who are randomly assigned
to one of two roles: one acts as a peer, while the other is the decision maker. Peers received
a fixed payment, while the decision maker chooses their preferred binary lottery from a menu
of choices. Each lottery has a downside of zero; decision makers then face a trade-off between
the size of a lottery’s upside and the likelihood with which this upside is received. The fixed
payment of peers is varied between treatments. The main result is that — as predicted by a
theory of loss aversion around social reference points — subjects choose riskier lotteries when
they observe a high fixed payment for the peer in an attempt to avoid an outcome in which
they earn less. Further evidence then suggests that this result cannot be explained by non-social
reference points such as expectations. In a similar setup, Linde and Sonnemans (2012) find no
evidence for the presence of diminishing sensitivity with a social reference point (see also Vendrik
and Woltjer, 2007). These studies are part of a growing literature which analyses risk preferences
in social contexts; see for instance Gamba et al. (2017) and Mu¨ller and Rau (2017) for recent
contributions. Real-world evidence for socially determined reference points comes from Kuhn
et al. (2011), who study the consumption behaviour of the neighbours of Dutch Postcode Lottery
winners and find that living next to a winner significantly increases the probability of households
purchasing a new car over the next six months.
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relative availability of food will be reflected in the payoffs of others, so that peer
observations are informative regarding the returns to foraging effort in the current
environment. As a cognitive mechanism, an animal which experiences envy will
then be further driven to increase foraging effort when observing the high payoffs
of peers; i.e. in exactly those situations where increases in this effort are likely to
yield high returns. Clearly, this provides an evolutionary advantage by increasing
foraging efficiency. Similarly, Rayo and Becker (2007) employ approaches from
economic theory to argue that social comparisons may have been evolutionarily
advantageous. In a principal-agent framework, they imagine a principal (repre-
senting the process of natural selection) who must design an agent’s emotional
responses to outcomes in such a way as to maximise fitness and show that peer
comparisons are a feature of the optimal mechanism.41
However, on a psychological level there is a clear distinction between the two
concepts. While inequity aversion is often discussed in the context of fairness and
having an actual concern for the payoffs of others, an individual who exhibits
reference-dependent preferences with respect to a social reference point does not
care about the payoff of others per se; instead, they merely use this information
to evaluate their own payoff.
Despite this distinction, both of these concepts can lead to similar behaviour,
so that it is unclear which mechanism is at work in any given situation. For in-
stance, Raihani and McAuliffe (2012) provide a discussion of the cognitive process
behind an individual’s decision to punish cheats in social interactions. Observa-
tions of cheating often inspire negative emotions such as anger or disgust, with
neurological evidence suggesting that it is these emotions which underpin the de-
cision to punish rather than cognitive processes; the administration of punishment
may negate these negative feelings by activating brain reward centres (see Rai-
hani and McAuliffe, 2012 for further discussion and references). However, the
source of the negative emotions is unclear. While they could arise from fairness
concerns relating to inequity aversion, another alternative is that the cheating be-
haviour leads an individual’s payoff to fall below some reference point, resulting
in dissatisfaction.
Finally, as mentioned previously, economic models which incorporate these
concepts into the preferences of individuals often share several similarities. For
instance, compare the Fehr and Schmidt model of preferences in a two agent
environment (27) with the simple model of loss aversion (30). Both functions are
piecewise linear around a kink point; by setting the reference point r in (30) equal
to agent j’s payoff xj and appropriately adjusting the remaining parameters, the
41Along similar lines, Falk and Knell (2004) present a theoretical model, along with supporting
evidence, in which individuals have relative income concerns and choose their relevant social
reference group in such a way as to promote self-improvement and self-enhancement.
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two functions become equal. Similarly, slightly adjusting the Ko˝szegi and Rabin
model of reference-dependent preferences with a stochastic reference point (33) by
equating each ri with another agent’s payoff xj and setting all weights qi equal to
1
N−1 yields — given risk neutral consumption utility and piecewise linear gain-loss
utility — the general Fehr and Schmidt model for N agents, (28). Accordingly,
it is not surprising that in many economic applications, inequity aversion and
reference-dependence can lead to similar or identical outcomes.
While the incorporation of these features of individual preferences into econo-
mic analysis has already enhanced our understanding of a wide range of pheno-
mena, there are still many open questions relating to both inequity aversion and
reference-dependent preferences which require future research. Some of these —
such as the composition of the reference group or the nature of reference points
— we have touched upon in this section.42 In particular, an understudied area
relates to the interplay between the two concepts. Recent developments, such as
the aforementioned investigations into risk preferences in social contexts, will help
clarify this and in turn improve economic applications of these models.
4 Incentive Contracting with Inequity Aversion and
Loss Aversion
4.1 Inequity Aversion
4.1.1 Independent Contracting
To begin our exploration of how incentive contracting is impacted by inequity
averse preferences, we initially consider a simple environment with continuous
efforts and binary performance measures, so that A = R+ and X = {xL, xH}. The
model presented here is based primarily on those of Itoh (2004) and Demougin
and Fluet (2006).43 A principal employs two homogeneous agents, denoted 1
and 2, to undertake identical tasks. The agents are inequity averse a` la Fehr and
Schmidt and compare their wages with one another, but not the principal, so that
their preferences can be represented by the utility function (27).44 We normalise
42Some further possible future directions are discussed in the conclusion to this chapter.
43While these papers share a similar theme — both examine incentive contracting with in-
dependent and team contracts when agents are other-regarding and performance measures are
binary — there are a number of differences. The model of Demougin and Fluet (2006) features
continuous effort, while attention is restricted to envious agents who compare net wages; that
is, individuals include effort costs when making comparisons. In contrast, Itoh (2004) models
effort as binary, while agents compare wages only. Envious, compassionate and status-seeking
preferences are all permitted in his model.
44Alternative specifications include agents who compare net wages (i.e. wages minus effort
costs) with one another, or agents who compare their wage to the principal’s income. We discuss
both of these cases later in this subsection.
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the reservation utility of each agent to zero.45 It is assumed that the principal
has access to two performance measures — one for each agent — and that these
signals are independent of one another. That is, the probability of observing a
signal of high performance for agent i does not depend on the effort provision,
nor the performance signal, of agent j. Moreover, we will initially assume that
the principal offers independent contracts, such that wage payments to agent i do
not depend on the signal of agent j’s performance and that the same contract is
offered to each agent. Accordingly, we analyse the principal’s problem of designing
the cost minimising contract to implement a given effort level a for Agent 1, given
that in equilibrium an identical contract will be offered to Agent 2.
As in our previous examples, we let p(·) denote the probability of observing a
signal of high performance conditional on effort, so that the principal’s problem
is:
min
wH ,wL
p(a)wH + [1− p(a)]wL (43)
subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints as usual. Denoting
the effort levels of Agent 1 and Agent 2 by a1 and a2 respectively, the expected
utility of Agent 1 is given by:
p(a1)wH + [1− p(a1)]wL − p(a1) [1− p(a2)]β (wH − wL)
− [1− p(a1)] p(a2)α (wH − wL)− c(a1) (44)
The first two terms of (44) represent the agent’s expected consumption utility,
while the final term captures the agent’s disutility from undertaking effort as
usual. The expected utility impact of inequity is then captured by terms three
and four. Intuitively, wage inequality occurs when the principal observes different
signal realisations for each agent, which results in a wage spread equal to wH−wL.
Term three captures inequity concerns when Agent 1 receives a higher wage, which
occurs with probability p(a1) [1− p(a2)]; term four captures the reverse case where
Agent 2 receives a higher wage, the probability of which is [1− p(a1)] p(a2).
Incentive compatibility requires that a is the argument that maximises Agent
1’s expected utility. We take the first-order approach and differentiate (44) with
respect to a1, setting the result equal to zero. This yields:
p′(a1) (wH − wL)− p′(a1) (wH − wL) [[1− p(a2)]β − p(a2)α]
− c′(a1) = 0 (45)
45As previously discussed, this assumption is not without loss of generality since it implies
agents no longer undertake social comparisons when not employed by the firm. See footnote 26.
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In equilibrium, since wage schemes are incentive compatible and identical, both
agents will undertake effort a. Substituting and rearranging yields the wage spread
required to induce effort a:
wH − wL = c
′(a)
p′(a)
· 1
1 + p(a)α− [1− p(a)]β (46)
This allows us to make some observations. First, note that the RHS of (46) is
decreasing in the coefficient of envy, α. Intuitively, the principal creates effort in-
centives by setting wages as to generate differences in (expected) utility between
high and low realisations of the performance measure.46 Envious individuals ex-
perience disutility from receiving lower wages than others. In our model, this
is only possible when an agent’s performance is low; accordingly, envy reduces
the expected utility associated with a low signal of performance, which provides
additional effort incentives to the agent. This allows for lower explicit incentives
and a reduction in the necessary wage spread.
Second, the RHS of (46) is increasing in the coefficient of compassion, β. The
intuition here is similar to the foregoing case. Since compassionate individuals
suffer from receiving a higher wage than others, the expected utility associated
with a high performance signal is reduced, which weakens effort incentives and
therefore a higher wage spread is required. Alternatively, as status-seeking agents
enjoy receiving higher wages than others, this expected utility is increased and the
necessary wage spread is lower. These results can be summarised by the following
remark.
Remark. Envious (α > 0) and status seeking (β < 0) preferences create a positive
incentive effect, leading to a lower wage spread required in order to implement
effort a. For compassionate (β > 0) preferences, the incentive effect is negative.
When agents are both envious and compassionate, the overall sign of this
incentive effect will depend on the magnitude of both parameters as well as the
relative probabilities of high and low performance being observed. Finally, the
absence of any inequity concerns (α = β = 0) yields the wage spread of the
standard self-interested case, (12).
We now move onto the agent’s participation constraint, which can be written,
using (44) along with a1 = a2 = a, as:
p(a)wH + [1− p(a)]wL − p(a) [1− p(a)] (wH − wL) (α+ β)− c(a) ≥ 0 (47)
46Note that, for a given contract, the utility associated with a specific realisation of agent i’s
performance measure is stochastic when agents are other-regarding, since it also depends on the
performance signal for agent j. Accordingly, we discuss the expected utility associated with high
and low realisations of the performance measure for agent i.
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where the third term measures the utility impact of inequity concerns; otherwise,
the constraint is identical to the self-interested case, as shown by (11). First, we
consider the case where there are no restrictions on wage payments, so that the
participation constraint is binding. Using (46) and rearranging (47) then yields:
wL = c(a)− p(a) c
′(a)
p′(a)
· 1− [1− p(a)] (α+ β)
1 + p(a)α− [1− p(a)]β (48)
so that the principal’s costs become:
CP (a) = c(a) + [1− p(a)] p(a) c
′(a)
p′(a)
· (α+ β)
1 + p(a)α− [1− p(a)]β (49)
Since the principal faces no restrictions on wage payments, wL will be set such
that the agent extracts no rent from the relationship. As standard, the agent
must be compensated for both his effort costs c(a) and his outside utility, in this
case zero. However, in order to accept the contract, an other-regarding agent
must also receive compensation for exposure to potential inequity: we refer to the
second term of (49) as an inequity premium. Since both envy and compassion
result in disutility for agents, in the case of a binding participation constraint
the principal’s costs are therefore increasing in both α and β.47 However, since a
status-seeking agent experiences higher utility, the principal’s costs will be reduced
relative to the self-interested case. Summarising:
Remark. Envious (α > 0) and compassionate (β > 0) preferences create a negative
participation effect, which increases the principal’s overall costs of implementing
effort when the participation constraint is binding. Status seeking (β < 0) prefe-
rences, on the other hand, create a positive participation effect.
Second, we consider the case where wages are restricted to be non-negative.
In this case, if the participation constraint does not bind then the principal will
set wL = 0 so that her costs can be expressed as:
CP (a) = p(a)
c′(a)
p′(a)
· 1
1 + p(a)α− [1− p(a)]β (50)
which is decreasing in α but increasing in β. Intuitively, since the limited liability
constraints imply that the agent will extract a positive rent, the participation
constraint plays no role. As such, there is no participation effect of other-regarding
preferences in this case and the impact on the principal’s costs is determined solely
by the incentive effect. Overall, the following remark summarises the effects of
47This is clearly true for β. For α, the result follows from:
∂
∂α
[
(α+ β)
1 + p(a)α− (1− p(a))β
]
=
1− β
[1 + p(a)α− (1− p(a))β]2 > 0
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other-regarding preferences on the principal’s costs of implementing effort:
Remark. Other-regarding preferences on the part of the agent have the following
impact on the principal’s costs:
– Compassionate (β > 0) preferences are always detrimental to the principal.
They induce a negative incentive effect, which requires a higher wage spread
in order to induce a given effort level a. In the case of limited liability, where
wL = 0, this implies that a higher wH is necessary. Moreover, compassionate
preferences induce a negative participation effect since the agent’s expected
utility is reduced. When wages are not restricted and the participation
constraint binds, wL must then be increased in order to guarantee that the
agent accepts the contract. In either case, the principal’s costs increase.
– Status-seeking (β < 0) preferences always benefit the principal. Both the in-
centive effect and the participation effect are positive, so that the principal’s
costs decrease regardless of whether the participation constraint binds.
– The effect of envious (α > 0) preferences depends on the specifics of the
economic environment. Since there is a positive incentive effect, the required
wage spread to induce effort is reduced. When limited liability restricts the
wages available to the principal so that wL = 0, the high payment wH can
be lowered, leading to a decrease in the principal’s costs. However, when the
participation constraint is binding, the principal must compensate the agent
for the disutility associated with envy, leading to a negative participation
effect and an increase in the principal’s costs.
The majority of the literature on incentive contracting with inequity averse
agents centres around the incentive and participation effects of other-regarding
preferences described above. In particular, many studies examine how contracts
can be designed in order to eliminate — or generate — unequal wages between
agents, to the principal’s advantage. These will be examined shortly. It should
also be noted that several papers limit attention to agents who are purely envious.
There are two key reasons for this. First, as discussed in Section 3.1, it is typical
to assume that |α| ≥ |β| so that disadvantageous inequity concerns are more
important to agents and as such envy is the driving force of preferences even
when allowing for compassion or status-seeking. Second, as outlined in the above
remark, envy has particularly interesting implications for contracting since the
incentive and participation effects have opposing signs.
Before moving onto more complex contractual structures, we briefly consi-
der some analyses of independent incentive contracting in the presence of other-
regarding agents. Neilson and Stowe (2010) consider an environment where per-
formance measures take the form xi = ai + i and restrict attention to linear
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contracts. They first analyse the incentive effect and derive conditions for the
existence of a symmetric equilibrium in which other-regarding agents undertake
higher effort for a given piecerate, relative to the self-interested case. Next, they
consider the participation effect and show that the required inequity premium
is increasing in the piecerate, since this magnifies expected inequality between
agents. Accordingly, when deciding on the optimal piecerate (and therefore the
effort to be induced), the principal faces a trade-off between providing incentives
and minimising the necessary inequity premium. Note that this is similar to the
classical trade-off between incentives and insurance in the case of risk aversion. As
a result, the optimal piecerate can be lower than the self-interested case; the aut-
hors suggest that this may provide an explanation for observed wage compression
in firms.
Bartling and von Siemens (2010b) restrict attention to envy, but allow for
risk aversion and an arbitrarily informative performance measure to consider how
the effects of other-regarding preferences depend on the specifics of the econo-
mic environment. They consider the principal’s cost minimisation problem for
implementing a given effort level and show that this depends on envy in two par-
ticular ways. First, for a given interval of possible wages, envy influences the
set of utilities which the principal can impose on the agent. More specifically,
envy decreases the lower bound of this set and therefore increases the principal’s
ability to punish the agent for low performance. However, note that this positive
incentive effect only plays a role in the presence of limited liability constraints; if
the principal’s choice of wage scheme is unrestricted, then it is possible to impose
any utility level on the agent. Accordingly, envy can only reduce the principal’s
costs in environments where the set of feasible wages is restricted. Second, the
principal’s costs of providing an agent with a certain utility level are increasing
in envy, since the agent dislikes the possibility of receiving lower wages than his
coworkers. Bartling and von Siemens (2010b) are therefore able to replicate the
foregoing results regarding the positive incentive and negative participation effects
of envy in a much more general setting.48
4.1.2 Team Contracting
We have seen that when we limit our attention to independent incentive contracts,
the introduction of other-regarding preferences on the part of agents can lead to an
increase in the principal’s costs. A natural question then arises as to whether the
48While Bartling and von Siemens (2010b) do not explicitly model compassionate preferences,
they argue that the effects on the principal’s costs will be unambiguously negative. Compassion
will reduce the upper bound of the set of utilities which can be provided for a given set of wages,
as well as increase the principal’s costs of imposing a given effort level. Neither of these effects
can be beneficial.
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principal may prefer to use some sort of team contract, whereby the remuneration
of an agent is dependent on the performance measure of others.
In order to consider this possibility, we extend the foregoing model to the case
where the principal offers an extreme team contract, in which the wage wH is paid
if and only if a high signal of performance is observed for both agents. In all
other cases, the wage wL is paid.
49 As before, we analyse the principal’s problem
of designing the cost minimising contract to implement a given effort level a for
Agent 1, again assuming that Agent 2 will be offered the same contract.
The extreme team contract implies that Agent 1 will only be paid the high
wage wH if the signal xH is observed for both himself and Agent 2. This occurs
with probability p(a1)p(a2), so that the principal’s problem becomes:
min
wH ,wL
p(a)p(a)wH + [1− p(a)p(a)]wL (51)
subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Agent 1’s ex-
pected utility, conditional on the effort levels a1 and a2, can now be expressed
as:
p(a1)p(a2)wH + [1− p(a1)p(a2)]wL − c(a1) (52)
The most striking feature of (52) is that inequity concerns play no role. This is
because the extreme team contract entirely shields agents from all wage inequality;
both agents receive wL for all possible realisations of their performance measures,
except when xH is observed for both agents, in which case they each receive the
payment wH . Accordingly, there is neither an incentive nor a participation effect
when the extreme team contract is used. The incentive compatibility constraint
requires that:
p′(a1)p(a2)wH − p′(a1)p(a2)wL − c′(a1) = 0 (53)
Since in equilibrium both agents will undertake effort a, the necessary wage spread
is therefore:
wH − wL = c
′(a)
p′(a)p(a)
(54)
Note that this is larger than the case of independent contracting in the absence of
inequity concerns, (12). Intuitively, the probability of Agent 1 receiving the high
wage payment is now less responsive to his effort input (since it also depends on
the signal for Agent 2) and therefore the wage spread required to induce effort a
49Loosely speaking, any wage scheme in which one agent’s payment is increasing in the per-
formance of others can be thought of as a team contract. However, we will restrict our formal
analysis to the case of the extreme team contract.
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becomes higher. Inserting (54) into the participation constraint then yields:
wL + p(a)
c′(a)
p′(a)
− c(a) ≥ 0 (55)
As before, we consider the cases of a binding and non-binding constraint in turn.
First, in the absence of limited liability constraints, (55) holds with equality which
yields:
wL = c(a)− p(a) c
′(a)
p′(a)
(56)
This implies that the principal’s costs become once again equal to the agent’s
effort costs:
CP (a) = c(a) (57)
The participation effect of other-regarding preferences can therefore be nullified
entirely when the principal is able to use a team contract which does not allow
for wage inequalities. When either envy or compassion are the driving force of
an agent’s inequity preferences (i.e. when status-seeking plays a relatively small
role), this implies that the principal’s costs in the absence of limited liability
constraints are lower when using the extreme team contract (57) than when using
an independent contract (49). This represents a violation of the sufficient statistic
result introduced in Section 2.4. Even though the performance measures of other
agents are not informative about an agent’s effort choice, they should nonetheless
be incorporated into the optimal wage scheme, since they can be used to reduce
(or eliminate) the necessary premium required for exposure to inequality.50
Remark. Inequity averse preferences provide a rationale for team contracting in
the absence of informational or technological linkage between agents, violating
the sufficient statistic result.
Next, in the case where limited liability constraints enable the agent to extract
a rent, the principal sets wL = 0 and her resulting costs can be expressed as:
CP (a) = p(a)
c′(a)
p′(a)
(58)
Whether the principal prefers to use an independent or team contract in this case
50The sufficient statistic result applies to the case of risk averse agents, rather than those who
are risk neutral as we assumed in our simple example. When agents are risk averse, contracting
on the performance of others induces a trade-off between exposure to risk and inequality. As
noted in particular by Bartling and von Siemens (2010b), while the optimal contract for a risk
and inequity averse agent will typically include information about the performance of others,
this may not be the case if the resulting risk exposure is sufficiently large.
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depends on which of (50) and (58) are larger. When the agent’s preferences are
predominantly envious, she will tend to prefer an independent contract due to the
positive incentive effect of envy in this case, leading to lower costs.
The aforementioned analyses of Itoh (2004) and Demougin and Fluet (2006)
both consider team contracting when performance measures are binary and dis-
cuss the conditions under which such contracts become optimal. Goel and Thakor
(2006) present a very general model featuring n simultaneously risk averse and
inequity averse agents, while both effort and the performance measure for each
agent are assumed to be continuous. They then solve for the principal’s cost-
minimising contract in order to implement an effort level a. Unlimited liability
is assumed throughout, so that participation constraints of agents always bind.
As before, independence between signals of performance is assumed so that the
classical theory predicts independent contracts. They show that the optimal pay-
ment scheme for an agent features a wage which is increasing in both his own
performance and the performance of others, extending the finding that inequity
concerns can lead to violations of the sufficient statistic result to a more general
setting.
Since in their model agents are risk averse and signals are independent, va-
rying wage payments with the performance of others increases the risk imposed
upon an agent and therefore the necessary risk premium in order to induce parti-
cipation. However, it also decreases the required inequity premium; the optimal
wage scheme then trades off these two effects in such a way as to minimise the
principal’s costs, although payments will always be more sensitive to increases
in an agent’s own performance so that the provision of incentives remains the
primary determinant of the wage schedule. Moreover, restricting attention to
linear contracts, Goel and Thakor (2006) show that piecerates will decrease as
the strength of other-regarding preferences increases, resulting in lower powered
incentives, similar to the case of independent contracts discussed previously.
4.1.3 Relative Performance Evaluation
So far we have considered environments in which the performance measures of
agents are independent of one another. However, we have previously seen in
Section 2.5 that when these signals are positively correlated, the classical theory
predicts that relative performance evaluation (RPE) — in which an agent’s wage is
negatively related to the performance of others — becomes optimal. This creates
an interesting tension, since RPE will typically increase wage inequalities between
agents.
A formal analysis of this issue is provided by Bartling (2011), who presents
a two-agent model similar to that of Section 2.5. As before, there exists a per-
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formance measure xi = ai + i for each agent, where i is a normally distributed
noise term which is positively correlated between agents, while the principal is
restricted to offering identical linear contracts of the form wi = η + γxi + δxj .
Each agent’s preferences are now assumed to be represented by the CARA utility
function:
U(w, a) = −e−ρ[w−c(a)−L(w,a)] (59)
where L(w, a) denotes the agent’s ex ante expected loss from inequality, given
both the contract and the effort he undertakes. Inequity concerns therefore enter
the utility function as a fixed loss, equivalent to a wealth effect; this approach
implies that agents are risk averse over wages, but risk neutral over losses from
inequitable outcomes. When choosing the variables γ and δ, the principal must
take into account their impact on the term L(w; a) and the resulting inequity
premium required to ensure participation.
Bartling (2011) shows that the principal will choose the sign of δ and thus
the type of contract (team, independent or RPE) by trading off three different
forces associated with inequity aversion. First, as we have seen previously, other-
regarding preferences create an incentive effect. If envy is the most prominent
aspect of an agent’s social preferences, then this incentive effect is positive and
will be maximised when the contract features RPE (δ < 0). Intuitively, an increase
in performance will then raise the agent’s own wage while reducing the wage of
his coworker, significantly reducing the likelihood of the agent receiving a lower
payment and experiencing envy. In contrast, with a team contract, increases in
performance raise the wages of both agents, so that this incentive effect is much
weaker. In the extreme case where γ = δ (a form of extreme team contract),
there is no inequality since wages are identical and depend only on the sum of
performance measures (x1 +x2) so that the incentive effect is eliminated entirely.
Second, as in the standard model, the principal’s choice of δ will influence the
risk imposed upon the agent. As shown in Section 2.5, in the case of positive
correlation between error terms, RPE is optimal for shielding the agent from risk.
Third, other-regarding preferences create disutility from inequity concerns.
Note that the difference in wages between agents can be expressed as:
w1 − w2 = (γ − δ) (x1 − x2) (60)
For given levels of performance, the magnitude of this difference is maximised
when δ < 0, or when we have RPE. In this case, even small differences in per-
formance lead to relatively large wage disparities and therefore a high loss from
inequity L(w; a). In contrast, by setting δ > 0, differences in wages for given
performance levels are reduced and can even be eliminated with an extreme team
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contract (γ = δ).
While incentive provision and risk shielding therefore provide a motivation for
RPE, maximal reduction of inequality requires a team contract.51 The sign of the
optimal δ will be determined by this three-way trade-off. If agents are sufficiently
averse to inequitable outcomes, a team contract can become optimal even when
error terms are positively correlated so that the standard theory predicts that RPE
is optimal.52 Bartling (2011) argues that this may provide an explanation for the
lack of empirical evidence for real-world use of relative performance evaluation.
Moreover, the magnitude of γ is likely to be reduced relative to the standard case,
since a high piecerate will not only increase exposure to risk but also expected
inequality.
In a related paper, Bartling (2012a) argues that firms may decide against
using RPE not only because it increases wage inequality, but also because it can
generate social comparisons by lowering the ‘social proximity’ between agents and
making such comparisons more salient. In this case, when there is relatively little
correlation between performance measures, the benefits of RPE are limited and
as such the principal will use an independent contract in order to avoid the costs
associated with agents comparing wages with one another. RPE only becomes
beneficial for the principal when performance measures are strongly correlated,
in which case risk exposure can be significantly reduced, while the difference in
wages — and therefore the required inequity premium — will typically be small.
Krapp and Sandner (2016) show that movements away from RPE and toward
team contracting can also be motivated by a principal’s desire to adhere to an
equal pay norm, even when agents are self-interested. This is modelled by assu-
ming that ex post inequality between the wages of agents enters the principal’s
payoff function directly as a cost. The optimal contract will then result from a
trade-off between the desire for equal pay and the need to shield agents from risk.
It is not surprising that the impact of an equal pay norm is similar to that of
inequity averse agents. In the latter case, the principal must indirectly bear the
costs of wage inequality through the increased inequity premium which must be
paid to agents in order to induce participation, while in the former case these
costs enter directly. In both instances, the principal has an incentive to reduce
the inequality exposure of the optimal contract.
Other papers have explored how relative performance evaluation may become
51Note that in the case of negatively correlated performance measures, a team contract is
optimal not only for reducing inequality, but also for reducing exposure to risk.
52DeMarzo and Kaniel (2017) find similar results when agents care about how their wage
compares to the average of the reference group. In the limit, as agents’ relative income concerns
become the driving force of preferences, an extreme team contract where wages are paid on the
basis of aggregate performance becomes optimal. See also Fershtman et al. (2003), Miglietta
(2008) and Goukasian and Wan (2010).
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optimal with other-regarding agents even in the absence of correlated performance
signals. For example, as discussed previously, status-seeking preferences create po-
sitive incentive and participation effects. Itoh (2004) then shows that if this is
the driving force of agents’ preferences, the principal can take advantage of these
positive effects by increasing the probability of inequitable outcomes through use
of RPE. Alternatively, Rey-Biel (2008) analyses how relative performance evalu-
ation may be optimal for the principal in the absence of moral hazard, where the
effort choices of agents are perfectly contractable. In the standard case, inducing
an agent to undertake high effort then simply requires compensating him for his
additional effort costs. However, with other-regarding preferences, the principal
may be able to induce high effort by threatening an inequitable outcome in the
case where an agent shirks; this then reduces the compensation required for the
agent to undertake this high effort and leads to lower costs for the principal.
Note, however, that this can only be the case when the agent extracts a rent
(for instance, due to minimum wage constraints), otherwise the agent must be
compensated fully for the additional effort undertaken in order to participate.
As a final remark, note that throughout our discussion we have so far consi-
dered agents who compare wages, rather than accounting for any differences in
effort costs. At first glance this is of minor importance, since most papers in
the literature consider homogeneous agents who are offered identical contracts,
so that there is no difference in equilibrium effort levels or effort costs. However,
the exact nature of the comparison has subtle implications for the impact of in-
equity aversion on incentives. To illustrate this, recall our finding that envious
preferences have a positive incentive effect since, by increasing effort provision,
an agent can reduce the probability of an outcome which entails disadvantage-
ous inequality. When individuals care about disparities in net wages, there is an
additional effect: should such an outcome be realised, the agent’s higher effort
provision means that the inequality is exacerbated; clearly, this will negatively
impact incentives. Analogous results hold for the incentive effects of compassion
and status-seeking.
Moreover, as emphasised by Bartling (2011), these additional effects have
implications for the optimal contractual form. For instance, the incentive effect
of envy becomes negative with an extreme team contract because — since wages
are always equal — an agent who undertakes higher effort will decrease his net
wage. The principal must then take such effects into account when designing the
wage scheme.
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4.1.4 Comparisons with the Principal
While most papers in the literature consider multiple agents who make social
comparisons with one another, in some environments it may be plausible that an
agent compares his income with that of the principal. Some authors have explored
this possibility, typically in a model featuring one agent and one principal.
Itoh (2004) considers a simple framework, in which a risk neutral but inequity
averse agent works on a binary-outcome project (success or failure) on behalf of
the principal, whereby effort increases the probability of success. The relevant
question in this environment regards how the benefits from a successful project
should be split between parties. Assuming that the principal has a strictly hig-
her income than the agent following a successful project, introducing envious
preferences requires stronger incentives due to the disutility associated with the
inequitable outcome, increasing the principal’s costs.53 This is true regardless of
whether the participation constraint binds. In case it does, an inequity premium
must also be paid, just as in the environments considered previously.
A more general analysis is presented by Englmaier and Wambach (2010). They
study the classical moral hazard framework of Holmstro¨m (1979), in which a risk
averse agent’s effort influences the probability distribution over different levels of
output x ∈ [x, x], which then acts as a performance measure for the principal
(see footnote 6). In their environment, the optimal wage scheme w(x) therefore
specifies how output should be shared between parties and is assumed to have
a slope w′(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all x.54 When the agent is self-interested, there is the
standard trade-off between providing maximal effort incentives (which calls for
w′(x) = 1) and insurance against risk (which calls for a fixed wage and therefore
w′(x) = 0).
Englmaier and Wambach (2010) introduce inequity aversion, but importantly,
deviate from the Fehr and Schmidt specification by modelling the inequity loss as
a strictly convex, U-shaped function G(·) around a minimum of zero, so that the
agent displays both envy and compassion. An example of −G(·) is shown by the
left-hand panel of Figure 4. Crucially, this formalisation implies that the agent
dislikes lotteries over different levels of inequity, in contrast to the model of Fehr
and Schmidt. As a result, minimising the necessary inequity premium requires
that an additional unit of output should be shared equally between parties so
that w′(x) = 12 and the income differential remains constant over realisations
of x. This additional force must then be taken into account when determining
the optimal contract (see the right-hand panel of Figure 4). In the limit, as
53Following a similar logic, in the case where the agent is ahead following a successful project,
the principal’s costs are increasing in compassion, but decreasing in status-seeking.
54This is a common assumption in the moral hazard literature. One possible justification is
that parties may be able to boost or destroy output; see Innes (1990).
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Figure 4: The function −G(·) (LHS) and the forces which determine the optimal
wage scheme (RHS); reproduced from Englmaier and Wambach (2010).
the agent’s dislike of inequity becomes the driving force of his preferences, the
principal maximises her profit by utilising an equal sharing rule in which w′(x) = 12
for all x. Moreover, any additional information about the principal’s income —
even if it is uninformative with respect to the agent’s effort choice — should
be included in the contract, so that once again the sufficient statistic result is
violated.55
Assuming a similar specification of inequity aversion, Dur and Glazer (2007)
show that an agent’s dislike of lotteries over levels of inequality can lead to variable
wage payments even in the absence of moral hazard, so that the standard theory
would predict a fixed wage since the agent is risk averse. While there is no need
to provide incentives since effort is contractable, a variable wage can be used to
insure the agent against variations in the income differential between parties and
therefore reduce the necessary inequity premium. The authors argue that this
may provide an explanation for firms offering stock-options to low level workers,
a phenomenon which cannot be explained by incentive provision since their effort
will have a negligible impact on the stock price.
Finally, Banerjee and Sarkar (2017) show that introducing other-regarding
preferences on the part of the principal (with respect to the agent) yields similar
results to the self-interested case, since the principal will still design the contract
in order to maximise profits. This holds unless the principal is strongly com-
passionate, in which case output will be split such as to ensure income equality
between parties (see also Itoh, 2004).
4.1.5 Further Applications
To conclude this subsection, we consider how the concept of inequity aversion
has been applied to a broad range of topics associated with incentive contracting.
Demougin et al. (2006) allow for technological dependence between the tasks of
55See Cato and Ebina (2014) for an extension of the Englmaier and Wambach (2010) model
to the multi-period case.
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asymmetric agents in order to study the impact of inequity aversion on output.
Increasing the effort provision of one agent requires higher incentive pay and
impacts expected wage inequality and, therefore, the required inequity premia for
coworkers. This introduces a further interdependence between the effort of agents.
They show that increases in inequity aversion will typically lead to a reduction in
total output, especially when tasks are complementary. Intuitively, in this case,
implementing lower effort from one agent in order to alleviate inequalities has the
additional effect of reducing the marginal return to effort of other agents.
Teyssier (2007) considers a competitive market in which principals compete
for agents with heterogeneous social preferences. Self-interested agents prefer a
competitive tournament-like scheme which generates high output, whereas ine-
quity averse agents dislike the wage inequality inherent in such a scheme and
prefer a contract in which output is shared equally. It can be shown that a se-
parating equilibrium exists in which each type of agent prefers to self-select into
their preferred wage scheme.
So far our analysis has assumed the existence of a suitable contractable perfor-
mance measure. However, when this is not the case, effort incentives can still be
provided using long-term implicit or relational contracts, which make use of non-
verifiable signals of performance and must be self-enforcing, since courts cannot
punish parties for deviating from the contractual terms. Kragl and Schmid (2009)
consider a multi-agent model in which, at the end of each period, the principal
can choose to renege on agreements by refusing to pay the agreed upon bonus
payments. This yields an immediate benefit in the form of lower wage costs, but
damages the principal’s reputation and prevents contracting in subsequent peri-
ods, leading to zero future profits. Requiring contracts to be self-enforcing thus
imposes the constraint that bonus payments must be smaller than the value of
the continuation game.
Introducing envious preferences on the part of the agents has two key effects
on this credibility constraint. First, due to the incentive effect of envy, the bonus
payment required to implement a given effort level is smaller so that the constraint
becomes easier to satisfy. Second, due to the participation effect of envy, profits
in any given period are lower which means that honouring the contracts becomes
less attractive; this makes satisfying the constraint more difficult. The overall
impact of envy will depend on which effect dominates. Kragl and Schmid (2009)
derive conditions under which envious preferences relax the credibility constraint
and expand the set of self-enforcable contracts, allowing higher profits for the
principal so that envy can be beneficial even when the participation constraint is
binding and inequity premia must be paid.
Two further papers then explore alternative contractual forms when agreements
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must be self-enforcing. Kragl (2015) considers team contracts, which as we have
seen can eliminate inequity concerns but often require larger bonus payments rela-
tive to individual wage schemes, while Kragl (2016) analyses tournament schemes
which can avoid commitment problems but necessarily result in unequal wages
between agents.
An important topic in the classical moral hazard literature is multitasking,
whereby an agent’s effort provision has numerous dimensions, each corresponding
to a different task he has been assigned. The key finding of this literature, known
as the equal compensation principle, is that the contract must be designed such
that the agent’s marginal return to each task is equalised. If not, then tasks
which yield low returns to the agent will be ignored completely (Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom, 1991). Bartling (2012b) studies an environment in which agents are
required to undertake two tasks. The first, individual production, potentially
entails wage inequalities between agents since the relationship between effort and
output is stochastic. The second consists of contributing toward team production,
in which all agents are rewarded based on their aggregate output, and therefore
the wages associated with this task are necessarily equal. As we have previously
seen, inequity aversion can cause the principal to lower incentive intensity when
there is the potential for wage inequalities — in this case for individual production
— in order to reduce the necessary inequity premium. The equal compensation
principle then requires that incentives for team production must also be reduced,
despite the fact that this task cannot contribute toward differences in wages.
Finally, Grund and Przemeck (2012) investigate the impact of inequity aver-
sion on performance appraisals within organisations. There is significant empirical
evidence to suggest that firms have a systematic tendency to i) overrate the per-
formance of their employees (a leniency bias) and ii) differentiate only slightly
between difference performance levels between employees (a centrality bias), so
that appraisals of workers therefore tend to be grouped together toward the hig-
her end of the performance scale. Grund and Przemeck (2012) show that this can
be explained using a simple model with an altruistic supervisor who appraises
the performance of inequity averse agents, whose wages are dependent on their
appraisal. Note that since agents are inequity averse, the wage inequality asso-
ciated with widely contrasting reports will induce disutility. Accordingly, since
the altruistic supervisor cares about the utility of the agents, she will tend to
award similar reports, resulting in the centrality bias. Similarly, overstating the
performance of agents leads to increases in their wages and utility, from which
the leniency bias results.
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4.2 Reference-Dependent Preferences and Loss Aversion
4.2.1 A Simple Model
We now move onto studying the implications of reference-dependent preferences
and loss aversion for incentive contracting. To begin our analysis, we once again
consider a simple example with continuous effort and a binary performance me-
asure. We assume that the agent’s monetary preferences are represented by the
piecewise linear function (30), where λ > 1 and r > 0. Moreover, we restrict
attention to cases whereby wL < r < wH .
56 Given these assumptions, the agent’s
expected utility can be written as:
p(a)wH + [1− p(a)] [λwL − (λ− 1) r]− c(a) (61)
As before, the principal wishes to minimise the expected wage payment, so that
her problem continues to be given by (43). To ensure incentive compatibility, we
again take the first-order approach and set the derivative of (61) with respect to
a equal to zero. Rearranging for the bonus payment wH then yields:
wH = λwL − (λ− 1) r + c
′(a)
p′(a)
(62)
It is clear to see that the RHS of (62) is decreasing in both r and λ. This implies
that, for a fixed wL, the necessary bonus payment (and therefore wage spread)
is decreasing in both the reference point and the agent’s aversion to losses. It
follows that loss aversion induces a positive incentive effect. Intuitively, a higher
λ increases the extent to which the loss associated with receiving the wage wL is
felt by the agent, while a higher reference point r increases the relative size of this
loss. Both effects reduce the utility associated with wL, while leaving the utility
associated with wH unchanged, resulting in higher effort incentives.
We next consider the effect on the agent’s participation decision. Similar to
our previous analysis, we assume that the agent’s expected utility must be weakly
greater than his outside utility level, which we set equal to zero.57 Substituting
56If this was not the case, both wage payments would be on the same portion of the utility
function (30), which would then be linear over the relevant region.
57This assumption implies that the agent’s outside utility is invariant to both his level of loss
aversion and the reference point. The literature has typically followed this approach, especially
in contexts where the reference point is determined endogenously by the contract. However, one
could imagine scenarios — such as when r is determined by last year’s salary — in which the
agent will continue to make comparisons with the reference point when rejecting the contract.
Moreover, the exact assumption made will determine the impact of changes in λ and r on the
participation constraint and therefore has important implications; see footnote 26 for a similar
argument in the context of inequity aversion.
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(62) into (61), the participation constraint then becomes:
λwL − (λ− 1) r + p(a) c
′(a)
p′(a)
− c(a) ≥ 0 (63)
When wage payments are unrestricted, so that this constraint binds, the low wage
wL can be expressed as:
wL =
1
λ
[
c(a) + (λ− 1) r − p(a) c
′(a)
p′(a)
]
(64)
This implies that the principal’s costs of implementing effort are:
CP (a) = c(a)
[
p(a) + [1− p(a)] 1
λ
]
+
λ− 1
λ
[1− p(a)]
[
r + p(a)
c′(a)
p′(a)
]
(65)
Studying (65) allows us to make some observations. First, note that by setting λ =
1, the utility function (30) becomes u(w) = w, so that we are in the standard risk
neutral case; the principal’s costs of implementing effort then reduce to CP (a) =
c(a). Second, for λ > 1, the RHS of (65) is increasing in both r and λ, so that
loss aversion induces a negative participation effect, raising the principal’s costs.58
We have seen that increases in both r and λ reduce the utility associated with the
wage payment wL, aiding the creation of incentives. However, for the same reason
these increases also reduce the agent’s expected utility, so that a loss premium
must be paid by the principal.
Alternatively, if limited liability restricts the principal’s choice of wages such
that the agent extracts a rent, she will set wL = 0, which implies the following
costs:
CP (a) = p(a)
[
c′(a)
p′(a)
− (λ− 1) r
]
(66)
which are clearly decreasing in both r and λ, since only the incentive effect of loss
aversion applies. Our findings are summarised by the following remark.
Remark. An increase in the reference point r or the agent’s aversion to losses λ
leads to a positive incentive effect, reducing the wage spread required to implement
effort a. When limited liability restricts the wages available to the principal, so
that wL = 0, the high payment wH can then be lowered, leading to a decrease
in the principal’s costs. However, when the participation constraint binds, the
principal must compensate the agent for the disutility associated with exposure
58This is clearly true for r. Differentiating the RHS of (65) with respect to λ yields:
∂CP (a)
∂λ
=
1
λ2
[1− p(a)]
[
r + p(a)
c′(a)
p′(a)
− c(a)
]
which can be shown to be positive; see footnote 12.
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to losses, increasing her costs.
Note that there is a direct parallel between the impact of loss aversion and
the impact of envy, studied in Section 4.1: both lead to a positive incentive
effect, but a negative participation effect, with the overall consequences for the
principal’s costs dependent on the economic environment. Moreover, similar to
envy, loss aversion will typically lead the principal to implement a reduced effort
level relative to the classical case.
4.2.2 The Optimal Contractual Form
The literature on incentive provision in the presence of loss aversion has typi-
cally focussed on studying the form of the optimal contract when the principal
has access to a rich performance measure. An early contribution by de Meza
and Webb (2007) considers a binary effort environment (A = {aL, aH}) with
a continuous signal of performance (X = [x, x]), in which the agent’s utility
function is additively separable in terms capturing i) intrinsic consumption uti-
lity, ii) reference-dependence and loss aversion and iii) effort costs, so that the
agent’s preferences over monetary outcomes are similar to (31). Consumption
utility is assumed to be strictly concave, so that the standard theory would pre-
dict an everywhere strictly increasing wage scheme. de Meza and Webb (2007)
then solve for the principal’s cost minimising contract in order to implement the
effort level aH , making various assumptions about both the reference point and
the nature of the agent’s loss aversion.59
They first consider the case of linear loss aversion with respect to an exoge-
nously given reference point; one possible interpretation of this might be that
the agent compares his wage to the previous year’s earnings. In this case, they
show that the optimal wage scheme typically features a region over which pay
is insensitive to performance, with wage payments here equal to the reference
point.60
As illustrated by Figure 5, this region can occur at the start, middle or end of
the wage schedule, depending on the value of the reference point.61 de Meza and
Webb (2007) argue that this pay insensitivity results from the principal’s need
to balance creating effort incentives with ensuring the participation of the agent.
59Note that solving for the optimal contract typically entails differentiation of the agent’s utility
function with respect to the wage scheme. This becomes difficult when the utility function is
kinked, due to the non-differentiability at r. Many papers in the literature therefore require the
use of subdifferential calculus to solve the principal’s problem.
60Kanbur et al. (2008) study the issue of income taxation under moral hazard when agents
have reference-dependent preferences and similarly find that full insurance around the reference
point is optimal.
61There do exist cases in which the agent’s wage is everywhere strictly increasing. However,
this occurs only when the reference point is either extremely high or extremely low, so that the
whole wage schedule is entirely in either the loss or gain space.
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Figure 5: Three possibilities for the shape of the optimal wage scheme; adapted
from de Meza and Webb (2007).
Intuitively, receiving a wage payment which is perceived as a loss reduces the
agent’s utility. If the participation constraint is binding, then in order to meet
the agent’s outside option, the principal is forced to pay a loss premium which
compensates for the possibility of such an event. The optimal contract takes this
into account; while a large degree of wage differentiation is an effective means of
inducing effort, it also raises the probability that the agent experiences a loss,
hence increasing the required loss premium. This generates a trade-off for the
principal. Exposure to losses for poor performance is a powerful way to create
incentives, but necessitates paying higher wages elsewhere to ensure participation.
Accordingly, the principal finds it advantageous to shield the agent from losses for
some realisations of the performance measure so that the wage scheme becomes
partially unresponsive around the reference point. As we shall see, this has been
the key finding in the literature on incentive contracting with loss averse agents
and is recurrent in several studies.
Next, de Meza and Webb (2007) introduce diminishing sensitivity into the
agent’s utility function, which implies convexity below the reference point. Im-
posing a lower bound on the set of possible wage payments, they show that the
principal will never choose to pay a wage in between this lower bound and the
reference point. Intuitively, since the agent is now risk loving in the loss region,
the utility level associated with a particular wage could be provided to the agent
at a lower cost by paying a lottery. However, they further show that lotteries
are not a feature of the optimal contract; in order to best create incentives, any
wages which are below the reference point will be bunched at the lower bound.
The wage scheme then potentially has two flat regions: one at the lower bound,
the other at the reference point. In some cases, this will account for the entire
wage schedule, so that there are only two possible wage payments and the contract
becomes binary.62
62Dittmann et al. (2010) and Iantchev (2009) also consider agents with reference-dependent
preferences, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, so that utility is convex below the reference
point. Dittmann et al. (2010) assume that preferences over wages are given by (29), as suggested
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Finally, they once again consider linear loss aversion but allow for endogenous
reference points, which are determined by the design of the contract. In many
cases this will be more plausible than an exogenous formulation and is closely
related to the concept of expectations acting as a reference point. They consider
two alternative formalisations.
First, it is assumed that the reference point is determined by the certainty
equivalent of the distribution implied by the wage scheme. The principal’s pro-
blem is simplified since the certainty equivalent is tied down by the participation
constraint; accordingly, the optimal contractual form is identical to the case of an
exogenous reference point. However, an important difference is that the region
over which pay is insensitive is now always strictly on the interior of the wage
scheme.
Second, they consider the median of this distribution, finding that the wage
schedule again features wage insensitivities, but also discontinuities.
de Meza and Webb (2007) argue that their results are consistent with real
world incentive schemes, which typically feature pay insensitivity and shielding
from losses. For example, CEOs are often remunerated via a base salary plus stock
options so that they are rewarded when performance is high, but not punished
when it is low. This protection from losses cannot be explained by classical models
of incentive provision.
Jofre et al. (2015) extend the framework of de Meza and Webb (2007) to a
(finite-horizon) dynamic environment, assuming that the previous period’s wage
acts as a reference point for the agent. That is, the reference point varies over
time and in period t is determined by the wage payment received in period t− 1.
They assume that the agent’s utility function is everywhere strictly concave, but
kinked, and show that under these assumptions the optimal contract exhibits two
key differences relative to the classical case.
First, in each period the wage schedule features an interval over which pay is
insensitive to performance and w(x) = r, replicating the result of de Meza and
Webb (2007). This also implies the possibility of wage persistence, since there is
always a positive probability of the period t payment being equal to that of period
t− 1.
Second, the principal understands that today’s wage payment will determine
the agent’s reference point tomorrow and takes this into account when designing
the contract. Since a high wage increases the probability of the agent incurring
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), while Iantchev (2009) imposes a piecewise quadratic form.
Both papers also find that the optimal wage scheme features a discontinuous drop below the
reference point to the lowest possible wage payment, a feature which is interpreted as dismissal
from employment. Wages are found to be continuously increasing elsewhere. The optimal con-
tracts are then compared with real-world data, with both studies finding that loss aversion can
explain observed wage schemes better than risk aversion alone.
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a loss in the next period, the principal prefers to pay lower wages in order to
reduce the prospect of a loss and lower the necessary loss premium, so that wages
become compressed relative to the classical model. In particular, they do not rule
out the case where wages are fixed in each period except the last — so that it is
not possible for the agent to experience a loss — with incentives being provided
solely through payments in the final period.63
The optimal contractual form has also been studied using the Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) model of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences
outlined in Section 3.2.4. Herweg et al. (2010) consider a continuous effort en-
vironment with a discrete performance measure so that X = {x1, ..., xn}. The
agent’s preferences over money are described by (33), where the (stochastic) refe-
rence point is determined endogenously by the expectations induced by both the
wage scheme and the agent’s action, in a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium
(CPE). The gain-loss function capturing reference-dependence is assumed to be
piecewise linear, while effort costs enter into the utility function as normal.
When the agent’s intrinsic consumption utility is strictly concave, in the ab-
sence of loss aversion the optimal contract is fully contingent and specifies a
different wage for each signal xi. However, Herweg et al. (2010) show that the
optimal contract for a loss averse agent can take a binary form, specifying only
two distinct wage payments. They argue that this may provide an explanation
for the real-world prevalence of bonus contracts, which are commonly used to
motivate workers despite suffering from well-known drawbacks.64
Intuitively, recall that under the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) model of
preferences, an agent ex post compares his actual wage with each other possible
wage, weighted by the ex ante probability with which the alternative outcome
occurs. Due to loss aversion — and as shown previously in our simple example
by (37) — these comparisons lead to an ex ante reduction in the agent’s expected
utility, requiring the principal to pay a loss premium. Herweg et al. (2010) show
that this loss premium is increasing in the contract’s degree of wage differenti-
ation: a scheme which specifies many different wage payments leads to a large
number of comparisons and causes the agent to ex ante consider deviations from
the (stochastic) reference point likely. In order to reduce the necessary loss pre-
63Hori and Osano (2014) introduce loss aversion into a continuous-time agency model to explain
the dynamics of CEO compensation, dividends and capital structure. Since this modification
entails various departures from the standard principal-agent framework, we do not provide a
detailed review of their analysis. However, consistent with the literature, they also find that the
optimal contract features a range of outcomes over which compensation is invariant to outcomes.
64For instance, a worker who has already met a sales target has no further incentive to under-
take effort if they already know they will be awarded the bonus. Moreover, they are motivated
to delay further sales until subsequent periods. Both of these issues can be avoided by using
alternative forms of remuneration, such as piecerates. See also the discussion in Herweg et al.
(2010).
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mium, the principal therefore has an incentive to pay the same wage for several
different signals of performance. While the agent’s risk aversion provides the
usual motivation for a strictly increasing wage schedule, if this plays a relatively
minor role compared to loss aversion, then the optimal contract minimises wage
differentiation and pays only two distinct wages.
Further properties of the optimal wage scheme can also be derived. Recall from
(37) that the agent’s reduction in expected utility from loss aversion is maximised
when outcomes are equally likely — in that example when p = 0.5. Accordingly,
in order to minimise the loss premium, the optimal contract will pay the bonus
either very often or very rarely, since this minimises the weight which the agent
puts ex ante on experiencing a loss when the bonus is not paid. Finally, while a
loss averse agent may allow the principal to use a lower powered incentive scheme
relative to the loss neutral case, it can be shown that the principal’s costs of
implementing effort are strictly increasing in loss aversion, similar to our earlier
results.65
In order to explain the real world prevalence of deferred incentives, Macera
(2018a) considers a two-period dynamic environment in which the agent has pre-
ferences as described by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), so that utility is affected by
changes in the agent’s rational expectations over both current and future pay-
ments. In equilibrium, the possibility of changes in expectations always results
in an ex ante utility loss, since the prospect of being disappointed outweighs the
prospect of being pleasantly surprised. As the agent is more sensitive to changes
in expectations over current-period payments relative to future payments, this
utility loss can be reduced by paying a fixed wage in the first period and deferring
65Herweg et al. (2010) also consider higher degrees of loss aversion and show that in such cases,
the principal may be able to reduce implementation costs by committing to stochastically ignore
the outcome of the performance measure, or ‘turn a blind eye’. This allows for payment of the
bonus even when the principal observes a signal which is suggestive of low effort. Daido and
Murooka (2016) find similar results for even moderate levels of loss aversion.
Intuitively, in some environments, an agent may increase their ex ante expected loss by working
harder, an effect which dampens effort incentives. This is especially true, for instance, when the
performance measure is binary and the probability of a signal of high performance is low (c.f.
equation 37). By committing to stochastically ignore the performance measure with a certain
probability, the principal can influence both the agent’s expected loss and the marginal impact
of effort on this expected loss. Accordingly, such stochastic ignorance may be beneficial for the
creation of effort incentives.
Daido and Murooka (2016) argue that since the principal may find it difficult to commit to such
a contract, the same effect can be generated through the use of team incentives, since this allows
for a low performing agent to still be awarded a bonus, so long as coworkers have performed well.
Along similar lines, Marchegiani et al. (2016) argue that by having a systematic tendency to
overrate the performance of their employees (a leniency bias), firms are able to increase wage
expectations; this aids the creation of incentives when agents are loss averse since the pain
associated with receiving a low wage in the case of poor performance is increased. They then
provide support for this argument by conducting a real-effort laboratory experiment, showing
that a contract which occasionally fails to reward hard-working subjects induces significantly
less effort than a contract which occassionally rewards those who shirk.
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all incentives to the second period. This result is in contrast to the classical risk
averse case, where the optimal contract uses a combination of both present and
future incentives. In an accompanying paper, Macera (2018b) provides support
from an experiment in which subjects were required to undertake a real-effort task
over the course of two sessions and were allowed to choose between two incentive
schemes. The majority of subjects preferred a scheme which defers incentives into
the future, contrary to the predictions of the classical model.
The optimal contractual form under reference-dependence and loss aversion
has therefore been studied in various environments, both static and dynamic, and
with several different specifications of the agent’s preferences. As we have seen, a
recurrent finding has been that the optimal wage scheme is partially unresponsive
to the performance measure, violating the sufficient statistic result. This is the
key result of the literature and is summarised by the following remark.
Remark. When the agent’s preferences are characterised by reference-dependence
and loss aversion, the optimal contract typically features some degree of insensiti-
vity, whereby wages do not increase in response to a higher signal of performance.
This constitutes a violation of the sufficient statistic result, since contracts do
not make use of all relevant information. Intuitively, wage insensitivities occur
since the principal wishes to shield the agent from losses, in order to reduce the
necessary premium required to induce participation.
4.2.3 Further Applications
Reference-dependent preferences have also been applied to various different as-
pects of incentive contracting. One particularly interesting application has explo-
red how effort provision is impacted by the framing of incentives. For instance,
a contract which specifies two different wage levels contingent on performance
can be presented in two different ways: as a bonus contract, which offers a low
base wage along with an additional payment for high performance, or as a malus
contract, which combines a high base wage with a punishment or fine for low
performance. While classical economic theory predicts that the way in which a
contract is framed should be inconsequential for the provision of effort, this is
not necessarily the case if the principal’s choice of frame is able to influence the
agent’s preferences.
Armantier and Boly (2015) study a model in which a contract consists of a
schedule of wages, one of which is specified by the principal as the base wage. This
payment then acts as the agent’s reference point. Due to loss aversion, contracts
which implement effort using the threat of punishment are then more effective and
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should induce agents to work harder.66 However, Armantier and Boly (2015) note
that diminishing sensitivity also plays a role: since the agent’s utility function is
convex below the reference point, for large losses the agent becomes less sensitive
to changes in income. Accordingly, when the base wage is unrealistically high, the
marginal utility of income is low for most payments, reducing effort incentives.
The authors find experimental evidence for these results and suggest that incentive
contracts will be most effective when they combine the use of both penalties and
rewards.
Just and Wu (2005) and Hilken et al. (2013) consider similar frameworks but
also analyse the agent’s participation decision. In this case, when choosing the
contract frame, the principal must take into account not only the incentive effect
but also the impact on the agent’s expected utility. Consistent with the broader
literature, they then find that since the disutility associated with exposure to
losses requires a higher average payment to induce participation and therefore
increases the principal’s costs, the optimal contract will feature a low base wage
with the possibility of bonus payments, so that punishments do not play a role.67
A related issue concerns how principals may be able to create effort incenti-
ves by using performance targets, even if they are not associated with monetary
rewards. Corgnet et al. (2018) note that while economists have traditionally ig-
nored the role of intrinsic motivation, psychologists have long argued that the
motivation of individuals will typically depend on a variety of factors, including
non-monetary incentives. For instance, a performance target may act as a yard-
stick by which workers can assess their ability, with the desire to appear competent
creating incentives to meet this target, increasing effort provision.
Abstracting from explicit monetary incentives, Rablen (2010) studies a frame-
work in which the agent’s utility depends on how his performance compares to
a target set by the principal, in a manner consistent with the value function of
prospect theory. Since this target determines the agent’s reference point, the prin-
cipal can manipulate effort incentives through her choice of performance goal. Due
to diminishing sensitivity, the marginal utility of performance is highest around
the reference point. This implies that effort incentives will be inverse U-shaped
in the performance target, with the optimal goal being some intermediate level
which is challenging, but attainable. Rablen (2010) also notes that there is an
additional argument against setting the performance goal too high if the agent
66See also Pierre (2016, 2018) for a similar argument in the static and dynamic cases, respecti-
vely.
67Note that this only holds when the agent’s outside option is invariant to the principal’s
choice of frame. This may not always be the case. For example, suppose a worker is negotiating
a contract with his current employer but also has a job offer elsewhere; it seems plausible that by
modifying the terms of the contract, the employer can influence the worker’s perception of this
job offer. If the principal can reduce the agent’s outside utility by increasing the base wage (and
therefore the reference point), then the optimal contract will typically feature punishments.
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has some discretion over the degree of risk in the production process. A high
goal means that performance will often fall below the target, with the associated
convexity below the reference point implying that the agent becomes prone to
risky behaviour, even when this has no effect on the expected level of output.
Corgnet et al. (2018) consider a similar model in which the principal can set a
wage-irrelevant performance target in order to create incentives, but also allow for
explicit incentive pay in order to analyse the interaction between the two. They
show that these non-monetary incentives act as a substitute for performance pay,
allowing the principal to reduce the incentive payments required to implement
effort. However, the agent must be ex ante compensated with a higher fixed wage
in order to guarantee participation due to the possibility of a utility loss from
failing to meet the target. In their framework, the first effect dominates so that
principals benefit from setting wage-irrelevant performance goals, with the opti-
mal contract typically making use of both monetary and non-monetary incentives.
They complement their theoretical findings with experimental evidence and sug-
gest that non-monetary incentives may help explain the real world prevalence of
low powered wage schemes.68
The efficient assignment of tasks within firms when agents have expectation-
based reference-dependent preferences has also been studied. Daido et al. (2013)
consider an environment in which there is uncertainty over which agent will be
more productive for a certain task. Assuming that the principal can write a state-
specific contract, with classical preferences the task will be assigned in each state
of the world to the agent who is most productive. However, this may no longer be
the case. Intuitively, a state-contingent assignment creates uncertainty over both
wages and effort costs, which, with expectation-based loss aversion, leads to a
reduction in the expected utility of agents. Since this increases the compensation
required to ensure participation, a state-independent task assignment may be
optimal if loss aversion is sufficiently strong. Balmaceda (2018) similarly explores
how such preferences might influence a principal’s choice between assigning a
number of tasks all to one agent (multitasking), or to several agents, each of
whom undertakes a single task (specialisation).
Finally, Daido and Itoh (2007) analyse two effects in relation to self-fulfilling
prophecies within a principal-agent framework. As we have previously seen, in
68This strand of the literature highlights a more general point: changes to the agent’s reference
point — whether controlled by the principal or not — will typically influence the outcomes of
contracting between parties. For instance, while classical economic theory predicts that non-
binding regulatory caps on executive pay are inconsequential, Sta¨dter (2018) shows that this
may no longer be true if reducing the set of feasible contracts impacts the agent’s reference
point. Alternatively, Keefer (2016) argues that the organisational culture of a firm can lead to
changes in reference points by, for example, emphasising the importance of either work-related
effort or of job-related perks. In such cases, the induced change to the agent’s preferences will
have implications for both wages and effort provision.
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the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) model of preferences, differences in initial
expectations can lead to different behaviours in any given environment. One
example of this concerns an agent’s beliefs about his own future performance: if an
agent expects high performance, then he will be more likely to work hard in order
to meet this goal. This notion — that a worker’s enhanced expectations can lead to
improved performance — is known as the Galatea Effect. Moreover, the principal
may be able to influence what kind of expectations are formed, for instance,
if the agent cares about how his performance compares to the principal’s own
beliefs. This is then known as the Pygmalion Effect, whereby a manager’s high
expectations induce workers to act in ways as to fulfil these expectations. Daido
and Itoh (2007) show that both effects can be captured by reference-dependent
preferences and can be used by the principal to lower the costs of implementing
effort.
4.3 Tournaments
An alternative method by which a principal can create effort incentives for several
agents is through the use of a tournament scheme, whereby the remuneration of
an agent depends on how his performance is ranked relative to others. The use of
tournaments has numerous advantages over independent incentive schemes: only
ordinal information about the performance of agents is needed, which can lower
measurement costs; a principal can credibly commit to the scheme even when
performance signals are unverifiable; the principal’s wage expenditure is fixed and
known in advance; results will be unaffected by common shocks to performance
and, finally, tournaments often arise naturally in real-world situations, such as
when many agents compete for promotion within a firm. However, there are
also some disadvantages: tournaments may induce undesirable activities such as
sabotage or collusion; incentives can also be drastically reduced if agents have
access to interim information.
As a starting point for our analysis, we briefly consider a simple model of rank-
order tournaments, based on the work of Lazear and Rosen (1981). A principal
employs two identical agents, again denoted by 1 and 2, to undertake costly
effort on her behalf and has access to a performance measure for each, which
takes the form xi = ai + i. The error terms i are assumed to be normally
distributed and independent, with zero mean and a variance of σ2. After effort
has been undertaken and the values of x1 and x2 have been realised, the agents’
performances are ranked. A winner’s prize, or a high wage, denoted by wH is
awarded to the agent who achieves the highest performance level; the other agent
receives the low wage or loser’s prize wL.
69 The effort incentives created by the
69A complete scheme must also specify the outcome should the tournament end in a draw.
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tournament will depend upon the prize structure and in particular the prize spread
between wH and wL.
Formally, the principal’s problem is to implement the desired effort for each
agent while minimising total wage expenditure wH+wL. The probability of Agent
1 winning the tournament is:
Pr {x1 > x2} = Pr {1 − 2 > a2 − a1} (67)
Let G(·) denote the cumulative distribution function of the random variable ξ =
1−2, with associated density g(·). It follows that Pr {x1 > x2} = 1−G(a2−a1).
Agent 1’s expected utility is then:
[1−G(a2 − a1)]wH +G(a2 − a1)wL − c(a1) (68)
The prize structure must be such that agents are induced to both participate in the
tournament and undertake the desired effort level. As in the case of independent
contracting, the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint is replaced by the first-
order condition of (68) with respect to a1, which is set equal to zero. Rearranging
then yields:
wH − wL = c
′(a1)
g(a2 − a1) (69)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, both agents undertake identical effort a = a1 =
a2, which implies:
wH − wL = c
′(a)
g(0)
(70)
As before, the participation constraint requires that each agent’s expected utility
is weakly greater than his outside option, which we again set equal to zero. From
substituting the foregoing into (68) — along with a1 = a2 and G(0) =
1
2 — we
then have:
wL +
1
2
c′(a)
g(0)
− c(a) ≥ 0 (71)
If limited liability does not restrict the prizes which the principal can award, this
constraint will bind, implying the following loser’s prize:
wL = c(a)− 1
2
c′(a)
g(0)
(72)
For instance, a winner could be selected at random, or each agent could receive an equal wage
of 1
2
[wH + wL]. However, the exact rule is inconsequential for our analysis since performances
are equal with probability zero in the current framework.
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Note that the expected cost per agent of implementing the desired effort level is
1
2 [wL + wH ]. Substituting (70) and (72) then yields:
CP (a) = c(a) (73)
It follows that since the principal’s costs of implementation are equal to the agent’s
effort costs, a rank-order tournament with risk neutral participants and unlimited
liability leads to the first-best outcome, similar to an independent scheme (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981). Moreover, both Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and
Stokey (1983) argue that tournaments can outperform independent contracts if
error terms are sufficiently correlated between contestants, similar to the case of
relative performance evaluation. In the presence of limited liability constraints,
however, the principal’s choice of prizes may be restricted such that agents earn
a rent under the optimal scheme. As in the case of independent contracting, this
will typically lead to the implementation of suboptimal effort levels.
The study of tournament schemes when agents are inequity averse is particu-
larly important, since — unlike the other incentive schemes we have previously
considered — tournaments necessarily result in unequal wages being paid to par-
ticipants. Moreover, the fact that contestants are competing with one another for
rewards is likely to make wage comparisons especially salient. Grund and Sliwka
(2005) study a two-player tournament when agents are both compassionate and
envious. They show that many of the results we have previously derived extend
to the case of tournaments. First, for a fixed wage structure, an agent’s effort
choice under a tournament scheme will be increasing in envy, but decreasing in
compassion. The intuition behind this incentive effect is identical to the case of
independent contracting with inequity averse agents: envy reduces the utility as-
sociated with low performance (relative to the other agent), whereas compassion
reduces the utility associated with high performance.
Next, since inequity aversion decreases expected utility, there is again a ne-
gative participation effect due to the inequity premium. When agents do not
extract a rent so that the participation constraint binds, this increases the princi-
pal’s costs and, as a result, the optimal tournament fails to implement first-best
effort, in contrast to the self-interested case. In a similar model, Demougin and
Fluet (2003) introduce limited liability constraints and show that when agents do
extract a rent, so that only the incentive effect remains, the principal’s costs will
be reduced if envy is the driving force of preferences. Compassion, on the other
hand, can never be beneficial for the principal.70
Through these effects, there is a direct parallel between the impact of inequity
70See also Kra¨kel (2000), who studies a model of tournaments in which agents wish to minimise
the relative income difference between themselves and all others who are better off.
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aversion on tournament schemes and the case of independent contracting studied
in Section 4.1. There may, however, be a difference in the strength of the effects.
Demougin and Fluet (2003) establish that when agents do not extract a rent,
individual incentive pay will typically entail lower costs for the principal than a
tournament. The intuition here is straightforward: tournaments lead to unequal
wages between agents with certainty, whereas this is not necessarily the case under
an individual scheme. This then implies that inequity premia will be larger under
a tournament scheme, so that the principal’s costs are also increased.
The case where agents extract a rent is less clear. Demougin and Fluet (2003)
argue that this same guarantee of inequality can lead to a stronger incentive effect
under a tournament scheme, meaning that the required wage spread is reduced
— but this will depend on the exact specifications of the model. Similarly, in a
slightly different framework, Dubey et al. (2013) show that tournaments can lead
to stronger effort incentives when agents are envious and status-seeking, since
under a tournament scheme increased effort leads to not only a higher expected
wage for the agent, but also a reduction in the expected wages of competitors.
Ederer and Patacconi (2010) also consider envious and status-seeking agents,
in a framework where reference points are determined endogenously by the prize
structure of an n-player tournament. This captures the notions of interpersonal
comparisons and preferences for high status, both of which seem natural in a
tournament environment. The output of agents is ranked, with the top k < n
participants being awarded a high wage (winner’s prize), while the remainder
receive a low wage (loser’s prize). The point of reference for agents is assumed to
be the modal wage in the tournament; whether this is the high or low prize will
therefore depend on the principal’s choice of k. Ederer and Patacconi (2010) show
that the principal benefits from keeping the number of winners k sufficiently low
such that the reference wage is equal to the loser’s prize. In this case, since all
participants receive a wage weakly greater than the reference point, the principal
is able to eliminate the disutility which agents associate with low status. In fact,
since wages above this reference point yield extra utility to status-seeking agents,
the principal is able to reduce wage costs relative to the self-interested case.
Scho¨ttner (2005) investigates the use of J-type tournaments, which, rather than
fixing the prize structure, fix a bonus pool which is then split between agents
based on their relative performance. These incentive schemes are particularly
valuable when agents are inequity averse, since they are able to retain some of
the advantages of standard tournaments (for instance, fixed wage expenditure)
without exposing participants to the same level of expected inequality.
Moving away from inequity aversion, Gill and Stone (2010) study two-player
tournaments in a framework where agents have perceived entitlements which are
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sensitive to how hard they worked relative to a rival, or alternatively, care about
receiving their just deserts. Formally, each agent has a reference point which is
defined by his expected wage, conditional on the effort provision of both himself
and his competitor. They assume that agents dislike wages which fall below this
reference point, while wages above the reference point can result in either a posi-
tive or negative utility impact. Their specification therefore captures elements of
both inequity aversion and expectation-based reference-dependent preferences.71
In particular, they argue that these ‘desert’ preferences capture a more sophisti-
cated notion of fairness than inequity aversion, since agents additionally account
for the extent to which they feel any inequality is deserved.
Gill and Stone (2010) show that the expected loss in utility from desert in
tournaments is maximised when agents undertake identical efforts. Intuitively,
in this case, both agents feel that they deserve an equal share of the winner’s
prize. Yet, since one will win and one will lose, they will both receive a payoff far
away from this common reference point. In contrast, when there is a significant
difference between effort provision, the expected loss from desert is small: the
hard working agent’s expected payoff (and therefore reference point) is close to
the winner’s prize, while the shirking agent’s expected payoff is close to the loser’s
prize. Moreover, since the hard working agent often wins the tournament, both
players typically receive wages which are close to their reference points. If desert
concerns are sufficiently strong, symmetric equilibria cannot exist, since one player
would always prefer to ‘resign’ by lowering effort provision, thereby reducing the
expected desert loss. This result is particularly important, since many findings of
the tournament theory literature typically rest upon the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium (Dato et al., Forthcoming).
Dato et al. (Forthcoming) emphasise the relationship between Gill and Stone’s
(2010) notion of just deserts and the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) model of pre-
ferences, showing that the foregoing result is consistent with a choice-acclimating
equilibrium (CPE) in the latter framework.72 However, it is feasible that in some
71Since agents care about how their actual payoff compares to their expected payoff, there is a
particularly strong resemblance to some of the early models of reference-dependent preferences in
which the reference point is determined by expectations. However, there are some key differences.
For instance, Gill and Stone (2010) later consider ‘unfair’ tournaments, where one player has an
advantage which is felt to be undeserved. In this environment, when agents undertake identical
efforts, the player with the advantage faces a higher probability of winning the tournament and
therefore a higher expected payoff. However, since the advantage is unfair, expected payoffs
no longer coincide with perceived entitlements. In such cases, Gill and Stone (2010) define the
reference point as being the counterfactual expected payoff had the tournament been fair, so
that there is a clear departure from models which assume that the reference point is defined by
actual expectations.
72Similarly, Bergerhoff and Vosen (2015) consider dynamic tournaments, in which interim in-
formation is available to participants, when agents have expectation-based reference-dependent
preferences and the solution concept is a CPE. The foregoing logic also applies in this frame-
work, leading to asymmetric effort provision at the interim stage, since this reduces each agent’s
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tournaments — where the time between decision making and emergence of re-
sults is small — expectations may not have time to acclimate and as such remain
fixed. Dato et al. (Forthcoming) therefore consider the alternative solution con-
cept of choice-unacclimating equilibrium (UPE). Since an agent’s expectations
are then fixed with respect to effort provision, there is no longer any benefit from
resigning, as this would serve only to reduce the probability of winning and incre-
ase the expected loss. Instead, there will typically exist several equilibria around
(and including) the standard symmetric equilibrium; this multiplicity occurs since
agents become ‘attached’ to their initial plans and therefore unwilling to deviate.
However, similar to Gill and Stone (2010), as agents become increasingly sensi-
tive to how their wage compares to the reference point, only outcomes in which
agents undertake asymmetric effort levels can be a preferred personal equilibrium
for both agents.
4.4 Teams
Another important topic in the classical literature on incentive contracting has
been the study of team production or partnerships, whereby several agents un-
dertake effort which contributes to the joint production of output, with the re-
sulting profits distributed between parties according to some sharing rule. The
key assumption is then that neither effort provision nor individual contributions
to output are contractable, so that sharing rules can condition only on the total
level of joint output. As noted by Bartling and von Siemens (2010a), partnerships
are the prevalent organisational form in many industries, making their study an
important economic topic.
We consider the following simple model based on the seminal analysis of Holm-
stro¨m (1982), in which n identical agents each choose an effort level ai ∈ A = R+.
The cost of this effort for each agent is denoted by c(ai) and is assumed to satisfy
the usual restrictions. The efforts of agents jointly determine output according
to the deterministic production function Π : Rn+ → R+, which is assumed to
be strictly increasing, concave and differentiable. For simplicity, we initially re-
strict attention to a sharing rule in which the output produced is divided equally
between agents, so that each receives 1nΠ(a1, ..., an).
In this environment, the total surplus from production is:
Π(a1, ..., an)−
n∑
i=1
c(ai) (74)
expected loss. For tournaments which are sufficiently ‘tight’ at the interim stage, there exist equi-
libria in which the player who is initially behind undertakes strictly higher effort and becomes
the favourite to win the tournament. They argue that such ‘turnarounds’ cannot be explained
by the standard theory.
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which is simply the joint output produced minus the sum of effort costs. It follows
that the Pareto efficient effort level for each agent is defined by the following
condition:
∂Π(a1, ..., an)
∂ai
= c′(ai) (75)
so that each agent equates his marginal contribution to total output with his
marginal effort costs. However, since agents only receive a fraction of total output,
it is straightforward to show that utility maximisation implies effort provision
defined by:
1
n
∂Π(a1, ..., an)
∂ai
= c′(ai) (76)
so that agents undertake too little effort relative to the Pareto optimal quantity.
Intuitively, a misalignment of incentives occurs since each agent bears the full
cost of their effort, while receiving only a fraction of the benefit, leading to an
equilibrium underprovision which is reminiscent in nature of the classical economic
topic of public goods.73 In fact, while we have limited our analysis to an equal
sharing rule, Holmstro¨m (1982) shows that this free-rider problem will persist
for all sharing rules which are budget-balancing (i.e. those which exhaustively
distribute the entirety of output between agents). Since individual effort provision
is not observable and budget-balancing precludes sharing rules which punish all
parties for low output, at least one agent will always have an incentive to shirk.
If we allow for non budget-balancing sharing rules, Holmstro¨m (1982) notes
that typically many mechanisms can lead to an efficient outcome, since group
penalties can then be imposed; one simple example is a mechanism which stipu-
lates a zero payment to each agent unless output is at its optimal level, in which
case it will be split equally. However, non budget-balancing sharing rules may
be infeasible since in the event of suboptimal output, agents will have an ex post
preference to renegotiate the contract rather than ‘burn’ output, so that poten-
tial penalties may not actually be enforced. In this case, the free-riding problem
reappears, unless there exists a principal who can act as the residual claimant of
suboptimal output and therefore enforce the original contract.
Much of the subsequent literature on team production has studied the ways in
which the free-rider problem can be mitigated under equal sharing rules. One such
contribution comes from Kandel and Lazear (1992), who study an environment in
which agents can subject one another to peer pressure. Formally, let us consider
the foregoing environment but now additionally assume that there exists a peer
73Intuitively, in both cases, underprovision results since the costly inputs of individuals (either
effort or monetary contributions) confer positive externalities on other agents. Public good
provision has been studied with non-standard preferences (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999),
with findings which are directly relevant for the analysis of team production. However, this
literature lies outside the scope of the current discussion.
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pressure function Pi(a1, ..., an) which acts as a cost for each agent, so that utility
takes the form:
1
n
Π(a1, ..., an)− c(ai)− Pi(a1, ..., an) (77)
The effort provision of a utility maximising agent is then given by:
1
n
∂Π(a1, ..., an)
∂ai
= c′(ai) +
∂Pi(a1, ..., an)
∂ai
(78)
When ∂Pi∂ai < 0, the effort level that solves (78) is strictly greater than the level
that solves (76), as shown by Kandel and Lazear (1992). The essence of this
assumption is that the negative impact of peer pressure on an agent is reduced
by undertaking higher effort; this may be the case if, for example, agents feel
guilt from shirking or have a desire to conform to a social norm of high effort
provision. Some authors have then extended this analysis to show that inequity
averse preferences can lead to similar effects. Intuitively, when agents compare
wages net of effort costs, an equal sharing rule implies that differences in payoffs
can only result from differences in effort provision. Compassionate agents then
dislike shirking (since this leaves them ahead), while envious agents dislike the
shirking of others (since this leaves them behind).74
Mohnen et al. (2008) consider a model in which two agents contribute to a
group task over two periods and are subsequently paid a wage on the basis of total
output. Agents are assumed to dislike any differences in aggregate effort provision
across the two periods. In such an environment, inequity aversion can partially
alleviate the free-rider problem, similar to peer pressure, when agents are able to
observe the effort of their colleague after the first period. Intuitively, since agents
dislike effort disparity, there is an incentive to choose second period effort such
that these differences are reduced. For instance, if agent i undertakes strictly
higher effort in period 1, agent j will then work harder in order to reduce the gap
in aggregate effort contributions. It then follows that an agent’s marginal return
to first-period effort is increased, since high contributions have the additional
effect of inducing the coworker to increase his second period effort. The result
is that equilibria exist in which both agents undertake strictly higher total effort
relative to the self-interested case, with the paper’s findings being supported by
the outcome of a real effort experiment. In a related model, Huck and Rey-Biel
(2006) show that output will be maximised when agents move sequentially, rather
than simultaneously, since the first-mover is similarly able to induce his coworker
to undertake higher effort. As a result, leadership can emerge endogenously as an
74Note that compassionate preferences therefore have a positive incentive effect in the frame-
work of team production, contrary to our earlier findings for the case of independent incentive
contracts.
82
equilibrium if agents are able to choose the timing of their efforts.
Masclet (2002) shows that the free-rider problem can be similarly alleviated
if agents are able to punish one another after observing effort provision. In the
self-interested case, no punishments will occur if inflicting them is costly, since
agents do not care about the payoffs of others. However, this is no longer true
when agents sufficiently dislike inequality, in which case they are willing to incur
the costs associated with punishment in order to reduce the payoffs of those who
shirk. It follows that punishment becomes a credible threat, which can then induce
agents to undertake high effort in equilibrium.75
Ko¨lle et al. (2016) explore the case of heterogeneity in productivity between
agents, where payoff inequalities will naturally occur since high ability agents
undertake relatively more effort, but receive the same wage. As we have seen,
inequity aversion then creates incentives to adjust effort provision such that payoff
disparities are reduced, so that a high ability agent undertakes less effort relative
to the self-interested case. However, this can be avoided if the ex ante wealths of
agents are unequal. Specifically, if high ability agents initially have higher incomes
than their low ability counterparts, the desire for ex post payoff equality increases
their willingness to exert effort, which increases both total output and the welfare
of all agents.
The literature we have covered so far has assumed the use of an equal sharing
rule to divide output between parties. Bartling and von Siemens (2010a) note that
such mechanisms are commonly used in practice and argue that inequity aversion
may provide a rationale for this observation. The intuition here is simple: with an
equal sharing rule, there exists no payoff inequality when all agents undertake the
efficient level of effort, while the benefits for any agent who chooses to unilaterally
shirk are reduced by compassion. Accordingly, incentives to shirk are low. In
contrast, unequal sharing rules imply painful inequality even in the case of efficient
effort provision by all agents. Moreover, if envy is stronger than compassion, as is
typically assumed, the agent who receives the smallest share of output according
to the sharing rule may prefer to shirk — thereby increasing his net wage since
effort costs are reduced, and possibly moving ahead of others — rather than
undertake high effort and suffer from envy.
While the analysis of Bartling and von Siemens (2010a) highlights the fact
that compassion can help mitigate the free-rider problem and maintain high effort
provision, it may also lead to inefficiently small teams. To see this, suppose there
exists a team which employs an equal sharing rule when dividing output among
members. Now further suppose that another agent wishes to join the team and
that this is efficient (since the resulting increase in output is greater than the
75Similar results hold in the context of public good provision when inequity averse agents are
able to punish one another; see for instance Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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newcomer’s effort costs) but leads to a reduction in the average output per team
member. With self-interested agents, there may be a compromise in which all
parties benefit: for instance, the newcomer’s effort costs could be compensated
and the remaining additional output divided equally between existing members.
However, such a solution implies payoff differences among team members and
therefore may not be feasible when agents are compassionate.
Alternatively, Li (2009) shows that there exists a stochastic, budget-balancing
sharing rule which can elicit efficient effort when agents are inequity averse, in
contrast to the result of Holmstro¨m (1982). The mechanism works as follows. If
total output is equal to (or above) the optimal level, it is split equally between
agents. Otherwise, if output is below this level, then at least one agent has
shirked; in this case, a subset of agents is randomly chosen, who are then subject
to the largest fine possible given limited liability constraints. The revenue from
these fines, along with output, is then divided equally between the remaining
partners. Accordingly, each agent is either ‘lucky’, in which case they receive
a higher income but suffer from negative feelings of compassion, or ‘unlucky’,
which results in both lower income and disutility from envy. For agents who are
sufficiently other-regarding, the mechanism therefore enforces efficient effort by
imposing massive inequality — and therefore a reduction in expected utility —
as a result of shirking. Li (2009) further argues that this sharing rule is most
effective when team sizes are small, or when the subset of agents who are chosen
for punishment is large.
Beyond inequity aversion, there have been limited applications of reference-
dependent preferences to team contracting. Gill and Stone (2015) apply the con-
cept of just deserts, whereby agents care about their payoff relative to their percei-
ved entitlement.76 Specifically, this will depend on how an agent’s effort provision
compares to that of his teammates: he believes he deserves a higher wage if he
works harder, but a lower wage if he works less. They note that desert guilt —
whereby agents dislike receiving more than they feel they deserve — is a realistic
assumption in the context of team production. In this case, desert preferences
lead to endogenous complementarities since agents have an incentive to match the
efforts of others. To see this, suppose that all agents initially undertake identical
efforts. Each agent then believes they deserve an equal share of the team output
and, due to the equal sharing rule, each agent actually receives this share. Now
consider a single agent’s incentive to deviate. Increasing effort provision results in
a reference point above the equal share, while decreasing effort provision leads to
a reference point below this amount; in both cases however, the agent continues
to receive an equal share so that there is a disparity between his actual payoff
76‘Desert’ preferences were previously discussed in Section 4.3.
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and his perceived entitlement, resulting in a utility loss. This disinclination to
deviate from a common effort level means that a range of symmetric equilibria
are sustainable, both below and above the equilibrium self-interested effort le-
vel. Desert preferences of this type therefore generate behaviour consistent with
both positive and negative reciprocity and can both exacerbate and alleviate the
free-riding problem in teams.77
5 Conclusion
As we have seen, the introduction of inequity averse and loss averse preferences
into studies of incentive contracting has a significant impact on the outcomes
predicted by economic models. This impact can typically be delineated into two
distinct effects. First, there is a positive incentive effect which allows for lower-
powered explicit incentives in order to implement a given effort level. Second,
there is a negative participation effect, whereby reductions in an agent’s expected
utility must be compensated by a higher expected wage if the contract is to
be accepted. The latter effect then implies that the effort level chosen to be
implemented by the principal is typically reduced relative to the standard case.
Accordingly, the findings of the literature are consistent with empirical evidence,
both that wages tend to be compressed within organisations (Prendergast, 1999)
and that incentive pay is typically less sensitive to performance than predicted by
the standard theory (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
The aforementioned effects also have an impact on the structure of the opti-
mal contract. The literature which considers inequity aversion has predominantly
focused on the extent to which a worker’s wage should be dependent on the per-
formance of others, and, if so, whether there is a positive or negative relationship
between the two. In particular, firms may find it beneficial to eliminate wage ine-
qualities using team contracts, or exacerbate them through relative performance
evaluation or tournament schemes. We have also seen how inequity averse prefe-
rences — and in particular, compassion — allow groups of workers who engage in
partnerships to partially mitigate the free-rider problem.
In contrast, the literature which studies loss aversion often features an analysis
of optimal wage schemes in the presence of a rich performance measure, with a
recurrent finding being that payments will typically be invariant to the perfor-
mance signal over some regions. This unresponsiveness results from the firm’s
77The finding that desert preferences lead agents to undertake similar efforts is contrary to the
findings of Gill and Stone (2010) in the context of tournaments, discussed in Section 4.3, where
effort differentiation results. Intuitively, agents with desert concerns prefer outcomes in which
relative wages are reflective of relative effort provision. Since wages are necessarily unequal in
tournaments, agents are then motivated toward unequal efforts. Likewise, equal sharing rules in
partnerships typically induce equal efforts.
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desire to shield workers from payments below the reference point and therefore
reduce the size of the necessary loss premium. Accordingly, several authors have
noted that reference-dependent preferences may provide an explanation for the
real-world prevalence of simple wage schemes which typically feature a small num-
ber of distinct payments (see for instance Herweg et al., 2010 and the discussion
therein).
These central findings have been established numerous times and in many
different frameworks. However, there are several interesting questions which have
received relatively little attention, or have yet to be studied, when parties are
either inequity averse or loss averse. For instance, what are the implications
of such preferences for long-term contracting in dynamic environments? How
does the outcome of contracting change when workers are required to undertake
several different productive tasks? Or when they can control the risk inherent
in production? What if they can engage in undesirable activities in order to
manipulate the performance measure?
Unfortunately, investigation of such issues is often impeded by our lack of
knowledge regarding the exact nature of individual preferences in complex envi-
ronments. Insights regarding optimal dynamic contracts will crucially depend on
workers’ attitudes toward intertemporal wage inequalities, or how their reference
points adjust over time.78 There exists little evidence here. Likewise, Macera
(2018a) notes that our understanding of the relationship between risk aversion
and loss aversion is underdeveloped.
This same problem also hinders the study of further issues relating to organi-
sational design. Inequity aversion will likely have implications for managerial de-
cisions, such as the social proximity of workers within firms, wage secrecy policies
and the optimal size of departments or teams.79 However, there is no established
theory of how inequity concerns vary as coworkers become more distant, or as the
size of the reference group changes.80 It also seems overly simplistic to assume
that wage secrecy will prevent social comparisons from occurring, when workers
are likely to be able to infer at least some of the relevant information.
Similarly, while a small amount of papers which assume reference-dependent
preferences have investigated how firms may be able to influence the reference
78For instance, it is plausible that a worker who earns more than his colleagues in a particular
month may not feel particularly bad about this if he received less than them in previous months,
since ‘long-term’ inequality has been reduced.
79While we have previously discussed how social proximity can be influenced by the firm’s
choice of wage scheme, it may also be affected by other factors: whether workers share an office,
work similar hours, have the same job title etc.
80Suppose a worker receives the low wage wL, while all others in his reference group of size N
receive the high wage wH . Under the Fehr and Schmidt specification (28), the worker’s utility is
invariant to changes in N . Yet it seems doubtful that finishing behind one other person inspires
identical feelings to finishing behind one hundred others.
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point through channels such as design of the wage scheme, the framing of the
contract or the firm’s organisational culture, any resulting predictions are neces-
sarily speculative due to the dearth of evidence for how reference points change
in response to such actions. It seems, therefore, that more evidence regarding the
nature of individual preferences is required before we are able to investigate the
foregoing issues with any confidence.
In his overview of the broader behavioural contract theory literature, Ko˝szegi
(2014) notes that a common tendency of researchers has been to focus on how
the parameters of the behavioural theory affect predictions. Yet, economists are
ultimately more interested in how outcomes react to changes in the economic en-
vironment, since this kind of analysis yields predictions which are both more eco-
nomically relevant and easier to test. While the foregoing discussion has provided
some examples in this direction, there are many other interesting and important
issues which have yet to be investigated. Hopefully, subsequent studies will ex-
plore these areas and continue to shed light on the outcomes of contracting in
various environments.
Finally, it is important to note that the relationship between the theoretical
literature and evidence — experimental or empirical — runs in both directions.
While future studies can provide data which will continue to inspire theoretical
models and help us answer some of the foregoing questions, it will also be impor-
tant to discern whether the findings of the literature are consistent with real world
evidence. In doing so, we will make significant progress toward understanding the
nature of incentive contracts and their impact on economic behaviour.
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Chapter 2
1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored the existing literature which investigates incentive
contracting when workers are averse to either inequity or losses. In the former case,
we found that studies typically assume each worker’s reference group is confined
to others within the firm, such as coworkers, subordinates or superiors. However,
as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, there is significant evidence that
social comparisons often extend beyond the firm to wider groups in society. In
this chapter, we study incentive contracting when preferences are characterised
by relative income concerns and workers attempt to keep up with the Joneses.
In order to capture this notion, we introduce a stylised model where workers
have an aversion to falling behind a reference wage, which is determined by the
economy-wide average income.1 Moreover, to allow for a detailed comparative
static analysis, we assume that workers’ preferences can be represented by a utility
function which is piecewise linear around this reference wage. The importance of
relative income concerns is then captured by the difference between the left-hand
and right-hand marginal utilities at this point. Not only is this approach both
simple and intuitive, there is also survey evidence to suggest that the average
wage in an economy does indeed act as an important point of comparison. For
instance, the studies by Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002) and Alpizar et al. (2005) present evidence that many individuals would be
willing to sacrifice a significant amount of income in order to improve their relative
position in society and, in particular, move above the average income level.2
1This chapter is an earlier version of the paper ‘Moral Hazard and Keeping up with the
Joneses’ (Demougin and Upton, 2019) and was cowritten with Dominique Demougin.
2These papers each ask individuals to express their preferences over hypothetical outcomes,
which differ with respect to both their own income and the average income in society. For
instance, Solnick and Hemenway (1998) ask respondents questions of the following nature:
Would you rather live in Society A (you earn $50,000; others earn $25,000) or
Society B (you earn $100,000; others earn $200,000)?
It is explained that prices are at their current level and that the purchasing power of money
is equal in each society. They find that approximately half of respondents would prefer to live
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The first part of this chapter considers the contracting problem of a single
firm-worker pair who take the reference wage as exogenously given. Specifically,
we solve for the wage scheme which minimises the firm’s costs of implementing a
particular effort level in the presence of moral hazard. The resulting contract is
found to take either a binary or ternary form. The former is shown to be optimal
when all payments are below the worker’s reference wage, in which case utility is
linear over the relevant region and the resulting contract behaves essentially as
in the standard risk neutral case. We find that when the distribution function
satisfies an additional regularity requirement, this occurs precisely when effort is
sufficiently low. In the ternary case, depending on the outcome of a continuous
performance measure, the principal either pays the smallest possible payment
given limited liability, exactly the worker’s reference wage or a bonus which is
strictly greater than both. The frequency of the respective payments depends on
both the degree of the worker’s relative income concerns and on the quality of the
performance measure.
Next, we present a detailed comparative static analysis and show that the
firm benefits from contracting with workers who either have stronger relative
income concerns, or evaluate their earnings relative to a higher reference wage.
Intuitively, aversion to falling behind a reference wage creates a positive incentive
effect, similar to the cases of inequity aversion and loss aversion. When limited
liability constraints imply that the worker extracts a rent from the relationship,
any participation effect plays no role so that, altogether, effort can be implemented
at a lower cost for the firm. We also show that the firm’s costs are increasing in
the effort to be implemented, but decreasing in the quality of monitoring.
The last part of the chapter embeds the employment relationship into a replica
economy populated by a continuum of identical firm-worker pairs. The reference
wage is then assumed to be determined endogenously by the average income of
workers, allowing us to further the idea of keeping up with the Joneses. We
establish some additional comparative static results, before letting effort be chosen
endogenously by firms to maximise profit. Using a series of numerical examples,
we then examine how changes in the parameters of the model affect the economy’s
equilibrium. In particular, we highlight an externality effect whereby firms do
not take into account the impact of their contracting decisions on the economy’s
average wage; it follows that firms would be able to increase their profits if they
were to undertake these decisions collectively. In addition, we find that higher
relative income concerns are associated with a lower average wage, as well as a
reduced level of inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient.
Our analysis is closely related to papers which consider incentive contracting
in a society in which they have 50% less income, so long as their relative income is high (i.e.
expressing a preference for Society A in the foregoing example).
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when a firm employs several inequity averse workers who dislike wage inequali-
ties. As discussed in the previous chapter, a key issue in this literature is the
extent to which remuneration of one worker should depend on the performance of
others. Many studies investigate how contracts can be designed in order to either
exacerbate or eliminate inequality, using wage schemes such as team contracts
(Itoh, 2004; Demougin and Fluet, 2006; Goel and Thakor, 2006), relative per-
formance evaluation (Bartling, 2011; 2012a) or tournaments (Grund and Sliwka,
2005; Demougin and Fluet, 2003). In contrast to these works, we are interested in
wider social comparisons where the reference group consists of a large number of
others and extends beyond the firm. Moreover, we limit attention to independent
contracts where a worker’s wage is dependent only on his own performance level.
Since the first part of the chapter considers contracting between a firm-worker
pair where the reference wage is taken as exogenously given, our analysis also
bears a resemblance to papers which study incentive contracting when workers’
preferences are characterised by reference-dependence and loss aversion. The main
focus of these models has been the study of the optimal wage scheme when the
firm has access to a rich performance measure, with loss aversion implying that
wage schemes exhibit some degree of payment insensitivity, violating Holmstro¨m’s
(1979) sufficient statistic result (de Meza and Webb, 2007; Herweg et al., 2010).
However, this literature typically assumes that an individual’s reference point is
solely determined by his contract, rather than as a result of any wider social
comparisons.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model, while Section 3 describes the firm’s design problem and shows that the
optimal contract takes either a binary or ternary form. Section 4 describes the
key properties of these contracts and analyses when each will be used. Section
5 provides a comparative static analysis of the ternary contract, while Section 6
extends the model to allow for an endogenous reference wage. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix of the chapter.
2 Setup
We consider the contracting problem between a risk-neutral firm (the principal)
and a worker whose preferences are characterised by relative income concerns (the
agent). The firm owns a production technology and wishes to employ the worker
to undertake a certain level of effort, denoted by a > 0.3 We solve for the firm’s op-
timal contract which implements the desired effort level while minimising the ex-
pected wage. The worker’s preferences are represented by a utility function which
3In Section 6, we introduce a function v(a) which measures the firm’s value of the worker’s
effort and let a be determined endogenously.
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is separable in wage payment (w) and effort, U(w, a;α,wR) = u(w;α,wR)− c(a),
where wR is an exogenously given reference wage. The function c(a) captures the
worker’s disutility of undertaking effort a and is assumed to satisfy the standard
regularity requirements: c(0) = c′(0) = 0, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. The worker’s prefe-
rences over wage payments are represented by a piecewise linear function around
wR:
u(w;α,wR) =

w + α(w − wR) if w < wR
w if w ≥ wR
(1)
where the parameter α > 0 measures the worker’s aversion to falling behind
the reference wage, referred to hereafter as the KUJ parameter. We follow the
standard literature and assume that the firm holds all of the bargaining power,
offering the worker a take-it-or-leave-it contract. If the worker rejects the con-
tract, he undertakes no effort and receives no wage implying the utility level
U(0, 0;α,wR) = −αwR. In addition, the worker is financially constrained so that
wage payments are restricted to be non-negative in all states of the world.
Moral hazard occurs because effort is non-verifiable. Instead, the firm has
access to the following monitoring technology: after the worker has produced effort
a, monitoring generates a proxy variable x ∈ [0, 1] with an exogenous probability
m ∈ (0, 1) and no information, denoted by ∅, with probability (1 − m).4 It is
common knowledge that the realisation of x is drawn from a thrice-differentiable
distribution function F (x; a) with density f(x; a) > 0 over the support.5 In order
to guarantee the validity of the first-order approach, we require that F satisfies the
strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) and the strict Convexity of
the Distribution Function Condition (CDFC), as is standard in the moral hazard
literature (Rogerson, 1985).6
If monitoring does not generate information, all parties observe ∅. Otherwise,
the firm can choose to make the private signal x available, in which case it be-
comes verifiable. Alternatively, the firm can hide the realisation of x so that all
other parties observe ∅ (i.e. the worker and, potentially, third parties cannot
distinguish between situations where the monitoring technology did not generate
any information and those in which the firm hides a disfavourable outcome). This
4For instance, suppose x is the output of an electronic device and (1−m) the probability that
the device breaks down. A similar model with a different focus appears in Bental et al. (2016),
aimed at analysing the implications of incomplete contracts for legal design.
5We require that F has third derivatives for the comparative static analysis.
6Strict MLRP states that fa
f
(x; a) is strictly increasing in x for all x ∈ (0, 1); it also implies
first-order stochastic dominance (i.e. Fa(x; a) ≤ 0 for all x). Strict CDFC states that Faa(x; a) >
0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). See LiCalzi and Spaeter (2003) for a discussion of distributions which satisfy
these conditions.
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introduces an additional moral hazard issue on the side of the firm, who will an-
nounce the realisation of x only if it is advantageous to do so, thereby restricting
the set of feasible contracts as described in the subsequent section.
Before solving the model, a couple of remarks are in order. First, with respect
to the specification of monitoring and, in particular, the assumption m < 1. As is
well known from the principal-agent literature, when the agent is risk-neutral and
the principal has access to information of the form x ∈ [a, b], the optimal contract
is binary with a critical value equal to b; see e.g. Kim (1995; 1997). That is, the
bonus is paid only for the highest possible performance level, which in the case
of a continuous density function occurs with probability zero. In order to satisfy
incentive compatibility, this in turn implies an unbounded bonus. This peculiar
result also occurs when the wage-utility function is piecewise-linear; assuming that
monitoring may fail eliminates this possibility.
Second, our specification implies that the worker’s outside utility level varies
with both the reference wage and the worker’s KUJ parameter. We view this as
being consistent with our interpretation of relative income concerns, as a worker
who chose to reject the contract would continue to compare their earnings with
the reference wage. This is also coherent with our specification in Section 6, where
the reference wage is endogenously determined by the equilibrium average wage
in the economy. Our formalisation is in contrast to the literatures which consider
incentive contracting in the presence of inequity aversion or loss aversion, whe-
reby workers either make intra-firm wage comparisons, or compare their wage to
some reference point which is typically determined endogenously by the outcome
of contracting. Accordingly, in both of these cases, it is logically consistent to
consider an exogenously given outside utility.
3 Incentive Feasible Contracts
In this environment, an incentive feasible contract is a triplet C = {a,w∅, w(x)}
with the following characteristics. First, it specifies the required effort level a > 0.
Second, it conditions the worker’s remuneration w(x) on the verifiable monitoring
output x ∈ [0, 1] and stipulates the wage w∅ to be paid when this information is
not generated or is hidden by the firm. Third, the contract satisfies the following
conditions; (i) all wage payments are non-negative; (ii) C induces the worker to
participate; (iii) C induces the worker to exert effort a, anticipating that the firm
will not conceal the outcome of monitoring; (iv) C motivates the firm to never
conceal the outcome of monitoring. With respect to the last condition, note that
in its absence, the firm would only announce the realisation of x if w(x) ≤ w∅.
Anticipating this, the worker understands that any wage w(x) > w∅ would never
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actually be paid. Instead, for any realisation x, the parties would expect the wage
min{w(x), w∅} to be paid. Clearly this wage scheme satisfies (iv) so that we can
without loss of generality restrict attention to wage schemes such that w(x) ≤ w∅,
∀x ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose the firm wishes to implement a given effort level a > 0. Accordingly,
they will choose the incentive feasible contract C which minimises expected costs.
Mathematically, that contract is the solution to the optimisation problem:
CF (a;wR) = min
w∅,w(x)
(1−m)w∅ +m
1∫
0
w(x)f(x; a)dx (I)
a = arg max
aˆ
(1−m)u(w∅;α,wR) +m
1∫
0
u(w(x);α,wR)f(x; aˆ)dx− c(aˆ) (IC)
(1−m)u(w∅;α,wR) +m
1∫
0
u(w(x);α,wR)f(x; a)dx− c(a) ≥ −αwR (PC)
w∅ ≥ w(x), ∀x ∈ [0, 1] (FFC)
w∅, w(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1] (WFC)
where the (IC), (PC) conditions and the Worker’s Financial Constraint (WFC)
respectively ensure that the worker undertakes the effort a, that he accepts the
contract and that payments are non-negative. The Firm’s Feasibility Constraint
(FFC) guarantees that the outcome of monitoring is never concealed. Problem (I)
is solved in the appendix where we maximise the negative of the objective function
and apply the first-order approach (i.e. we substitute the first-order condition of
the worker’s optimisation problem for IC). Moreover, we show that (PC) is never
binding due to (WFC) and can thus be ignored.
Proposition 1 summarises the solution to (I) and introduces the notation ap-
plied in the remainder of the paper. We distinguish between three different con-
tracts, for the cases where the highest wage payment is strictly less than, equal
to, and strictly greater than the worker’s reference wage, respectively.
Proposition 1. For any a > 0, α > 0, m ∈ (0, 1) and wR > 0, there exists an
optimal contract which takes one of three possible forms:
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– A strict binary contract with
wB(x) =
0 0 ≤ x < zBBB zB ≤ x ≤ 1 (2)
where zB is a critical value which partitions the support into two subinter-
vals, BB satisfies 0 < BB < w
R and w∅ = BB.
– An intermediate contract with
wI(x) =
0 0 ≤ x < zIwR zI ≤ x ≤ 1 (3)
where zI is a critical value which partitions the support into two subintervals
and w∅ = wR.
– A strict ternary contract with
wT (x) =

0 0 ≤ x < z1
wR z1 ≤ x < z2
BT z2 ≤ x ≤ 1
(4)
where z1 < z2 are critical values which split the support into three subinter-
vals, BT satisfies w
R < BT and w∅ = BT .
Note that while the intermediate contract can be thought of as the limit case of
either the strict binary or the strict ternary contract, we introduce the distinction
for the sake of the ensuing comparative static analysis.
The use of a strict binary contract has a straightforward interpretation in
terms of the existing literature when the bonus required in order to align incen-
tives is less than wR, i.e. when effort is sufficiently small. In these cases, the
worker’s utility function is linear over the relevant region and the firm’s opti-
misation program becomes similar to that of the standard risk-neutral agency
problem.7 Applying the intuition from Kim (1995), risk-neutrality induces a bi-
nary contract characterised by a critical zB where low performance, defined by
x < zB, is rewarded with a zero payment, while the worker receives a bonus
payment BB in the case of high performance (i.e. x ≥ zB).
On the other hand, when effort is sufficiently large, the bonus payment is
necessarily strictly greater than wR, thereby crossing the worker’s reference wage
so that the relevant portion of the wage-utility function is piecewise linear, and
7The key difference is that in the current case, marginal utility is equal to (1 + α) instead of
1 for the standard risk-neutral case.
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non-differentiable when the wage is equal to wR. Solving (I) therefore requires
subdifferential calculus to address this issue.8 We show in the appendix that the
relevant first-order condition with respect to w(x) takes the form
−mf(x; a) + λm [1 + γ(x)α] fa(x; a) + ξ(x)− ζ(x) = 0, ∀x (5)
where ξ(x), ζ(x) are Lagrange variables associated with (WFC) and (FFC) while
γ(x) is a multiplier dealing with the non-differentiability at wR.9 γ(x) is equal to
1 when w(x) < wR, equal to 0 when w(x) > wR and can take any value over the
unit interval at w(x) = wR.10 Taking into account that the Lagrange variables
are non-negative, (5) implies that the wage prescribed for any given x depends
upon the direction of the inequality
λ [1 + γ(x)α]
fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
S 1 (6)
Figure 1 provides a graphical interpretation of this condition. First, consider the
case where ξ(x) > 0, which immediately implies w(x) = 0 so that ζ(x) = 0 and
γ(x) = 1. Substituting these values into (5) and rearranging implies that the LHS
of (6) becomes strictly less than the RHS. Geometrically, this requires x < z1. A
symmetric argument applies when ζ(x) > 0; accordingly, w(x) = BT > w
R. Here,
the LHS is strictly larger than the RHS and γ(x) = 0. Graphically, this is only
feasible for x > z2. Finally, when ξ(x) = ζ(x) = 0, (6) holds with equality. In
Figure 1, this corresponds to realisations of x at the intersection of the horizontal
bold line and the grey shaded area. Analytically, that intersection is characterised
by 0 < γ(x) < 1 a.e. so that w(x) = wR.11
From the foregoing, we know that the firm will use a strict binary contract for
sufficiently low effort levels and a strict ternary contract for sufficiently high effort
levels. By continuity, there must be at least one intermediate effort level where the
bonus takes the value wR. In Figure 1, it was assumed that λfa(1;a)f(1;a) > 1. Suppose
now that λfa(1;a)f(1;a) ≤ 1 so that the bold line does not intersect with λfa(x;a)f(x;a) over the
support of x. In this case, the only possible wage payments are 0 or wR and the
result of this is the intermediate contract described in Proposition 1. Although
strictly speaking this contract is binary, we differentiate it from the strict binary
8Subdifferential calculus is a technique for solving convex optimisation problems in the pre-
sence of non-differentiability. For a general reference, see Nesterov (2004).
9For a similar approach, see de Meza and Webb (2007).
10The expression 1 + γ(x)α therefore represents the superdifferential of u(w;α,wR). For w 6=
wR it is exactly equal to the usual derivative. However, for w = wR it can take any value in
the closed interval [1, 1 +α] and is a convex combination of the left and right derivatives at that
point; accordingly, γ(x) ∈ [0, 1].
11x = z1 and x = z2 are measure zero events and the value of w(x) at these two points is
inconsequential. The case where ξ(x) > 0, ζ(x) > 0 is shown in the appendix to never occur.
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Figure 1: The feasible region of λ [1 + γ(x)α] fa(x;a)f(x;a)
case since the determination of the critical value zI and the comparative statics
of the contract are different.
4 Optimal Contracts
Proposition 1 tells us that when looking for the firm’s optimal contract to imple-
ment a, we can restrict our search to three different types of wage scheme. In this
section, we solve for the optimal payments and associated critical value(s) for each
contractual form on a case-by-case basis. We proceed as follows. For the strict
binary and strict ternary cases, we solve for the respective bonus payments BB
and BT using the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint and determine the
corresponding critical values of the performance level in order to minimise costs.
For the intermediate contract, the critical value zI must be chosen to satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraint since wage payments are fixed at zero and wR.
We then return to the question of when each contract will be chosen.
4.1 Strict Binary Contract
In this subsection, we suppose that the firm uses a strict binary contract (zB, BB).
In this case, the worker’s incentive compatibility requirement becomes:
a = arg max
â
−mF (zB; â)αwR + [1−mF (zB; â)]
[
(1 + α)BB − αwR
]− c(â) (7)
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Hence, for any zB, implementing effort a requires that the bonus payment satisfies:
BB =
c′(a)
−mFa(zB; a)(1 + α) (8)
Accordingly, the firm will select zB in order to minimise expected costs. However,
this is only compatible with the worker’s preferences if the resulting bonus satisfies
BB < w
R. Altogether, the firm’s expected costs are given by:
CFB
(
a;wR
)
= min
zB
1−mF (zB; a)
−mFa(zB; a)(1 + α)c
′(a)
(9)
s.t.
c′(a)
−mFa(zB; a)(1 + α) < w
R
Whenever the minimisation problem (9) has a solution, the optimal critical value
z∗B is implicitly defined by its first order condition:
mFa(zB; a)f(zB; a) + [1−mF (zB; a)] fa(zB; a) = 0 (10)
In the alternative case, we set CFB
(
a;wR
)
= +∞. This ensures that CFB
(
a;wR
)
is well-defined over R++ for all values of a. Following a similar approach for the
intermediate and strict ternary cases, the firm’s optimal wage scheme can then
be found by minimising across the three contractual forms, whereby existence of
a finite solution is guaranteed by Proposition 1.
4.2 Intermediate Contract
By definition, the intermediate contract can be thought of as a limit case of either
the strict binary contract with BB = w
R or of the strict ternary contract with
BT = w
R. With either interpretation, the bonus is exogenously fixed at wR
resulting in the worker’s incentive compatibility requirement:
a = arg max
â
−mF (zI ; â)αwR + [1−mF (zI ; â)]wR − c(â) (11)
Hence, implementing effort a with the intermediate contract necessitates defining
z∗I as the implicit solution to the equation:
c′(a) +mFa(zI ; a) (1 + α)wR = 0 (12)
If (12) has a solution, the firm’s costs of implementing effort become:
CFI
(
a;wR
)
= [1−mF (z∗I ; a)]wR (13)
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Otherwise, when z∗I is not well-defined, applying a similar logic to the foregoing
subsection we define CFI
(
a;wR
)
= +∞.
4.3 Strict Ternary Contract
Finally, suppose the firm uses a strict ternary contract with BT > w
R. The
worker’s incentive compatibility constraint is then:
a = arg max
â
−mF (z1; â)αwR +m[F (z2; â)− F (z1; â)]wR
+ [1−mF (z2; â)]BT − c(â) (14)
Therefore, given critical values z1 and z2 the bonus payment takes the form:
BT = w
R +
c′(a) +m(1 + α)Fa(z1; a)wR
−mFa(z2; a) (15)
which implies that the cost of inducing effort becomes:
CFT
(
a;wR
)
= min
z1,z2
[1−mF (z1; a)]wR
+
1−mF (z2; a)
−mFa(z2; a)
[
c′(a) +m(1 + α)Fa(z1; a)wR
]
s.t. c′(a) +m(1 + α)Fa(z1; a)wR > 0 (16)
z2 > z1
Following the same convention as above, we define CFT
(
a;wR
)
= +∞ in the case
that (16) does not have a solution. Alternatively, the critical values z∗1 and z∗2 are
implicitly defined by the following block-recursive equation system:
mFa(z2; a)f(z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)](1 + α)fa(z1; a) = 0 (17)
mFa(z2; a)f(z2; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]fa(z2; a) = 0 (18)
Note that the equations (17) and (18) are independent of wR. Combining them
yields the following:12
(1 + α)
fa(z
∗
1 ; a)
f(z∗1 ; a)
=
fa(z
∗
2 ; a)
f(z∗2 ; a)
(19)
12Equation (19) can also derived directly from the equations (31) and (32) in the proof of
Proposition 1.
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The conditions (17)–(19) allow us to make some observations. First, strict sto-
chastic dominance – Fa < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1) – implies fa(z∗1 ; a), fa(z∗2 ; a) > 0,
which verifies our earlier representation in Figure 1. Second, the block-recursive
structure of the equation system means that z∗2 is determined independently of
the worker’s KUJ parameter α. Third, consider the case α = 0. Strict MLRP and
(19) then yields z∗1 = z∗2 which verifies the well-known result that in the absence
of relative income concerns the optimal contract is binary.
To conclude this subsection, note that as discussed above the intermediate
contract can also be interpreted as the limit case of the strict ternary contract.
In that case, substituting c′(a) + m(1 + α)Fa(z1; a)wR ≥ 0 for the constraint in
(16), the boundary case yields z∗1 = z∗I and from (15) BT = w
R. Even though z∗2
plays no role here, it can nevertheless be defined by (18). In the remainder, we
refer to a contract as being weakly ternary if it takes either a strict ternary or an
intermediate form.
4.4 The Firm’s Costs of Inducing Effort
By the results of Proposition 1 and the firm’s respective costs of inducing effort
using the three types of contract defined in the previous subsections, we can
immediately conclude
CF
(
a;wR
)
= min
{
CFB
(
a;wR
)
, CFI
(
a;wR
)
, CFT
(
a;wR
)}
(20)
While this definition is very intuitive, it is also quite cumbersome; it requires
solving three minimisation problems and comparing the ensuing costs for each
possible effort level. A more practical approach would be to find a characterisation
of the respective sets of effort levels associated with each contract type. With this
in mind, let AB denote the set
{
a > 0 | CF (a;wR) = CFB (a;wR)} and define AI ,
AT analogously.
Lemma 1. The sets AB, AI and AT satisfy:
i) AB =
{
a > 0 | CFB
(
a;wR
)
< +∞},
ii) AT =
{
a > 0 | CFT
(
a;wR
)
< +∞},
iii) AB,AI ,AT partition R++.
Recall that CFB
(
a;wR
)
< +∞ whenever the associated optimisation problem
has a solution. The key insight behind part i) of the result is that the firm prefers
to offer a bonus less than wR whenever possible. Intuitively, this obtains because
from the worker’s point of view, the resulting impact of a marginal increase in
the bonus is (1 + α) rather than 1. Hence, the marginal power of the additional
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Figure 2: The optimal bonus payment and the function CF (a;wR) as effort in-
creases.
payment is larger when the bonus is less than wR. With this in mind, part i)
simply states that the set of effort levels for which the strict binary contract
defined by (8) and (10) solves the original problem (I) is exactly equal to the set
of effort levels for which (9) has a solution. In the proof of the Lemma, we show
that a symmetric result holds for the set of strict ternary contracts. Together,
these results imply that the two sets are disjoint and also allows us to conclude:
AI =
{
a > 0 | CFB
(
a;wR
)
= CFT
(
a;wR
)
= +∞}
In line with the remark at the end of the previous subsection, we also introduce
AWT = AI∪AT as the set of effort levels associated with a weak ternary contract.
One would like to better understand the structure of these sets and in par-
ticular determine whether they are intervals. Unfortunately, without further re-
strictions on the distribution function, we cannot say how the critical values and
bonuses change with the level of effort. To see why this is the case, observe
that the respective equations which define the critical values contain the function
fa. Hence, evaluating the impact of a variation in a necessarily involves third
derivatives of F . The next result provides one example of such a condition.13
Lemma 2. Suppose the distribution function satisfies ∂∂a
(
Fa
fa
)
≤ 0 for all x ∈
[0, 1]. Then there exists a critical effort level a such that a ∈ AB if a < a and
a ∈ AWT otherwise.
Under the condition of the Lemma, we show in the appendix that the bonus
payment for a strict binary contract is increasing in a. Hence, such a contract
is only valid for low effort levels, up until a, at which point the bonus payment
becomes equal to wR. Accordingly, for a ≥ a a weak ternary contract must be
used.
13This condition is for instance satisfied by both classes of distribution functions described by
LiCalzi and Spaeter (2003).
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Figure 2 shows the typical evolution of the contract as a increases. The
graphics have been derived for the case where F (x; a) = x+ x−x
2
a+1 and c(a) =
1
2a
2.
The parameters chosen are α = 1, wR = 5 and m = 0.8. The left hand panel
shows the contract’s highest payment. Specifically, for a < a the optimal contract
is a strictly binary with a bonus payment BB less than w
R. From the foregoing,
BB is increasing until it becomes equal to w
R at the point a = a. Between the
effort levels a and a, the intermediate contract is optimal. Hence, over that re-
gion the bonus payment is constant at wR and variations in effort incentives are
provided by adjusting the critical value z∗I ; we return to this point in the next
section. For a > a, minimising incentive costs entails a strict ternary contract
with a bonus payment BT larger than w
R.
The right hand panel plots CFB (a;w
R), CFI (a;w
R) and CFT (a;w
R) for all values
of a where the associated contracts are feasible. Specifically, from the foregoing
CFB (a;w
R) exists only for a < a. Similarly, CFT (a;w
R) is only feasible for a > a. In
the graphic, these functions are represented by the solid curve segments. Finally,
the dashed curve illustrates all effort levels for which an intermediate contract
is feasible and plots the associated costs CFI (a;w
R). By definition, CF (a;wR) is
the lower envelope of these three curves. The graphics exemplify the findings of
Lemma 1; whenever the strict binary or strict ternary contracts exist, they will
minimise costs. In all other cases, the firm will use the intermediate contract.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section, we provide some comparative static results for the model. We
omit the analysis of the strict binary contract since this case behaves similarly to
the risk-neutral agency model which has been previously studied in the existing
literature (see for instance Demougin and Fluet, 2001). The next four Propositi-
ons consider situations where the optimal contract takes the strict ternary form
throughout the comparative statics exercise and examine the respective impacts
of variations in the underlying parameters. The last result of this section provides
analogous findings for the intermediate contract.
Proposition 2. An increase in the worker’s KUJ parameter α allows the firm to
implement the desired level of effort at a lower cost. Moreover, z∗1 decreases while
z∗2 remains unchanged. Finally, the bonus payment is reduced.
As emphasised earlier, equation (18) is independent of α so that z∗2 must be
invariant to changes in the worker’s KUJ parameter. This invariance implies that
the RHS of (19) remains constant. Accordingly, an increase in α on the LHS of
that equation must be compensated by a reduction in the likelihood ratio at the
point z∗1 . By strict MLRP, this implies that z∗1 decreases. The effect of a variation
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in α on the bonus can be understood as follows. Applying the envelope theorem
to (16) yields
∂CFT
∂α < 0. However, since z
∗
2 is constant, the bonus is paid as often
as before whereas the change in z∗1 implies that the reference wage is paid more
often. Accordingly, the reduction in costs implies that the bonus payment must
decrease. Intuitively, this is required in order to keep the worker’s effort incentives
constant.
Proposition 3. An increase in the worker’s reference wage wR allows the firm
to implement the desired level of effort at a lower cost. The optimal critical values
z∗1 and z∗2 are unchanged, while the bonus payment is reduced.
From the equations (17) and (18), it is immediate that the critical values z∗1
and z∗2 , and therefore the respective probabilities of obtaining the reference wage
and the bonus, are independent of wR. With this in mind, ceteris paribus an
increase in wR raises the worker’s effort incentives because it marginally reduces
the utility associated with a bad outcome (x < z∗1) while increasing utility in the
case of an intermediary result (z∗1 ≤ x < z∗2). Therefore, keeping the worker’s
motivation constant requires a reduction in the bonus. Technically, the proof
shows that the second effect dominates the former so that expected wage costs go
down.
Intuitively, the worker’s wage-utility function u(w;α,wR) is strictly decrea-
sing in both α and wR below the reference wage and unchanged elsewhere. These
changes therefore enhance the firm’s ability to punish the worker for poor perfor-
mance at no extra cost, since he either becomes less satisfied from not meeting
his reference wage following an increase in α, or finds himself further behind the
higher reference wage following an increase in wR. This allows for a reduction
in payments elsewhere. As such, in our model, relative income concerns result in
a positive incentive effect, similar to previous findings in the context of inequity
aversion and loss aversion.14 Moreover, since the worker’s financial constraint
implies that he will extract a rent from the relationship, any effect on the partici-
pation constraint plays no role. Accordingly, the positive incentive effect results
in a reduction of the firm’s costs.
While the above findings are consistent with models which assume either in-
equity averse or loss averse preferences, it should be noted that this is no longer
necessarily the case if workers face unlimited liability. In this event, the partici-
pation constraint will bind; as discussed in the previous chapter, this leads to a
negative participation effect following increases in either inequity aversion or loss
aversion. However, since in our framework the worker’s outside utility is decrea-
sing in both α and wR, we predict that the participation effect would be positive
14See, for instance, Bartling and von Siemens (2010b) and Herweg et al. (2010) respectively,
as well as the discussion in the previous chapter.
102
in our environment, leading to a further reduction in the firm’s costs. Intuitively,
since social comparisons extend beyond the firm and therefore beyond the employ-
ment relationship, changes in the worker’s preferences over relative income also
impact the utility associated with his outside option, relaxing the participation
constraint and lowering the firm’s costs.
Proposition 4. An increase in m, which measures the probability that monitoring
generates information, allows the firm to implement the desired level of effort at
a lower cost. The optimal critical values z∗1 and z∗2 increase, while the change in
the bonus payment is ambiguous.
Mathematically, the effects on the critical values z∗1 and z∗2 follow from applying
the implicit function theorem on the equation system (17)-(18). To provide an
intuition for this result, we first consider the case of a strict binary contract. In
that case, when the firm chooses the critical value z∗B, they face a simple trade-off.
On the one hand, rewarding only the highest levels of performance is the most
effective way to induce effort, but this requires a high bonus payment in order to
satisfy incentive compatibility. On the other hand, due to imperfect monitoring,
there is a possibility that no information is observed in which case the firm’s
feasibility requirement imposes paying the high reward. This waters down the
effectiveness of the wage scheme and increases costs, creating incentives to reduce
the critical value and lower the bonus. The same mechanism is at work with a
strict ternary contract, though the intuition becomes more cumbersome because
there are now two rewards, wR and BT , associated with the respective critical
values z∗1 and z∗2 .
With respect to the firm’s expected costs, it is straightforward to see that
they cannot increase in the frequency with which the worker is monitored. For
an intuitive justification, consider the case where m increases to m+ . The firm
could commit to ignoring any received information with probability , in which
case the mechanism would become equivalent to the one induced by the original
contract, prior to the increase in the monitoring variable. Finally, we observe that
the change in the bonus payment is ambiguous. For m close to zero, the effort level
a can only be induced by offering a relatively large reward, since there is a low
probability that effort influences the worker’s wage. As m increases, this reward
can be reduced. At the other extreme, when m converges to one, the increase in
the critical values z∗1 and z∗2 implies that the bonus will become infinite.
Proposition 5. An increase in the level of effort induced requires higher costs on
the part of the firm.
As emphasised in the discussion immediately preceding Lemma 2, without
additional restrictions on the distribution function we are unable to describe the
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effects of an increase in effort on the bonus payment and the optimal critical
values. To prove that the firm’s costs must be increasing, we directly apply the
envelope theorem to (16). For an intuitive explanation, note that the firm’s costs
can also be written as:
CFT (a;w
R) = [1−mF (z1; a)]wR + [1−mF (z2; a)](BT − wR) (21)
where BT − wR denotes the additional bonus paid on top of the reference wage
if x ≥ z2. By stochastic dominance, we know that Fa(x; a) ≤ 0. Accordingly an
increase in a raises the respective probabilities of paying the reference wage and
the additional bonus. Moreover, simple differentiation verifies that the additional
bonus itself is increasing in a.
Finally, we consider the comparative statics for the intermediate contract,
applying a similar restriction as above whereby the form of the optimal contract
is taken to remain unchanged throughout the exercise.
Proposition 6. Suppose the optimal contract is an intermediate contract. Then
the firm’s expected wage costs are i) decreasing in α, ii) decreasing in m, iii)
weakly decreasing in wR and iv) increasing in a.
Proposition 6 states that similar results and intuitions also hold for the inter-
mediate contract. Wage payments are fixed at zero and wR. Hence, for changes
in α, m and a the critical value z∗I defined by (12) must adjust in order for the
contract to remain incentive compatible. For α and m, the critical value z∗I in-
creases such that the reference wage is paid less often and costs are reduced. The
converse is true for a. When wR increases, there are two countervailing effects on
the firm’s costs. While the incentive payment is higher, it must also be paid less
often in order for effort incentives to remain constant: z∗I therefore decreases. In
the proof of Proposition 6, we show that the latter effect weakly dominates and
an increase in the worker’s reference wage cannot increase expected costs, similar
to our findings for the strict ternary contract in Proposition 3.
6 Endogenous Reference Wage
The foregoing analysis investigated the contracting problem of a single firm-worker
pair who took the reference wage as given. In this section, we allow wR to be
determined endogenously. Specifically, we consider an economy populated by a
continuum of identical firm-worker pairs, each of whom contract with one another
as described above. Consistent with the idea of keeping up with the Joneses, we
then assume that each worker’s reference wage is determined by the equilibrium
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average wage in this economy.15
Formally, we denote the economy’s average wage by w and consider the equi-
librium in which wR = w. While w is endogenous to the economy, due to our
assumption of a continuum it cannot be influenced by any single firm-worker pair,
each of whom take wR as given when contracting. Moreover, due to the homo-
geneity in the economy, all contracts between pairs will be identical, leading to
a common wage scheme. As a result of our assumption regarding the determina-
tion of the reference wage, this wage scheme must then be strictly ternary with
0 < w < BT .
We first consider the costs associated with an exogenously given effort level a.
Specifically, we derive CFT (a;w [a]), assuming that all firm-worker pairs implement
the same effort level, where w [a] results endogenously as described above.16 Using
this notation, our homogeneity assumption implies that in equilibrium each firm
faces identical costs, which are equal to the average wage:
CFT (a;w [a]) = w [a] (22)
Recall that the bonus payment and the firm’s expected costs for the strict ternary
contract are given by (15) and (16) respectively. It can be seen from (17) and
(18) that the optimal critical values z∗1 and z∗2 are independent of the reference
wage and therefore are unaffected by variations in w [a]. Combining (16) and (22)
together with w [a] = wR and rearranging terms, we obtain:
wR =
[1−mF (z2; a)]c′(a)
−m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)] (23)
which also represents the firm’s costs of implementing a. Substituting (23) into
(15) then yields the bonus payment for an endogenously determined wR:
BT =
[1−mF (z2; a) +mF (z1; a)] c′(a)
−m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)] (24)
Clearly, the comparative static results for z1 and z2 are unchanged from the
case of an exogenous reference wage. Proposition 7 establishes similar results
to Propositions 2, 4 and 5 for the firm’s costs of implementing effort and bonus
payment, for the case of an endogenous reference wage. The basic intuition for
these results is analogous to that for an exogenous reference wage as discussed in
15Implicitly, we apply the standard general equilibrium approach to the determination of the
economy’s average wage and assume that, at the time of contracting, firm-worker pairs have
rational expectations regarding this equilibrium.
16The square brackets in w [a] are used to emphasise that the argument of w [·] is not an
individual choice of the firm-worker pair, but results from the assumption that all pairs are
identical and implement the same effort level.
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the previous section and is therefore omitted here.
Proposition 7. Suppose the reference wage is determined endogenously as the
average wage in the economy. Then:
i) An increase in the KUJ parameter, α, reduces both the bonus payment and
the firm’s cost of implementing effort.
ii) An increase in the quality of monitoring, m, reduces the firm’s cost of im-
plementing effort, while the change in the bonus payment is ambiguous.
iii) An increase in the worker’s effort, a, raises the firm’s cost of implementing
effort.
Throughout this paper, we have so far considered the firm’s optimal contrac-
tual choice when implementing a given effort level a. In order to endogenise effort,
we further extend the model by introducing an increasing concave function v(a),
which represents the value accruing to each firm associated with its worker’s ef-
fort. The optimal a then results endogenously as the effort level which maximises
each firm’s profit. Given our restrictions on v(a) and c(a), this optimal value is
implicitly defined by equalising a firm’s marginal benefit to their marginal cost of
implementing effort,
∂CFT
∂a (a;w [a]), for the equilibrium value of w [a]. This, along
with (17) and (18), then defines an equation system which can be solved for a∗,
z∗1 and z∗2 .
Keeping in mind that each firm decides on their effort choice taking the re-
ference wage as given, they will each equalise the marginal benefit of effort with
the partial derivative of the cost function, rather than the total derivative with
respect to effort as given by (25).
dCFT
da
(a;w [a]) =
∂CFT
∂a
(a;w [a]) +
∂CFT
∂wR
(a;w [a]) · w′ [a] (25)
Moreover, we know from Propositions 3 and 7 that the second term on the right
hand side of (25) is negative. Accordingly, all firms could increase their profits if
they were to collectively decide on how much effort to implement, thereby taking
into account the impact of their decision on the economy’s average wage.
Figure 3 shows this phenomenon for the foregoing example, F (x; a) = x+ x−x
2
a+1
and c(a) = 12a
2, assuming v(a) = 10a, m = 0.8 and α = 1. In equilibrium, given
the reference wage w[a∗], each firm optimally chooses the effort level a∗ which
maximises profits, here given by v(a∗) − w[a∗]. However, this is less than the
profit level v(a∗∗) − w[a∗∗], which could be attained by all firms if they were to
agree to implement the higher level of effort a∗∗. Intuitively, the increase from
a∗ to a∗∗ leads to a rise in the average wage in the economy (w′ [a] > 0), from
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Figure 3: The value of effort and the firm’s associated costs.
Figure 4: The impact of increases in α and m on the economy’s equilibrium.
w[a∗] to w[a∗∗]. Since an increase in the worker’s reference wage reduces the
costs associated with implementing a given effort level (
∂CFT
∂wR
(a;w [a]) < 0), this
increase yields higher profits for each firm. However, given a reference wage of
w[a∗∗], a∗∗ is not the profit maximising effort choice for an individual firm, so
that this cannot be sustained as an equilibrium in the economy. Numerically, in
this example, under collective decision making by all firms there is a 30% increase
in the level of effort implemented and a 7% increase in profits, with the average
wage of workers rising by 69%.
We next consider the impact of variations in the parameters α and m for the
above numerical example. The left-hand panel of Figure 4 shows how a firm’s cost
function CF (a;w [a]) changes following an increase in α from 1 to 2. A higher
KUJ parameter has two effects on the firm’s equilibrium costs. First, there is a
direct effect which reduces the costs of implementing each effort level, in line with
Proposition 7. Second, there is an additional indirect effect, since an increase in α
also reduces the marginal cost of a; accordingly, the optimal effort level increases
from a1 to a2 which leads to a countervailing effect on the firm’s costs. The
right-hand panel of Figure 4 then shows similar effects following an increase in
monitoring quality from m = 0.8 to m = 0.9, leading to an increase in the optimal
effort from a3 to a4.
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Figure 5: The impact of variations in α and m on the economy’s Gini Coefficient.
While it is clear that the firm is better off following an increase in either the
KUJ parameter or the quality of monitoring, since the ensuing profits will be
higher, the impact on the worker’s average income is ambiguous. For instance, in
the numerical case represented by Figure 4, the direct effect dominates following
an increase in α from 1 to 2 so that the average wage payment decreases from
w[a1] to w[a2]. In contrast, when we increase m from 0.8 to 0.9, the indirect effect
becomes dominant so that the average wage rises from w[a3] to w[a4].
Finally, we evaluate the response of the Gini Coefficient amongst workers in
the economy to variations in α and m. Specifically, for variations in α, we fix m
at 0.8 and solve the foregoing example for values of α ∈ [0, 3]. For each α, we then
obtain the optimal contract with wage schedule (0, w,BT ), effort a and associated
payment frequencies mF (z1; a), m [F (z2; a)− F (z1; a)] and [1−mF (z2; a)]. We
use these variables to calculate the resulting Gini Coefficient. A similar approach
is followed for variations in m ∈ [0.5, 0.9], keeping α fixed at 1. Figure 5 plots the
respective Gini Coefficients. The left-hand panel shows a reduction in inequality
following increases in the KUJ parameter. Intuitively, this obtains because a hig-
her α allows for lower powered incentives, leading to a compressed wage schedule.
In contrast, the right-hand panel shows that inequality increases as the quality of
monitoring rises. Intuitively, a higher m leads to higher powered incentive pay in
order to implement a given effort level. Moreover, the bonus is further increased
due to the higher effort now chosen by firms. Since both effects are associated
with a rise in the average wage w, the intermediate payment is also higher, so
that the wage schedule becomes more dispersed.
While the above results seem intuitive, they do not necessarily extend to more
general settings. To see why this is the case, observe that an analytical approach
requires deriving the impact of a change in a on the payment scheme. However,
as discussed in Section 4 this is not possible without further restrictions on the
distribution function.
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7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study optimal incentive contracting under moral hazard when
workers have relative income concerns and attempt to keep up with the Joneses.
The first part of the chapter considers the contracting problem of a single firm-
worker pair who take the reference wage as exogenously given and shows that the
optimal wage scheme takes either a binary or ternary form. We also show that
firms benefit from relative income concerns, since any given effort level can be
implemented at a lower cost. The second part of the chapter assumes that the
reference wage is endogenously determined by the economy’s equilibrium average
income. In this case, contracting between pairs becomes interdependent via the
reference wage, so that externality effects can arise. It then follows that firms
could benefit from collective decision making when deciding on how much effort
to implement. Moreover, using a series of numerical examples, we show that
an economy with higher relative income concerns has a lower average wage and
reduced inequality, as measured by the Gini Coefficient.
There are a number of ways in which our findings complement the existing
literature. First, the result that the optimal wage scheme features either two or
three distinct payments is consistent with the literature which considers incentive
contracting in the presence of loss aversion. A key result in this literature is
that the wage scheme becomes partially unresponsive at the reference point, since
this shields the worker from losses. Similarly, in our framework, the optimal
contract features a payment which is equal to the reference wage. Second, we find
that relative income concerns induce a positive incentive effect, similar to both
inequity aversion and loss aversion, which allows the firm to implement effort
at a lower cost when the worker is financially constrained. However, we argue
that in the alternative case — where the worker faces unlimited liability — our
findings would differ from these literatures since the participation effect would
be positive. This is due to the fact that, in our framework, workers continue to
make social comparisons even when choosing to reject the contract. Third, in
the latter part of the chapter, we show that our formalisation of other-regarding
preferences continues to induce a positive effect on incentives when the reference
wage is determined endogenously by the average income in the economy.
To conclude, some comments with respect to our specification of the workers’
preferences are in order. First, imposing a piecewise linear wage-utility function
significantly simplifies our analysis, since the optimal contractual form features
either two or three wages. As is well known from the literature, a considerably
more complex wage scheme would emerge were we to introduce strict concavity
everywhere. We introduce this simplification since it allows us to investigate
some fundamental effects of relative income concerns, while retaining tractability.
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Second, we assume that all individuals share a common reference wage which is
equal to the average worker’s income in the economy. We believe that this is
consistent with both the idea of keeping up with the Joneses and with existing
scientific evidence, as discussed in the introduction. Moreover, the assumption
seems especially appropriate since all workers in our model are identical.
We believe that there are a number of interesting ways in which our analysis
could be further developed. A natural extension would be to allow for heteroge-
neity between firm-worker pairs with respect to productivity, leading to differences
in contracting between pairs. One could then examine how changes in the com-
position of the overall economy influence optimal contracts. Moreover, in such
an environment, heterogeneous workers could have relative income concerns with
respect to disparate reference wages. For instance, individuals may attempt to
keep up with the Joneses within a subset of the economy, such as those with a
comparable ability, education etc.
Alternatively, recall that the optimal contract typically features three distinct
payments; one possible interpretation of this result is a wage scheme which dis-
misses the worker for low performance. The remaining payment structure could
then be thought of as offering a basic payment equal to the reference wage, to-
gether with the promise of a bonus payment for high performance.17 One could
then analyse how incentives can be created via both bonus pay and the threat of
dismissal when workers have relative income concerns, as well as the implications
for labour market policies. A detailed investigation of this issue is provided in the
following chapter of this thesis.
8 Appendix
8.1 Optimal Contractual Form
Proof of Proposition 1. For 0 < w∅ < wR, (FFC) implies w(x) < wR for all x.
Hence, u(w;α,wR) is linear over the relevant region. We leave it to the reader
to verify that the contract will take the strict binary form described in the main
text.18
Next, for w∅ > wR we show that the optimal contract takes the strict ter-
nary form. We proceed as follows; (i) we maximise the negative of the objective
function; (ii) we initially ignore (PC) verifying at the end of the proof that it is
satisfied; (iii) given the restrictions on F (x; a) and c(a), we apply the first-order
17Dittmann et al. (2010) and Iantchev (2009) also derive optimal payment schemes which are
constant at the smallest possible wage for the lowest levels of performance and offer a similar
interpretation.
18This is well known from the risk-neutral case; see e.g. Kim (1995; 1997). For our specific
model, see also Bental et al. (2016).
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approach. Altogether, the Lagrangian of the simplified problem becomes:
L =− (1−m)w∅ −m
1∫
0
w(x)f(x; a)dx
+ λ
m 1∫
0
[
w(x) + θα(w(x)− wR)] fa(x; a)dx− c′(a)
 (26)
+
1∫
0
ξ(x)w(x)dx+
1∫
0
ζ(x) (w∅ − w(x)) dx
where u(w;α,wR) = w + θα(w − wR) and θ is an indicator function taking the
value 1 if w < wR and 0 otherwise. In order to deal with the slackness in the
first-order condition at wR, we introduce a multiplier γ(x) that takes the value
1 when w(x) < wR, the value 0 when w(x) > wR and requires 0 ≤ γ(x) ≤ 1 at
w(x) = wR. The necessary conditions for maximisation of (26) are:
−(1−m) +
1∫
0
ζ(x)dx = 0
−mf(x; a) + λm [1 + γ(x)α] fa(x; a) + ξ(x)− ζ(x) = 0, ∀x
ξ(x)w(x) = 0, ∀x
ζ(x)(w∅ − w(x)) = 0, ∀x
ξ(x), ζ(x) ≥ 0, ∀x
(27)
For any x ∈ [0, 1], there are in principle four possible cases: ξ(x) = ζ(x) = 0;
ξ(x) = 0, ζ(x) > 0; ξ(x) > 0, ζ(x) = 0 and ξ(x), ζ(x) > 0. Clearly, with
a > 0 the last possibility can never occur (otherwise by complementary slackness
w∅ = 0, and by (FFC) and (WFC) w(x) = 0 for all x so that (IC) can never be
satisfied). Associated with the remaining cases, we define three sets:
– XI = {x ∈ [0, 1] | ξ(x) > 0, ζ(x) = 0}. Accordingly, ∀x ∈ XI , we have
w(x) = 0 < wR and thus θ = 1. Hence, the second condition in (27)
implies:
∀x ∈ XI , λ [1 + α] fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
< 1 (28)
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– XII = {x ∈ [0, 1] | ξ(x) = 0, ζ(x) = 0}. Hence, we have:
∀x ∈ XII , λ [1 + γ(x)α] fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
= 1 (29)
Observe that by strict MLRP, (29) can only be satisfied for one distinct x
for γ(x) = 0 and similarly for γ(x) = 1, so that w(x) = wR a.e. in XII .
– XIII = {x ∈ [0, 1] | ξ(x) = 0, ζ(x) > 0}. For any x ∈ XIII , we have w(x) =
w∅ > wR and therefore θ = 0, hence:
∀x ∈ XIII , λfa(x; a)
f(x; a)
> 1 (30)
Observe that for any λ, the sets XI , XII , XIII form a partition of [0, 1]. Clearly,
λ = 0 is not possible since otherwise XI = [0, 1] from (28) which violates (IC).
Suppose λ > 0. We define z1 and z2 as the solutions to the respective equations:
λ(1 + α)
fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
= 1 (31)
and
λ
fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
= 1 (32)
Claim 1. XI = [0, z1); X
II = [z1, z2] and X
III = (z2, 1] where z1, z2 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We first show that z1, z2 ∈ (0, 1). By strict MLRP, if (31) and (32) have
solutions, they are unique with 0 < z1 < z2. Contrary to the claim, suppose
z2 = 1 or does not exist. Accordingly, the set X
III = ∅. Ignoring z1 and z2 since
they are of measure zero, this implies that either w(x) = 0 or w(x) = wR for all x.
But then the firm can reduce w∅, leading to a contradiction. Accordingly, z2 < 1
which also ensures z1 < 1.
[0, z1) ⊆ XI follows directly from Figure 1 since for all x < z1 we have
λ [1 + γ(x)α] fa(x;a)f(x;a) < 1. To verify [0, z1) ⊇ XI , suppose to the contrary x ∈
XI , but x ≥ z1. Since x ∈ XI , we know w(x) = 0. Then by strict MLRP
λ [1 + α] fa(x;a)f(x;a) ≥ 1 contradicting (28). Hence, XI = [0, z1). A similar argument
can be made to show that XIII = (z2, 1], from which X
II = [z1, z2] follows.
Since the wages paid at the exact points z1 and z2 are irrelevant to the opti-
misation problem, the above discussion implies that without loss of generality the
optimal wage scheme takes the strict ternary form given by (4) in the proposition.
Using similar arguments with λ < 0 would imply a monotonically decreasing
wage leading to a contradiction with (IC). Next, we verify that (PC) holds. Given
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the contractual form, (PC) requires:
−mF (z1; a)αwR +m[F (z2; a)− F (z1; a)]wR
+ [1−mF (z2; a)]BT − c(a) ≥ −αwR (33)
Clearly (33) is satisfied at a = 0, so that the worker can always guarantee expected
utility weakly greater than −αwR by undertaking zero effort. Moreover, by (IC),
expected utility from exerting the firm’s desired effort level must be weakly greater
than this; accordingly, the contract satisfies (PC).
Finally, with w∅ = wR the proof follows along similar lines to the above,
except that either z2 does not exist or is just equal to 1. Hence, any realization x
is either in XI or XII and the solution is the intermediate contract described by
Proposition 1.
8.2 Optimal Contracts
Proof of Lemma 1. We define SB =
{
a > 0 | CFB
(
a;wR
)
< +∞},
ST =
{
a > 0 | CFT
(
a;wR
)
< +∞} and proceed in four steps. Point 1 establishes
a subsidiary result which is used during the remainder of the proof. Parts i), ii)
and iii) of the Lemma are then shown in points 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
1. SB ∩ ST = ∅. Consider any a ∈ SB. Accordingly, (9) has a solution for a
with BB < w
R. By (8), this implies that c′(a) +mFa(z∗B; a)(1 + α)w
R < 0.
By contradiction, suppose a ∈ ST . Therefore (16) has a solution for a with
BT > w
R. By (15), this requires c′(a) + m(1 + α)Fa(z∗1 ; a)wR > 0. Taken
together, these inequalities imply:
c′(a) +mFa(z∗B; a)(1 + α)w
R < c′(a) +m(1 + α)Fa(z∗1 ; a)w
R
⇐⇒ Fa(z∗B; a) < Fa(z∗1 ; a)
⇐⇒ Fa(z∗2 ; a) < Fa(z∗1 ; a)
where the third inequality follows by (10) and (18). Moreover, (17) and (18)
imply fa(z
∗
1 ; a), fa(z
∗
2 ; a) > 0; combined with strict MLRP, this implies that
for all x ∈ [z∗1 , z∗2 ], we have fa(x; a) > 0. Hence, for x ∈ [z∗1 , z∗2 ], Fa(x; a)
is increasing in x so that z∗2 < z∗1 . This yields a contradiction to (19) by
MLRP and α > 0. Hence, SB ∩ ST = ∅.
2. AB = SB. Clearly, AB ⊆ SB since for any a > 0, we have CF (a;wR) < +∞.
To verify SB ⊆ AB, consider a ∈ SB. By point 1 of the proof, we know
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CFB
(
a;wR
)
< CFT
(
a;wR
)
. Moreover, a ∈ SB implies CFB
(
a;wR
)
< +∞
so that the constraint in (9) is irrelevant and the optimisation problem
simplifies to:
min
zB
1−mF (zB; a)
−mFa(zB; a)(1 + α)c
′(a) (34)
Observe that (34) contains the intermediate contract as a special case (when
zB = zI). Hence by convexity of the problem C
F
B
(
a;wR
)
< CFI
(
a;wR
)
and therefore CFB
(
a;wR
)
= min
{
CFB
(
a;wR
)
, CFI
(
a;wR
)
, CFT
(
a;wR
)}
and
a ∈ AB.
3. AT = ST . This follows by a similar argument to point 2.
4. AB,AI ,AT partition R++. By Proposition 1, AB ∪AI ∪AT = R++. AB ∩
AT = ∅ follows immediately from points 1-3. AB∩AI = ∅ can be seen from
the arguments of point 2. AI ∩ AT = ∅ then follows symmetrically.
Proof of Lemma 2. We proceed in three steps.
1. z∗B is weakly increasing in a. Let ϕ (zB, a,m) represent the LHS of (10) so
that
∂z∗B
∂a = −
ϕa(zB,a,m)
ϕz(zB ,a,m)
where taking the derivative with respect to zB and
substituting for [1−mF (zB; a)] using (10) yields:
∂ϕ
∂zB
=
mFa(zB; a)
fa(zB; a)
[fa(zB; a)fx(zB; a)− f(zB; a)fax(zB; a)] > 0 (35)
To see the sign, observe that the fraction and the square bracket are both ne-
gative by (10) and since ∂∂x
(
fa
f
)
= 1
f2
[faxf − fafx] > 0 by strict MLRP. Si-
milarly, taking the derivative of ϕ in a and again substituting for [1−mF (zB; a)]
yields:
∂ϕ
∂a
=
mf(zB; a)
fa(zB; a)
[fa(zB; a)Faa(zB; a)− Fa(zB; a)faa(zB; a)] ≤ 0 (36)
The result obtains since ∂∂a
(
Fa
fa
)
= 1
f2a
[faFaa − Fafaa] ≤ 0 verifying the
result.
2. lima→0BB = 0. First, note lima→0z∗B(a) 6= 0, 1. Indeed, by (10) we must
have fa(zB; a) > 0. However, by strict MLRP we know fa(x; a) < 0 as
x → 0. Moreover, z∗B being weakly increasing in a implies that the limit
cannot converge to 1. Hence, (8) and lima→0 c′(a) = 0 directly verify the
claim.
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3. Taking into account z∗′B(a) ≥ 0 and the restrictions on F (x; a), (8) implies
by total differentiation:
dBB
da
=
−Fa(z∗B; a)c′′(a) + c′(a) [fa(z∗B; a)z∗′B(a) + Faa(z∗B; a)]
m(1 + α)
[
Fa(z∗B; a)
]2 > 0
Altogether, the strict binary contract obtains for effort levels close to zero.
As effort increases, the strict binary contract remains feasible (and therefore
by part i) of Lemma 1 also optimal) until it requires setting BB = w
R; we
denote the associated effort level by a. Finally, it follows by Proposition 1
that for all a ≥ a, we have a ∈ AWT , thus concluding the proof.
8.3 Comparative Statics
Proof of Proposition 2. By the envelope theorem, we have:
∂CFT
∂α
= −[1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a)
Fa(z2; a)
wR < 0
which implies that the firm’s costs decrease. It can be seen from (18) that z∗2
does not vary in α; (19) and strict MLRP imply that z∗1 is decreasing in α. The
previous two results verify that BT decreases in α.
Proof of Proposition 3.
1. The firm’s costs are reduced. Let wR = ŵR and denote the optimal contract
by Ĉ =
(
0, ŵR, B̂, ẑ1, ẑ2
)
. Next, let the reference wage increase to w˜R > ŵR
and consider the (non-optimal) contract C˜ =
(
0, ŵR, B˜, ẑ1, ẑ2
)
where the
bonus B˜ has been adjusted to maintain incentive compatibility, while the
rest of the contract remains unchanged. Using the first-order condition of
the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint, it follows that:19
B˜ = ŵR + α(ŵR − w˜R) + c
′(a) + (1 + α)mŵRFa(ẑ1; a)
−mFa(ẑ2; a) (37)
19To be clear, ŵR appears in (37) since this is the payment prescribed for intermediate perfor-
mance. w˜R appears directly from the worker’s utility function. In particular, (37) can be derived
by differentiating the LHS of (33) and setting the result equal to zero. However, one must first
account for the fact that since ŵR < w˜R, in this case we have u(ŵR;α, w˜R) = ŵR+α(ŵR− w˜R).
This explains the additional term in (37) which does not appear in (15).
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Next, we use (15) and (37) in order to calculate:[
B˜ − B̂
]
= α
[
ŵR − w˜R] < 0
Accordingly, since all other aspects of the contract are unchanged, the firm’s
costs are lower. Even though C˜ is not the cost minimal incentive scheme,
this nevertheless verifies that the optimal contract reduces costs.
2. z1 and z2 unchanged. Follows immediately from (17) and (18).
3. Bonus payment decreases. Follows from points 1 and 2 and (21).
Proof of Proposition 4. By the envelope theorem, we have:
∂CFT
∂m
=
c′(a) + F (z2; a)(1 + α)Fa(z1; a)m2wR
m2Fa(z2; a)
− F (z1; a)wR
which is negative if c′(a) + F (z2; a)(1 + α)Fa(z1; a)m2wR > 0. This is satisfied
since c′(a) +m(1 +α)Fa(z1; a)wR > 0 (else we would have BT ≤ wR) and clearly
mF (z2; a) < 1. This implies that the firm’s costs decrease. Next, we proceed as
in the proof of Lemma 2 and let ϕ (zB, a,m) represent the LHS of (10) so that
∂z∗B
∂m = −
ϕm(zB,a,m)
ϕz(zB ,a,m)
. Taking the derivative with respect to m, we obtain:
∂ϕ
∂m
= Fa(zB)f(zB)− F (zB)fa(zB) < 0
where the sign can be seen from (10). This along with (35) implies
∂z∗B
∂m > 0. This
also implies
∂z∗2
∂m > 0 since z
∗
B = z
∗
2 by (10) and (18). Moreover,
∂z∗1
∂m > 0 follows
from (19) and strict MLRP. Finally, the change in the bonus payment remains
ambiguous since ∂BT∂z1 ,
∂BT
∂z2
> 0 while ∂BT∂m < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. By the envelope theorem, we have:
∂CFT
∂a
=−mFa(z1; a)wR −mFa(z2; a)(BT − wR) + [1−mF (z2; a)]∂BT
∂a
where ∂BT∂a > 0 from (15). Hence the firm’s costs are increasing in a.
Proof of Proposition 6. For points i),ii) and iv), we proceed in two steps. First,
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we apply the implicit function theorem to (12), which yields:
∂z∗I
∂α
= − Fa(zI ; a)
fa(zI ; a) (1 + α)
> 0
∂z∗I
∂m
= − Fa(zI ; a)
mfa(zI ; a)
> 0
∂z∗I
∂a
= −c
′′(a) +mFaa(zI ; a) (1 + α)wR
mfa(zI ; a) (1 + α)wR
< 0
where the sign of each derivative follows from fa(z
∗
I ; a) > 0 as shown in the proof
of Proposition 1.20 Second, we totally differentiate (13) with respect to each
variable:
dCFI
dα
=
[−mf (z∗I ; a)wR] ∂z∗I∂α < 0
dCFI
dm
=−
[
F (z∗I ; a) +mf (z
∗
I ; a)
∂z∗I
∂m
]
wR < 0
dCFI
da
=−
[
Fa (z
∗
I ; a) + f (z
∗
I ; a)
∂z∗I
∂a
]
mwR > 0
which verifies the claims.
For point iii), suppose that initially the reference wage is given by wR with an
optimal contract defined by C = (0, wR, zI). Given this, the effort level induced
is implicitly defined by (12). Consider a small increase of  in the reference
wage, such that the optimal contract remains intermediate. Next, suppose that
instead of applying the optimal (intermediate) contract, the firm were to leave the
incentive scheme unchanged. Since the bonus payment (wR) is then strictly less
than the reference wage (wR + ), the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint
must be taken from (7) i.e.:
a = arg max
â
−mF (zI ; â)α
(
wR + 
)
+ [1−mF (zI ; â)]
[
(1 + α)wR − α (wR + )]− c(â)
Differentiating this and rearranging yields (12), implying that the unchanged con-
tract would implement the original effort level at identical costs. Clearly, adjus-
20Recall that in the intermediate case, the first critical value continues to be defined by equation
(31). λ > 0 implies that the x which solves this equation must then satisfy fa(x; a) > 0.
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ting the contract optimally must therefore generate weakly lower expected costs,
verifying the claim.
Proof of Proposition 7.
i) The change in the bonus payment follows from differentiating (24) with
respect to α and z1, which yields:
∂BT
∂α
=
[1−mF (z2; a) +mF (z1; a)] c′(a)[1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a)
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
< 0
and
∂BT
∂z1
=
c′(a) [1−mF (z2; a)] [Fa(z2; a)− Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]mf(z1; a)
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
+
c′(a) [1−mF (z2; a)] [1−mF (z2; a) +mF (z1; a)] fa(z1; a) (1 + α)
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
> 0
respectively. Along with our previous findings that z1 is decreasing in α and
the value of z2 is independent of α, these results imply that (24) is decreasing
in α. To see that Fa(z2; a)−Fa(z1; a) (1 + α) > 0, note that for x ∈ [z∗1 , z∗2 ],
Fa(x; a) is increasing in x, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1. Since Fa < 0,
we have |Fa(z2; a)| < |Fa(z1; a)| from which Fa(z2; a)−Fa(z1; a) > 0 follows.
For the change in the firm’s costs, we first establish the following from
differentiation of (23):
∂CFT
∂z1
=
[1−mF (z2; a)]c′(a) [mFa(z2; a)f(z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
= 0
∂CFT
∂z2
=
c′(a)F (z1; a) [mFa(z2; a)f(z2; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]fa(z2; a)]
[mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
= 0
where equality to zero follows from (17) and (18) so that small changes in
z1 and z2 do not influence (23). Taking the partial derivative of (23) with
respect to α then yields:
∂CFT
∂α
=
[1−mF (z2; a)]2c′(a)Fa(z1; a)
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
< 0
as required.
ii) Since
∂CFT
∂z1
=
∂CFT
∂z2
= 0, the decrease in the firm’s costs follows from partial
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differentiation of (23):
∂CFT
∂m
=c′(a)
mF (z1; a)Fa(z2; a) [2−mF (z2; a)] + (1 + α) [1−mF (z2; a)]2Fa(z1; a)
m2 [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
< 0
as required.
iii) Since
∂CFT
∂z1
=
∂CFT
∂z2
= 0, the increase in the firm’s costs follows from partial
differentiation of (23):
∂CFT
∂a
=
c′(a)mF (z1; a)
[
mFa(z2; a)
2 + [1−mF (z2; a)]Faa(z2; a)
]
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
+
c′(a)[1−mF (z2; a)] [mFa(z2; a)Fa(z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)] (1 + α)Faa(z1; a)]
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
−c
′′(a)[1−mF (z2; a)] [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]
m [mFa(z2; a)F (z1; a) + [1−mF (z2; a)]Fa(z1; a) (1 + α)]2
> 0
as required.
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Chapter 3
1 Introduction
The foregoing chapter studied incentive contracting in an environment where wor-
kers’ preferences were characterised by relative income concerns, with a key finding
being that the optimal wage scheme featured three distinct payments. As discus-
sed previously, since the payment associated with poor performance was set by
the firm to be as low as possible, one possible interpretation of this result is a
binary wage scheme with the additional option of dismissing the worker. Alt-
hough there are then only two distinct payments, the contract would be perceived
by the worker as ternary, since there are three distinct outcomes (i.e. dismissal
and a base wage; retention and a base wage; retention, a base wage and a bonus
payment) associated with poor, intermediate and good performance, respectively.
Clearly, dismissal can only be an effective method of creating incentives if a
worker experiences a reduction in expected utility following termination of the
employment relationship. Whether this is the case will depend on the outco-
mes associated with dismissal and, in particular, labour market conditions. For
instance, a worker who expects to be unemployed for a long period of time follo-
wing dismissal, resulting in a significant loss of income, would anticipate a large
reduction in expected utility and, ex ante, become more inclined to undertake
costly effort in order to avoid this possibility.
It follows that labour market policies, which influence the payoffs of both em-
ployed and unemployed workers, will have further implications for employment
relationships when firms must provide workers with effort incentives. In recent
years, there has been a renewed focus on policies which attempt to reduce ine-
qualities; these include minimum wages, unemployment benefits and regulation
aimed at realigning the bargaining power between firms and workers. Such poli-
cies are particularly relevant if individuals care about how their incomes compare
to those of others. However, given the foregoing discussion, it is important when
evaluating these policies to also consider how they might impact employment
relationships and the ability of firms to provide effort incentives.
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In this chapter, we explore this issue by considering an economy populated by
infinitely lived firms and workers to be matched with one another, all of whom
are homogeneous and atomistic in nature. Firms are assumed to be self-interested
and risk neutral, while workers’ preferences exhibit relative income concerns. As
in the previous chapter, we formalise this notion by assuming that each worker’s
utility function is piecewise linear around a reference wage, which, in equilibrium,
is determined by the average income of employed workers in the economy.1 The
measure of workers is assumed to be constant, whereas the measure of firms is
determined in equilibrium by freedom of market entry.
All parties operate in a frictional labour market, so that both firms and wor-
kers who are unmatched face a positive probability of remaining unmatched in
the subsequent period. This is formalised using the standard textbook model of
‘labour market matching’ (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000, Chapter 1) in discrete time,
albeit with two key differences. First, each firm’s revenue depends on an unob-
servable effort input by its corresponding worker, resulting in moral hazard. In
accordance with the foregoing discussion, each firm creates incentives through use
of both a single explicit bonus payment and the threat of dismissal for poor per-
formance, so that there are three distinct outcomes for a worker depending on the
realisation of a performance measure. Such a contract is then perceived by workers
as being ternary in nature, as previously discussed. Second, the possibility that a
worker is dismissed due to poor performance results in an endogenous proportion
of matches being dissolved; this creates an additional flow into unemployment.
In this environment, we solve for a firm’s choice of contract in order to imple-
ment a given effort level. For simplicity, we assume that each firm-worker pair who
are matched in a given time period negotiate a new single-period contract, regard-
less of whether they were matched in previous time periods, so that multi-period
contracts between pairs are not allowed for. We show that the equilibrium critical
value of the performance measure associated with dismissal depends on the ratio
between the worker’s relative benefits of being employed and the firm’s relative
benefits of employing a worker. Intuitively, from a firm’s point of view, the threat
of dismissal creates incentives for the worker, allowing for a lower explicit bonus
payment and therefore reducing expected wage costs. The size of these dismis-
sal incentives is determined by the worker’s relative benefit of being employed.
On the other hand, the ‘costs’ for a firm of using dismissal are the possibility of
reduced profits in future periods, should they terminate a worker’s employment
following poor performance. The firm trades off these costs and benefits when
1This assumption, that all workers — including those who are unemployed — compare their
income to the average wage payment of employed workers in a given time period, is further
discussed in the conclusion to this chapter.
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deciding on the optimal critical value.2
This trade-off will, in particular, depend on two exogenous parameters in our
model which relate to labour market policy. First, the minimum wage determi-
nes how low firms can set their base wages and therefore has an impact on both
the income of employed workers and the profits of firms. Second, unemployment
benefits determine the income of unmatched workers and therefore affect the re-
lative benefits of employment. Using a series of numerical examples, we explore
the implications of exogenous variations in these parameters for the probability
of dismissal, the optimal contract and the steady-state equilibrium labour market
outcomes.
In our framework, the minimum wage acts as an efficiency wage, which impro-
ves the relative benefits for a worker of being employed. Accordingly, we find that
dismissal is more effective following a raise in the minimum wage and is therefore
used more often. This, in turn, allows for a lower bonus payment. It follows that
while firms are worse off from such an increase since they must pay a higher base
wage, they are partially cushioned from the impact due to this positive incentive
effect, with the overall result being a more compressed wage schedule. Additi-
onally, we find that, in our example, the unemployment rate rises following an
increase in the minimum wage due to two distinct effects. First, the increased
rate of dismissal means that more firm-worker matches are terminated in each
period, with the frictional nature of the labour market implying that some of this
unemployment is persistent. Second, the reduction in profits leads to less active
firms in the market in each period, lowering the rate at which pairs are matched.
The effect of an increase in unemployment benefits, in contrast, is to reduce the
relative value for a worker of being employed. This makes the threat of dismissal
less effective, so that the bonus payment in this case must be increased. Moreover,
since dismissal becomes less effective, it is used less often. Overall, the firm’s costs
of implementing effort increase, while the wage schedule becomes more dispersed.
We find that a rise in unemployment benefits induces two opposing effects on the
unemployment rate. Since wage costs increase, firms make lower profits and as
a result some are forced out of the market, meaning that it becomes harder for
unemployed workers to find match. However, as dismissal is used less often to
create incentives, existing matches last for longer on average. In our example, the
latter effect is dominant so that unemployment is reduced in equilibrium.
We show that while these effects exist for the case where workers are self-
interested, they are amplified in the presence of relative income concerns. Intui-
2In the framework of Wang and Yang (2015), workers who produce a sequence of low outputs
become increasingly poor and therefore difficult to motivate. Similar to our analysis, firms then
trade off the benefits of hiring a new worker with the potential costs in terms of foregone future
profits, with dismissal only occurring when workers become sufficiently poor.
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tively, this results because both the minimum wage and unemployment benefit
payments are less than the average wage in the economy, which acts as a reference
wage for workers. It follows that even small changes then have large impacts on
utility when individuals care about their relative income, due to the high marginal
utility below the reference wage.
This chapter is closely related to three distinct areas. First, our analysis is
part of a wider literature which studies employment relationships characterised
by moral hazard in a frictional labour market (see for instance Rocheteau, 2001;
Demougin and Helm, 2011; Moen and Rose´n, 2011, 2013; Starmans, 2017). Per-
haps most closely related to this chapter is the recent article by Wang and Yang
(2015), who study dynamic contracts featuring endogenous termination, motiva-
ted by the optimal provision of incentives and risk sharing.3 They argue that
their model generates predictions consistent with empirical observations relating
to wage and employment dynamics, with severance compensation playing a key
role in their framework. In contrast to their paper, our primary focus is the equi-
librium contract between a firm-worker pair rather than labour market outcomes.
Moreover, their analysis differs from ours in several important respects: they al-
low for multi-period contracts, study non-participation in the labour force as well
as consumption and savings decisions and pairs are assumed to bargain over the
employment contract. In particular, a key difference is that in their setup workers
are assumed to be risk averse but self-interested, so that relative income concerns
play no role.
Second, our analysis is related to a number of studies which consider the labour
market impact of minimum wages, typically in the context of search-and-matching
models (for instance, Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998; Acemoglu, 2001 and Flinn,
2006). Moreover, our results are consistent with previous findings that minimum
wages can act as efficiency wages in environments where the effort of workers is
unobservable (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). The chapter
is also related to the vast literature which investigates — both theoretically and
empirically — the impact of changes in minimum wages on employment; see
Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a survey and Meer and West (2016) for a recent
contribution.4
Third, our analysis relates to papers which study the role of unemployment
benefits in labour markets with matching frictions. In the benchmark model,
unemployment benefits determine the outside option of workers and therefore
influence wages through bargaining (Pissarides, 2000). Some authors have furt-
3Studies which consider the incentive effects of dismissal in the absence of labour market
frictions include Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), Spear and Wang (2005), Sannikov (2008) and Wang
(2011, 2013).
4Our analysis is also related to studies which explore the spillover effects of minimum wages;
see for instance Katz and Krueger (1992).
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her extended this model in order to study the additional impact on the search
incentives of workers (see for instance Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; recent con-
tributions include Mitman and Rabinovich, 2015, Boadway and Cuff, 2018 and
Landais et al., 2018). Our analysis also contributes to a wider literature which
analyses the effects of unemployment benefits on labour market outcomes; see
Schmieder and von Wachter (2016) for a recent survey article.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and outlines parties’ preferences, the labour market and the employment
relationship. Section 3 then analyses the contracting problem of a single firm-
worker pair, while Section 4 discusses the model’s equilibrium. In Section 5, we
perform some numerical exercises to study the impact of changes in the minimum
wage and unemployment benefits. Section 6 concludes.
2 Setup
2.1 Preferences
We consider a discrete-time economy populated by many firms (principals) and
many workers (agents), all of whom are infinitely lived and atomistic in nature.
All firms are identical, as are all workers. The measure of workers active in the
market is constant and normalised to one, while the measure of active firms at
time t ∈ N will be determined endogenously by freedom of market entry.
Each firm is risk neutral and owns a production technology, which, in each
period, requires the effort input at of a single worker and creates revenue Γ(at),
where Γ(0) = 0, Γ′ > 0 and Γ′′ ≤ 0. The period t profit of a firm that employs a
worker is then simply Γ(at), net of any wage payment wt, so that:
pi(at, wt) = Γ(at)− wt (1)
Alternatively, as is standard in the matching literature, firms who do not employ
a worker at time t but choose to remain in the market must pay hiring costs h
associated with maintaining an open job vacancy.
Workers’ preferences are assumed to be characterised by relative income con-
cerns and can be represented by a utility function which is separable in wages
and effort, U(wt, at;α,w
R
t ) = u(wt;α,w
R
t ) − c(at). The function u(wt;α,wRt ) is
piecewise linear around a reference wage wRt :
u(wt;α,w
R
t ) =

wt + α
(
wt − wRt
)
if wt < w
R
t
wt if wt ≥ wRt
(2)
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where the parameter α ≥ 0 measures the extent to which the workers are averse
to falling behind the reference wage.5 Note that setting α = 0 yields standard
risk-neutrality as a special case. The reference wage is common to all workers
and is determined endogenously in equilibrium as the average wage payment in
the economy at time t. However, due to their atomistic natures, wRt cannot be
influenced by any single firm or worker and as such is taken by all as given during
contracting.6 The function c(at) represents a worker’s disutility of undertaking
effort and satisfies c′ > 0, c′′ >, c(0) = 0 and limat→0 c′(at) = 0. Firms and
workers both discount the future at a common and constant rate β ∈ (0, 1) and
behave as to maximise their lifetime discounted expected profits and utilities,
respectively.7
Finally, the state imposes a minimum wage, such that any payments from
firms to workers cannot be lower than M ≥ 0. This also prohibits transfers from
workers to firms, or negative wage payments. Moreover, the state pays a benefit
b to workers who are unemployed, where 0 ≤ b ≤ M . For simplicity, we assume
that these unemployment benefits are exogenously given and do not consider the
mechanism by which they are financed.8
2.2 Labour Market Environment
Contracting takes place in a labour market characterised by frictions, which is
captured by a simple model of matching (see for instance Pissarides, 2000). In
a given time period, each firm is matched with at most one worker, while each
worker is matched with at most one firm. At time t, the proportion of unmatched
workers is denoted by ρut . These workers are referred to as being unemployed,
with ρut then representing the economy’s unemployment rate. The number of
unmatched firms per worker is denoted by ρvt .
The number of new matches in each time period t is determined by the
function:
µ (ρut , ρ
v
t ) (3)
which is increasing in both arguments, concave, exhibits constant returns to scale
and satisfies µ(0, ρvt ) = µ (ρ
u
t , 0) = 0.
9 Workers and firms are selected randomly
5In the following, for notational convenience we suppress the dependence of u(·) on α and wRt
where appropriate and simply write u(wt).
6We retain our assumption from the previous chapter regarding the rational-expectations
determination of the reference wage in each period.
7For simplicity, we assume that workers consume all of their income in each time period and
as such do not accumulate wealth over time.
8One could rectify this, for example, by imposing a fixed tax upon each employed worker. We
also assume that these benefits are independent of employment history.
9These are standard requirements for a matching function, see Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). We assume that only unmatched firms and workers engage in matching; that is, we
do not allow for movements from employment to employment. Moreover, we do not consider
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from the pools of unemployed workers and vacant jobs, with our assumption of
homogeneity ensuring that each match is identical in nature. It is convenient to
follow the matching literature and let:
θt ≡ ρ
v
t
ρut
(4)
denote the ratio of vacant jobs to unemployed workers, or labour market tightness.
The number of new matches per vacant job then follows from constant returns to
scale of the matching function:
µ (ρut , ρ
v
t )
ρvt
= µ
(
ρut
ρvt
, 1
)
= µ
(
1
θt
, 1
)
= q(θt) (5)
which also represents the probability of a firm with an open vacancy being matched
at time t. Similarly, we let the number of new matches per unemployed worker
be denoted by:
µ (ρut , ρ
v
t )
ρut
= µ
(
1,
ρvt
ρut
)
= µ (1, θt) = θtq(θt) (6)
which is also the probability of an unemployed worker finding a match in a given
time period.10
The flow out of employment in each time period t consists of two elements.
First, as is standard in the matching literature, an exogenous proportion ϕ of the
existing matches are destroyed, perhaps due to changes in demand or shocks to
productivity. Second, an endogenous proportion δt are dissolved due to dismissal
of the worker for poor performance; the variable δt is therefore determined by
the contractual agreements between firm-worker pairs. The total flow out of
employment at time t is then equal to (ϕ+ (1− ϕ) δt) (1− ρut ). Altogether, the
flows into and out of employment are illustrated by Figure 1, along with the
quantity of workers and firms who are matched or unmatched at any given time
t.
In each time period t, a sequence of three events occurs. First, each firm-worker
pair who enter the period matched undergo a time-independent employment rela-
tionship, to be discussed subsequently.11 This results in an instantaneous expected
the case where unemployed workers can expend costly search effort in order to improve their
prospects of being matched.
10The last equality follows from:
θtq(θt) = θtµ
(
1
θt
, 1
)
= µ (1, θt)
11Specifically, for the sake of parsimony, we restrict attention to single-period contracts which
do not depend upon the histories of either the firm or worker. It follows that all matches at time
t are identical in nature and depend only on the environment in which parties interact at that
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Figure 1: The flows into and out of employment.
utility vet and instantaneous expected profit pi
e
t for the worker and firm, respecti-
vely. The respective instantaneous utilities and profits of unmatched workers and
firms are vut and pi
u
t . Second, a proportion ϕ+ (1− ϕ) δt of the existing matches
are dissolved. Firms and workers who exit a match, for either reason, will be
unmatched with certainty in period t + 1. Finally, a number of the firms and
workers who have been unmatched throughout period t are chosen to be matched
at random, according to the process described above; they will then enter period
t+ 1 as matches.
The foregoing discussion allows us to write the lifetime discounted expected
profits of a matched and unmatched firm at time t, denoted hereafter by Πet and
Πut , respectively:
Πet = pi
e
t + β
[
(1− ϕ) (1− δt) Πet+1 + (ϕ+ δt − ϕδt) Πut+1
]
(7)
Πut = pi
u
t + β
[
q(θt)Π
e
t+1 + (1− q(θt)) Πut+1
]
(8)
The first term in (7) is a firm’s instantaneous expected profit associated with
employing a worker; the second term is then the discounted future expected profit.
The square bracket in (7) is explained as follows. With probability (1− ϕ) (1− δt),
the firm will remain matched in the subsequent period t + 1, which, at that
time, yields the discounted expected profit Πet+1. Alternatively, with probability
ϕ + δt − ϕδt, the firm’s match is dissolved so that it is unmatched in period
t+1, yielding discounted expected profit Πut+1. The equation (8) can be explained
similarly, with q(θt) representing the probability of a firm with a vacancy in period
time.
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t being matched and therefore employing a worker in period t+ 1.
By a similar logic, the respective lifetime discounted expected utilities of an
employed and unemployed worker at time t are:
V et = v
e
t + β
[
(1− ϕ) (1− δt)V et+1 + (ϕ+ δt − ϕδt)V ut+1
]
(9)
V ut = v
u
t + β
[
θtq(θt)V
e
t+1 + (1− θtq(θt))V ut+1
]
(10)
The intuitions for the expressions (9) and (10) are similar to the foregoing case,
with the main difference being that an unemployed worker’s probability of beco-
ming matched is θtq(θt), rather than q(θt) for an unmatched firm.
Finally, we are able to express the change in the unemployment rate at time
t as:
dρut
dt
= (ϕ+ δt − ϕδt) (1− ρut )− ρut θtq(θt) (11)
where the first and second terms represent the flows into and out of unemploy-
ment respectively, as described previously. A steady-state equilibrium in the
labour market is characterised by two conditions. First, the unemployment level
is constant, so that
dρut
dt = 0.
12 Rearranging (11) then yields the steady-state
unemployment level:
ρut =
ϕ+ δt − ϕδt
ϕ+ δt − ϕδt + θtq(θt) (12)
Second, freedom of market entry requires that the lifetime discounted expected
profit of a firm which chooses to open a vacancy is zero. Mathematically, this
condition requires that:
Πut = 0 (13)
Our subsequent analysis will restrict attention to the steady-state equilibrium in
the labour market. Along with our assumption that employment relationships
between firms and workers are time-independent, this ensures that all variables
become constant over time in equilibrium. Accordingly, for simplicity, we omit
all time subscripts t for the remainder of the chapter.
2.3 The Employment Relationship
Employment relationships are time-independent and similar to those discussed in
the previous chapter, with two key differences: all wage payments must be greater
12By (6), we have ρut θtq(θt) = µ (ρ
u
t , ρ
v
t ) so that the second term on the RHS of (11) is simply
the number of new matches at time t. The stationarity condition
dρut
dt
= 0 therefore implies that
ρvt also becomes constant over time in equilibrium.
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than the economy’s minimum wage and the firm can additionally use dismissal
to create incentives. As before, the worker is paid a wage in return for exerting
effort, with moral hazard occurring because this effort is non-verifiable. Instead,
the firm has access to a monitoring technology which operates as follows. Once
the worker has produced effort a, a verifiable proxy variable x ∈ [0, 1] is generated
with exogenous probability m ∈ (0, 1). In this case, we say that monitoring has
succeeded. It is common knowledge that the realisation of x is drawn from a time-
independent distribution function F (x; a), with associated density f(x; a) > 0 over
the support. In addition, F is assumed to satisfy the strict Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property (MLRP) and the strict Convexity of the Distribution Function
Condition (CDFC).13 Alternatively, with probability (1−m) monitoring fails and
no information (denoted by ∅) is produced.14
The firm has two available channels by which the monitoring process can be
used to create effort incentives. First, the worker can be dismissed for poor per-
formance, i.e. a low realisation of x. As long as an employed worker receives a
higher discounted expected utility than an unemployed worker, this will create
incentives to undertake effort. Second, as is standard in the moral hazard litera-
ture, the firm can condition wages on the information (if any) that is observed.
We also make the standard assumption that the firm is assumed to hold all of the
bargaining power.
The order of the game for the employment relationship is then as follows.
First, the firm offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the worker. If the contract
is rejected, then the match is immediately dissolved and both parties receive
instantaneous payoffs equal to those of firms and workers who were not initially
matched (i.e. piu and vu respectively). If the contract is accepted, the worker
then chooses a level of effort to undertake. Next, the monitoring process either
succeeds and produces information x, or fails and produces no information ∅.
Finally, based on the outcome of monitoring, the firm pays the appropriate wage
and possibly terminates the worker’s employment, as outlined by the contract. It
is assumed that the firm can feasibly commit to dismissal for poor performance
and cannot renege on this obligation once effort has been undertaken.
Finally, as outlined previously, unemployed workers receive a benefit payment
b, while firms who do not employ a worker but continue to remain in the market
must pay hiring costs h. This implies the following instantaneous utility and profit
13Strict MLRP states that fa
f
(x; a) is strictly increasing in x for all x ∈ (0, 1), while strict
CDFC requires Faa(x; a) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). See also the discussion in the previous chapter.
14See the previous chapter for a detailed discussion of this monitoring process.
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levels:
vu = (1 + α) b− αwR (14)
piu = −h (15)
where (14) follows from (2) and the fact that wR will be determined by the average
wage in the economy and, therefore, b ≤M ≤ wR.
3 Contracting
The previous chapter derived the optimal wage scheme for a worker whose pre-
ferences can be represented by the utility function (2). When the reference wage
is defined by the average wage in the economy, it was shown that this contract
was ternary, with three distinct wage payments. While that environment did not
explicitly feature unemployment, we discussed that one possible interpretation
of this result could be a binary wage scheme (i.e. a base wage which is always
paid, as well as a possible bonus payment for high performance) along with the
possibility of dismissal for sufficiently poor performance. While such a contract
features only two distinct possible wage payments, it is nonetheless perceived by
workers as being ternary since, from their point of view, there are three distinct
possible outcomes. In this chapter, we explore this possibility in an environment
which does explicitly feature unemployment, allowing us to study how changes in
labour market policies impact contracting between parties.
As before, we first study the firm’s optimal single-period contractual choice in
order to implement a given effort level a at the lowest possible cost, before later
considering the firm’s optimal effort choice. In line with the foregoing discussion,
we restrict attention to wage schemes which take the form:
w(x) =

W x ∈ [0, z2)
W +B x ∈ [z2, 1]
(16)
where the base wage W , the bonus payment B and the critical performance level
z2 are decision variables for the firm.
15 Moreover, the firm must also choose an
additional critical performance level, z1, which represents the ‘lowest acceptable’
performance for a worker. That is, outcomes x < z1, observed with frequency
mF (z1; a), will result in dismissal. The probability of a match being dissolved
15We do not investigate whether such a wage scheme would be optimal in the current frame-
work.
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Figure 2: The payment and dismissal decision associated with each realisation
of the performance signal x ∈ [0, 1], along with their respective probabilities. In
case of no information, which occurs with probability (1−m), the worker is paid
W +B and retained for employment in the next period.
due to dismissal of a worker is then:
δ = mF (z1; a) (17)
As long as the worker’s expected utility from being employed in each period is
greater than that from unemployment, dismissal will create further effort incenti-
ves. It is assumed that the effort level a to be implemented is always sufficiently
large that explicit incentive pay is required and therefore B > 0.16 The case in
which monitoring fails and no information is generated is treated identically to a
realisation of x ≥ z2; that is, the employee is not dismissed and the wage received
is W + B.17 Altogether, the contractual form is summarised by Figure 2, which
illustrates the payment and dismissal decision associated with each realisation of
the performance measure x ∈ [0, 1].
In this environment, an incentive feasible contract is a tuple C = {W,B, z1, z2}
which induces the worker to undertake the firm’s desired effort level a. The
firm’s objective is therefore to design the wage scheme which maximises lifetime
discounted expected profits, subject to the following constraints:
1. The contract must induce the worker to undertake effort a. Since workers
behave as to maximise their discounted expected lifetime utility, the incen-
tive compatibility constraint then requires that a maximises V e.
2. The contract must induce the worker to accept the contract. Since rejecting
the contract results in unemployment for a worker, the participation con-
straint then requires that V e ≥ V u.
3. All possible wage payments must be weakly greater than the minimum wage:
16For low effort levels, it may be possible to pay a fixed wage and provide adequate incentives
solely via the threat of dismissal; we ignore these cases. In addition, note that we rule out the
counter-intuitive case of a worker simultaneously receiving a bonus payment and being dismissed
from employment; as we shall see later, such a result never occurs for the numerical examples
we consider.
17This assumption is similar in nature to the requirement that w(x) ≤ w∅ in the previous
chapter. See the discussion there for an intuitive justification.
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W,W +B ≥M .
We solve for the firm’s choice of contract in three steps. First, we derive the bonus
payment. From the foregoing discussion, an employed worker’s instantaneous
expected utility is given by:
ve = mF (z2; a)u(W ) + [1−mF (z2; a)]u(W +B)− c(a) (18)
In equilibrium, each worker’s reference wage will be determined by the average
wage in the economy. It then follows that W ≤ wR ≤ W + B, so that u(W ) =
(1 + α)W − αwR while u(W + B) = W + B. Accordingly, Condition 1 requires
that:
a = arg max
aˆ
mF (z2; aˆ)
(
(1 + α)W − αwR)+ [1−mF (z2; aˆ)] (W +B)− c(aˆ)
+ β [(1− ϕ) (1−mF (z1; aˆ))V e + (ϕ+ (1− ϕ)mF (z1; aˆ))V u] (19)
The RHS of (19) represents the worker’s discounted expected lifetime utility (9),
where we have substituted δ and ve using (17) and (18). Note that while a worker’s
effort at time t influences both their instantaneous utility and the probability of
employment or unemployment in the subsequent period, it does not affect the
value of this employment or unemployment. Accordingly, the terms V e and V u
in (19) do not vary with the worker’s effort and are therefore taken as given.18
Our restrictions on the distribution function imply the validity of the first-order
approach, so that we can substitute (19) for its first-order condition. Setting this
equal to zero and rearranging then yields the necessary bonus payment:
B = α
(
W − wR)+ c′(a) + β (1− ϕ)mFa(z1; a) (V e − V u)−mFa(z2; a) (20)
Second, we show that the worker will always prefer to accept the contract for
any z1 ∈ [0, 1], z2 ∈ [0, 1] and W ≥ M , so that the participation constraint (and
therefore condition 2) is satisfied.
Lemma 1. The worker prefers to accept the contract for any base wage W ≥M .
Proof. From (9) and (10), the steady-state equilibrium values of V e and V u are
18Slightly abusing notation and reintroducing time-subscripts for clarity, the constraint can be
written as:
at = arg max
aˆt
V et (aˆt) = v
e
t (aˆt) + β [(1− ϕ) (1− δt(aˆt))V et+1 + (ϕ+ (1− ϕ) δt(aˆt))V ut+1]
where V et+1 and V
u
t+1 clearly do not depend on the effort at time t, aˆt.
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given by:
V e = ve + β [(1− ϕ) (1− δ)V e + (ϕ+ δ − ϕδ)V u] (21)
V u = vu + β [θq(θ)V e + (1− θq(θ))V u] (22)
respectively. Rearranging these expressions and simplifying then yields:
V e − V u ≥ 0 (23)
⇔ v
e − vu
1− β (1− δ) (1− ϕ) + βθq(θ) ≥ 0 (24)
so that V e − V u ≥ 0 if and only if ve − vu ≥ 0. Using (14) and (18), the latter
inequality can be expressed as:
mF (z2; a)
(
(1 + α)W − αwR)+ [1−mF (z2; a)] (W +B)
− c(a)− [(1 + α) b− αwR] ≥ 0 (25)
Rearranging this then yields:
(1 + α) (W − b) + [1−mF (z2; a)]α
(
wR −W )
+ [1−mF (z2; a)]B − c(a) ≥ 0 (26)
Note that the first three terms of (26) are positive, so that the inequality is
satisfied in particular when the worker chooses to implement zero effort (c(0) = 0).
Incentive compatibility then implies that the inequality must also hold when the
worker implements the firm’s desired effort level.
Intuitively, the proof of Lemma 1 shows that V e ≥ V u is equivalent to the
requirement that ve ≥ vu. Since we have W ≥ M ≥ b, the minimum payment
received by an employed worker cannot be less than the unemployment benefit b.
This implies that the instantaneous utility of an employed worker who undertakes
zero effort cannot be less than that of an unemployed worker. Employed workers
who undertake the firm’s desired effort level a must then also receive a weakly
greater instantaneous utility, due to incentive compatibility, so that ve ≥ vu is
satisfied.
Third, we derive the values of W , z1 and z2 which maximise the firm’s discoun-
ted expected lifetime profit V e, subject to the minimum wage constraint. Note
that the firm’s instantaneous profit pie is simply the value of output produced,
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Γ(a), net of expected wage costs:
pie = Γ(a)−W − [1−mF (z2; a)]B (27)
Inserting (17), (20) and (27) into (9) then yields the firm’s optimisation problem:
min
W,z1,z2
Γ(a)−W − [1−mF (z2; a)]α
(
W − wR)
− [1−mF (z2; a)] c
′(a) + β (1− ϕ)mFa(z1; a) (V e − V u)
−mFa(z2; a)
+ β [(1− ϕ) (1−mF (z1; a)) Πe + (ϕ+ (1− ϕ)mF (z1; a)) Πu] (28)
s.t. W ≥M
Note that since the term W enters the firm’s objective function negatively —
and since the worker’s participation is guaranteed for any W ≥ M — the firm
will set W as low as possible so that the minimum wage constraint binds and
W = M .19 Using this result, the first order conditions with respect to z1 and z2
can be expressed as follows:
1−mF (z2; a)
mFa(z2; a)
· fa(z1; a)
f(z1; a)
− Π
e −Πu
V e − V u = 0 (29)
[−mf(z2; a)]
[
α
[
W − wR]+ c′(a) + (1− ϕ)βmFa(z1; a) [V e − V u]−mFa(z2; a)
]
+ [1−mF (z2; a)]
[
[c′(a) + (1− ϕ)βmFa(z1; a) [V e − V u]]mfa(z2; a)
[mFa(z2; a)]
2
]
= 0 (30)
where the terms V e, V u, Πe and Πu are taken as given by the firm, analogous to
the case of the worker’s optimisation problem (19).20
4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the reference wage is determined by the average wage in the eco-
nomy, W + [1−mF (z2; a)]B. Using (20), along with the fact that each firm will
19Intuitively, this results since the current period base wage cannot be used to create incentives,
as all contracts are single-period in nature.
20Intuitively, these terms are unaffected by the firm’s contractual decisions; see also footnote
18.
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set W = M , we therefore have:
wR = M + [1−mF (z2; a)]α
(
M − wR)
+ [1−mF (z2; a)] c
′(a) + β (1− ϕ)mFa(z1; a) (V e − V u)
−mFa(z2; a) (31)
Rearranging this then yields:
wR = M + [1−mF (z2; a)] c
′(a) + β (1− ϕ)mFa(z1; a) (V e − V u)
−mFa(z2; a) [1 + α [1−mF (z2; a)]] (32)
Using (32), the first-order conditions associated with the firm’s choice of critical
values, (29) and (30), can be rewritten as:
1−mF (z2; a)
mFa(z2; a)
· fa(z1; a)
f(z1; a)
− Π
e −Πu
V e − V u = 0 (33)
mf(z2; a)Fa(z2; a) + [1 + α [1−mF (z2; a)]] [1−mF (z2; a)] fa(z2; a) = 0 (34)
The critical value z2 does not affect the probability of dismissal; it is therefore
chosen by the firm in order to minimise current-period expected wage costs and,
from (34), is determined by the quality of monitoring m and the relative income
concerns parameter α alone. In contrast, the firm’s choice of z1 will determine
the dismissal probability and therefore by (33) depends on the variables V e, V u,
Πe and Πu, each of which vary with the underlying labour market conditions.
From the firm’s point of view, the possibility of the worker’s dismissal creates
two effects. First, dismissal entails a loss of discounted expected utility equal
to V e − V u for the worker. This creates positive effort incentives, since workers
undertake higher effort in an attempt to avoid dismissal, allowing the firm to re-
duce the size of the bonus payment and therefore increase instantaneous expected
profits. Second, dismissal of the worker causes the match to be dissolved. Due
to the frictional nature of the labour market, the firm must then pay hiring costs
and forego the profits from employment for an uncertain number of periods, until
they are rematched with another worker. This leads to an expected reduction
in discounted expected profits of Πe − Πu. These two effects can be respectively
thought of as the benefits and costs of using dismissal to create incentives and will
determine a firm’s optimal choice of z1. In particular, the effects will vary with
both the minimum wage in the economy, M , and the magnitude of unemployment
benefits, b.
The equations (7), (8), (9), (10), (14), (15), (17), (18), (20), (27) and (32)
form a linear system which can be solved for the variables Πe, Πu, V e, V u, pie, piu,
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ve, vu, B, wR and δ. In addition, the values of z1 and z2 are determined by (33)
and (34), while the steady state equilibrium unemployment rate ρu and vacancy
per worker ρv are determined by the labour market equilibrium conditions (12)
and (13). Altogether, these equations characterise the solution to the model.
5 Numerical Analysis
We wish to explore how variations in the underlying parameters of the model
impact the economy’s equilibrium. However, the complexity of the equation sy-
stem prevents us from proceeding analytically. As such, we instead proceed by
solving a series of numerical examples. To that end, we let Γ(a) = γa, where γ is
a measure of productivity, and assume that c(a) = 0.5a2. In addition, we let the
distribution function be defined by F (x; a) = xa and apply the transformation
y1 = z
a
1 , which enables us to write Fa(z1; a) =
1
a (y1 ln y1). A similar transfor-
mation is applied for z2; we then treat y1 and y2 as the firm’s decision variables.
Finally, we let the economy’s matching function µ take the Cobb-Douglas form
µ (ρut , ρ
v
t ) = µ (ρ
u
t )
0.5 (ρvt )
0.5, where µ is a parameter which captures the efficiency
of the matching process. It then follows that q(θ) = µθ−0.5 .
While the previous section analysed a firm’s contracting decision in order to
implement a given effort level a, we slightly extend the model to allow effort
to be determined endogenously. As with the variables W , z1 and z2, each firm
will choose a in order to maximise discounted expected lifetime profits. Given
the above specifications and the transformations F (zi; a) = yi and Fa(zi; a) =
1
a (yi ln yi), the firm’s optimisation problem (28) can be re-expressed as:
max
y1,y2,a
γa−M − [1−my2]α
(
M − wR)
− [1−my2] a
2 + β (1− ϕ)my1 ln y1 (V e − V u)
−my2 ln y2
+ β [(1− ϕ) (1−my1) Πe + (ϕ+ (1− ϕ)my1) Πu] (35)
where W = M . The first order condition associated with a is then:
γ − [1−my2] 2a−my2 ln y2 = 0 (36)
Note that the optimal a is therefore determined solely by the parameters γ, m
and α (via y2); neither the minimum wage nor employment benefits play a role.
Intuitively, a change in either of these parameters shifts the firm’s costs of creating
effort incentives, but leaves the marginal cost unchanged; accordingly, there is no
effect on the optimal a. This is helpful, since it reduces the complexity of the
model and allows us to delineate the effects of a change in either parameter with
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Figure 3: The impact of a change in
M on y1.
Figure 4: The impact of a change in
M on B.
increased clarity. However, it is possible that with other distribution functions
the optimal effort level may respond to changes in these parameters, so that this
is not a general feature of the model.
In the following, we use Mathematica to solve the model for a series of nume-
rical examples. Throughout, we assume that m = 0.9, β = 0.8, h = 300, γ = 100,
ϕ = 0.05 and µ = 0.2. We then consider variations in M and b for the cases
where α = 0 (solid lines) and α = 1 (dashed lines); this allows us to analyse the
effect of relative income concerns on the economy’s equilibrium. Specifically, as
a benchmark we let M = 800 and b = 100. The first part of the analysis then
considers variations of M from this benchmark between 700 and 1000, while the
second part considers variations of b between 0 and 300.21
5.1 Changes in M
5.1.1 Contracting
We first consider the implications of an increase in M for contracting between
a firm-worker pair. From (34) and (36), neither y2 nor a are affected by such a
change. As discussed previously, when deciding on the optimal value of y1, the
firm compares the worker’s gain in discounted expected utility from employment,
V e − V u, with its own increase in discounted expected profits from employing a
worker, Πe−Πu. The ratio of these terms then determines the choice of y1 by (33).
As the worker’s benefit from being employed increases, dismissal becomes more
effective as a tool for creating incentives and is therefore used more often. On
the other hand, the greater the firm’s increase in profit from having an employee,
the more expensive dismissal becomes as a way to induce effort (i.e. in terms of
21Note that since the purpose of the analysis is not to generate labour market outcomes
consistent with real world data, these parameter values have not been chosen on the basis of
empirical observations. Instead, our purpose is to demonstrate some possible implications of
changes in labour market policies for incentive contracting when firms can use dismissal to
create incentives.
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foregone future profits) and therefore the probability of termination is lower.
With this in mind, there are two ceteris paribus effects of an increase in the
economy’s minimum wage. First, the term V e − V u increases. Clearly, employed
workers receive higher wages, raising the instantaneous expected utility associated
with employment, ve. Moreover, this effect is particularly strong when workers
have relative income concerns. Since the reference wage of individuals is determi-
ned by the average payment to matched workers, which has increased, unemployed
workers who receive an unchanged benefit b find themselves further behind wR
and therefore suffer a utility loss, reducing vu. As such, an increase in M widens
the discounted expected utility gap between employed and unemployed workers,
so that dismissal becomes increasingly more painful for employees. Second, hig-
her wages imply that a firm’s profits when employing a worker are now reduced,
whereas the payoff of an unmatched firm is unchanged. It follows that the term
Πe −Πu is reduced.
The above discussion implies that dismissal becomes both more effective and
less expensive following an increase in M and therefore becomes a more efficient
method of creating incentives. Accordingly, Figure 3 shows the increase in y1 for
our specific numerical example as M is increased, so that workers are dismissed
more often.22 This is true in the case of both standard preferences (α = 0; solid
line) and relative income concerns (α = 1; dashed line). However, the curve is
steeper — and therefore more sensitive to variations in M — in the α = 1 case,
due to the additional impact of relative income concerns on the instantaneous
utility of unemployed workers, vu, via the reference wage.
Figure 4 shows that in both cases, the contract’s bonus payment is reduced.
Since dismissal of workers becomes a more effective way to create incentives, and is
therefore used more often, workers are willing to exert higher effort in an attempt
to avoid termination of their employment. Moreover, as the effort level to be
induced remains constant, this allows for lower explicit incentive pay, so that the
bonus is reduced. Finally, note that the required bonus payment for any given
value of M is lower in the relative income concerns case. Intuitively, this follows
from the fact that aversion to falling behind the reference wage helps the firm to
create effort incentives at a lower costs, as shown in the previous chapter.
5.1.2 Utility and Profit
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of an increase in M on the average wage in the
economy and therefore the reference wage of workers. For our example, despite the
decrease in the bonus, the rise in M is sufficient to increase the contract’s expected
wage payment. The change in the instantaneous utility of workers is then shown
22Note that since a is unchanged and y1 = F (z1; a) = z
a
1 , this also implies that z1 increases.
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Figure 5: The impact of a change in
M on wR.
Figure 6: The impact of a change in
M on ve.
Figure 7: The impact of a change in
M on the rent of an employed wor-
ker.
Figure 8: The impact of a change in
M on pie.
by Figure 6. In both cases, ve is increasing. However, the increase is at a faster
rate when α = 1 due to the higher marginal utility associated with payments
below the reference wage. Next, the change in a worker’s relative benefit of being
employed (i.e. the term ve−vu), hereafter referred to as an employed worker’s rent,
is illustrated by Figure 7. Since the income of unemployed workers is constant
and equal to b, vu is unchanged in the case of standard preferences; accordingly,
the increase in rent is then driven solely by the increase in ve outlined above.
However, as discussed previously, when workers have relative income concerns,
the rise in the reference wage wR implies that vu is reduced following the increase
in M . This reduction, along with the increase in ve, causes a much steeper rise
in the rent of employed workers in the α = 1 case.
Finally, we consider the implications for the profit of firms who employ a
worker. Clearly, since the average wage payment wR has increased and effort
remains unchanged, firms will make lower profits following an increase in M .
However, due to the positive effect on incentives, it should be noted that the
magnitude of the marginal reduction in profit as M rises is less than unity. That
is, for every £1 by which the minimum wage increases, the expected profit of a
firm is reduced by less than £1. This is illustrated by Figure 8, which should be
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Figure 9: The impact of a change in M on the number of active firms in the
economy.
read as follows. The solid and dashed lines show the actual reductions in profit, for
the cases where α = 0 and α = 1, respectively. The dotted lines below then plot
the profit levels in the absence of any incentive effect, so that the bonus payment
remains unadjusted.23 It follows that while minimum wages do indeed leave firms
worse off, they are partially cushioned by the impact due to an efficiency wage
effect, which allows them to reduce explicit incentive payments.
5.1.3 Labour Market
We now consider the impact of variations in M on equilibrium in the labour
market. The number of active firms in the economy is determined by the freedom
of market entry condition (13).24 Combining (13) with (8) and (15) yields:
h
β
= q(θ)Πe (37)
Clearly, the left-hand side of (37) is invariant to changes in M , so that the change
in the number of firms is determined by the right-hand side of the equation alone.
Recall that q(θ) represents the probability of an unmatched firm finding a worker
in a given time period, while Πe denotes the discounted expected profit of a
matched firm. With this in mind, note that an increase inM has two effects. First,
as previously discussed, a raise in the minimum wage reduces the instantaneous
profit of a matched firm, pie. This also implies that Πe decreases. Second, since
firms increase y1 after an raise in M , as shown by Figure 3, workers are dismissed
with a higher probability; this increases the flow of workers into unemployment
and therefore improves an unmatched firm’s chances of finding a match. These two
23Technically, since we are considering variations in M between 700 and 1000, the origin of
the graph in Figure 8 is associated with M = 700. Slightly abusing notation by writing profit
as a function of the minimum wage, the lines labelled ‘actual’ plot pie(M) for the cases where
α = 0 and α = 1, while the lines labelled ‘unadjusted’ plot pie(700)− (M − 700).
24The number of active firms in the economy is given by the term (1− ρu) + ρv.
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Figure 10: The impact of a change
in M on q(θ).
Figure 11: The impact of a change
in M on θq(θ).
Figure 12: The impact of a change
in M on ρu.
Figure 13: The impact of a change in
M on the economy’s vacancy rate.
effects have an opposing impact on the number of active firms in the economy.
Figure 9 shows that in our example, the former effect is dominant so that the
number of firms decreases. However, the decrease is much less pronounced in the
α = 1 case. Intuitively, this occurs since, by Figure 3, y1 is more responsive to
variations in M when workers have relative income concerns. Accordingly, the
flow into unemployment is higher in this case, increasing the probability that
an unmatched firm becomes matched (i.e. strengthening the latter of these two
effects).
The above discussion implies that q(θ) must increase in response to a higher
M ; this is illustrated by Figure 10. Not only are matches now dissolved at a higher
rate, there are also less firms in the economy to compete with. In contrast, the
probability of an unmatched worker finding employment, θq(θ), falls following an
increase in M , as shown by Figure 11. This follows from the fact that there are a
fixed number of workers in the economy, while the number of firms has decreased.
Finally, Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the impact of a change in M on the
economy’s unemployment rate and vacancy rate, respectively.25 Unemployment
25Note that ρu denotes the number of unemployed workers per worker and therefore captures
the economy’s unemployment rate. In contrast, ρv denotes the number of unmatched firms per
worker. While ρv is commonly referred to as the vacancy rate in the literature, Figure 13 plots
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Figure 14: The impact of a change in M on the economy’s Gini Coefficient.
clearly rises, since there are less firms active in the economy and existing matches
are dissolved at a greater rate. Moreover, the same effects imply that the vacancy
rate in the economy will also increase.
5.1.4 The Gini Coefficient
To conclude our analysis of the impact of a variation in M , we consider the
economy’s Gini Coefficient. Specifically, we consider three distinct groups in the
economy: unemployed workers who receive an income b, employed workers who
receive an income M and employed workers who receive an income M +B. The
respective frequencies of these groups are given by ρu, (1 − ρu)mF (z2; a) and
(1 − ρu) [1−mF (z2; a)]. Using this information, the Gini Coefficient amongst
workers in the economy can be calculated for each particular value of M . Figure
14 then plots this graph.
In both the α = 0 and α = 1 cases, we can see that there is a marginal
decrease in the Gini Coefficient as M rises. This is a result of several counteracting
forces. While b remains unchanged, the increase in the unemployment rate ρu
implies that more workers receive this level of income. In addition, the terms
M and M + B each increase. Both of these effects increase inequality. However,
among employed workers, there is a decrease in inequality since the wage schedule
becomes compressed due to the reduction in B. Accordingly, the distance between
M and M +B is reduced. This is shown by Figure 14 to be the dominant effect
on the Gini Coefficient, which is reduced in both cases.
the number of unmatched firms per firm, i.e. the term:
ρv
(1− ρu) + ρv
which we refer to throughout as the economy’s vacancy rate.
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Figure 15: The impact of a change
in b on y1.
Figure 16: The impact of a change
in b on B.
5.2 Changes in b
5.2.1 Contracting
As before, we begin our analysis of the impact of an increase in the unemployment
benefit b by considering the implications for contracting between a firm-worker
pair. Similar to the case of M , neither y2 nor a are affected by such a change.
The impact on a firm’s choice of y1 will again depend on how the terms V
e − V u
and Πe−Πu respond to variations. The key effect of an increase in b is to decrease
the term V e−V u. Intuitively, unemployed workers receive a higher payment and
as such the income difference between them and their employed counterparts is
reduced. This effect is especially pronounced when workers have relative income
concerns, due to the high marginal utility below the reference wage.
The result of the increase in b is therefore to reduce the effectiveness of dismis-
sal as a tool for creating incentives. Accordingly, Figure 15 shows that firms reduce
y1 in our numerical example, so that workers face a lower probability of dismissal
from employment.26 As before, the cases of standard preferences (α = 0) and
relative income concerns (α = 1) are represented by the solid and dashed lines,
respectively. In either instance, y1 is lowered. However, the curve is steeper when
α = 1, as y1 becomes more sensitive to changes in b due to the aforementioned
high marginal utility.
Figure 16 then shows that the contract’s bonus payment is increased. Intui-
tively, this occurs since dismissal of workers is less effective and is therefore used
less often. Workers are less willing to exert effort in order to avoid termination,
as the utility associated with being unmatched has increased. Moreover, since the
firm continues to induce the same amount of effort, explicit incentives (i.e. the
bonus payment) must now be raised.
26This is in contrast to the findings of Wang and Yang (2015). In their model, workers are only
dismissed once they become too poor to motivate. Increases in unemployment benefits ceteris
paribus reduce incentives, so that the threshold for termination must be increased, resulting in
a higher flow into unemployment.
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Figure 17: The impact of a change
in b on wR.
Figure 18: The impact of a change
in b on ve.
Figure 19: The impact of a change in
b on the rent of an employed worker.
Figure 20: The impact of a change
in b on pie.
5.2.2 Utility and Profit
The above discussion implies that, since the base wage is unchanged and the bonus
payment increases, the average payment to employed workers rises in response to
a higher b. It follows that the reference wage of workers, wR, becomes higher, as il-
lustrated by Figure 17. The graph in Figure 18 then shows that the instantaneous
utility of employed workers increases accordingly. An increase in unemployment
benefits is therefore associated with higher utility for both employed and unem-
ployed workers, due to the negative effect on incentives.27 However, the rent of an
unemployed worker (the term ve − vu) is decreasing, since vu grows much faster.
This is particularly true when workers have relative income concerns, due to the
higher marginal utility below the reference point, so that the dashed line in Figure
19 is steeper.
Finally, we consider the implications of an increase in b for the profits of
matched firms. Clearly, since the effort to be induced remains unchanged, while
the bonus payment must increase, firms pay higher wages on average and therefore
make lower instantaneous profits. This is illustrated for our example by Figure
27Wang and Yang (2015) also find that employed workers become better off following an
increase in unemployment benefits, since outside options are increased and wages are determined
by the outcome of bargaining.
144
Figure 21: The impact of a change in b on the number of active firms in the
economy.
20. It follows that even if higher unemployment benefits do not affect affect firms
directly — for instance, due to difficulties in finding prospective workers or via
the taxation required to fund such an increase — they may still suffer due to the
negative effect on incentives.
5.2.3 Labour Market
We now turn our attention to the effects of variations in b on the labour market
equilibrium. Recall that the change in the number of firms will be determined
by the right-hand side of (37). An increase in unemployment benefits has two
effects. First, as discussed in the foregoing, the negative impact of a higher b on
incentives means that firms must pay a higher bonus and as such receive lower
profits, which implies that discounted expected profits, Πe, also decrease. Second,
since workers are let go with a lower probability y1 following the change, as shown
by Figure 15, the flow of workers into unemployment is decreased. This reduces
an unmatched firm’s chances of finding an unemployed worker. These two effects
work in the same direction to reduce the number of firms active in the market, as
illustrated by Figure 21. Intuitively, less firms wish to expend money searching
for a worker, since, ceteris paribus, i) the probability of finding one is lower and
ii) expected profits in the case that they do find one are reduced.
From (37), it is clear that q(θ) must increase if Πe falls. Figure 22 then
illustrates this. Intuitively, the number of firms active in the labour market are
reduced so that those who remain face a better chance of finding a worker. In
contrast, the probability of an unemployed worker finding a match is reduced
following an increase in b; this is shown by Figure 23. Not only is the rate at
which matches are dissolved lower due to the decrease in y1, but there are now
also less firms actively searching for a worker.
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the respective implications of an increase in b
for the economy’s unemployment rate and vacancy rate. In particular, there are
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Figure 22: The impact of a change
in b on q(θ).
Figure 23: The impact of a change
in b on θq(θ).
Figure 24: The impact of a change
in b on ρu.
Figure 25: The impact of a change
in b on the economy’s vacancy rate.
two effects on the unemployment rate. First, workers are dismissed with a lower
probability which means that the rate at which matches are dissolved is reduced;
this leads to a lower ρu. Second, as discussed in the foregoing, the reduction
in the amount of firms active in the economy lowers an unemployed worker’s
chances of finding a match, decreasing the flow out of unemployment and leading
to a higher ρu. Figure 24 shows that in both cases of our example, the former
effect is dominant so that unemployment is reduced. This is especially true when
workers have relative income concerns, since the former effect is stronger due to
the increased sensitivity of y1 to variations in b. Finally, Figure 25 plots the
economy’s vacancy rate, which is falling in b. Not only are there less dismissals,
so that existing matches last longer, an increase in b also leads to a reduction of
unmatched firms in the market. Both of these effects lead to a lower vacancy rate.
5.2.4 The Gini Coefficient
Following the same approach as the previous subsection, we can calculate the Gini
Coefficient associated with a particular value of b. Figure 26 plots this graph. In
both the α = 0 and α = 1 cases, the Gini Coefficient is decreasing as b grows. The
effects which lead to this change are as follows. First, there are less unemployed
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Figure 26: The impact of a change in b on the economy’s Gini Coefficient.
workers due to the reduction in ρu, while those workers who are unemployed
receive an increased income of b. Both of these effects reduce inequality. On the
other hand, among employed workers, the increase in the bonus payment has the
effect of increasing inequality. Figure 26 shows that for our example, the former
effects are dominant so that overall inequality among workers in the economy is
reduced.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study incentive contracting when workers have relative income
concerns and firms can use the threat of dismissal to create effort incentives. In
order to formalise this idea, we extend the contracting environment outlined in
the previous chapter to allow for a frictional labour market with unemployment.
In this context, we use a series of numerical examples to analyse the impact of
changes in the economy’s minimum wage and unemployment benefit payments.
We find that the minimum wage acts as an efficiency wage by raising the value
of employment relative to unemployment. This induces workers to exert higher
effort in an attempt to avoid the loss of income associated with dismissal, allowing
firms to lower explicit incentive pay. It follows that since dismissal becomes more
effective, it is used more often and firms terminate the employment of workers with
a higher probability. However, expected wage payments rise following an increase,
so that employed workers are better off on average and firms’ expected profits are
reduced. In contrast, an increase in unemployment benefits reduces the relative
value of employment, so that the bonus payment must be increased if incentives
are to stay constant. Dismissal becomes less efficient and is therefore used less
often. The average wage payment to workers then increases, reducing the profits
of firms. We show that while these effects exist when workers are self-interested,
they are particularly strong in the presence of relative income concerns.
While we primarily consider the implications for contracting between firm-
147
worker pairs, we also investigate how these changes affect labour market outcomes.
Studies which analyse the impact of changes in the minimum wage in the context
of search-and-matching models typically find two opposing effects on employment
(Meer and West, 2016). First, by increasing a firm’s costs of hiring a worker,
an increase in the minimum wage reduces demand for labour and pushes some
firms out of the market. Second, the higher minimum wage increases the expected
returns to employment, which induces additional search effort from workers. This
increases both the quantity of workers and the intensity of their search, leading to
a positive effect on employment.28 Our analysis shows that, even in the absence
of search effects, this increase in returns to employed workers can impact the rate
of unemployment via the efficiency wage effect, which increases the probability of
dismissal and therefore raises the flow of workers into unemployment.
In the standard textbook model of matching, unemployment benefits dictate
workers’ outside options. Since wages are determined by Nash bargaining bet-
ween firms and workers, it follows that a higher unemployment benefit increases
equilibrium wages, reducing the profitability of firms and leading to a reduction
in demand for labour. When workers must additionally undertake costly effort
when searching for employment, many papers have also studied the potential dis-
couragement effects of increases in unemployment benefits on this search effort
and the resulting impact on unemployment (Boadway and Cuff, 2018; Landais
et al., 2018). However, our analysis highlights the existence of a positive employ-
ment effect, since increases in the unemployment benefit reduce the efficiency of
dismissal as a tool for creating incentives. Accordingly, firms dismiss workers less
often, reducing the flow into unemployment.
To conclude the chapter, we briefly comment on our specification of workers’
preferences. Throughout, we assumed that all workers, employed or unemployed,
compared their incomes to the same reference wage, which was determined by the
average wage payment to employed workers. The assumption of identical reference
wages seems natural, since all workers in our model are ex ante homogeneous,
while the assumption that the income of unemployed workers is not taken into
account is consistent with evidence that social comparisons have a tendency to
be upward-looking in nature (see e.g. Hecht, 2017). Moreover, this specification
significantly simplifies the analysis, since it implies b < W < wR < W + B
and therefore prevents situations whereby the reference wage becomes less than
the economy’s minimum wage. However, due to the lack of evidence for how
social comparisons change when relevant others are in alternative ‘states’ (such
as unemployment or retirement), it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of this
assumption.
28See Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), Acemoglu (2001) and Flinn (2006).
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In addition, for the sake of tractability we assumed that each worker compared
their income in a given time period with the average income in the economy in that
same time period. Similarly, evidence for the exact nature of social comparisons
in dynamic environments is scarce, so that alternative specifications are possible.
For instance, one could allow for workers who accumulate wealth over time, which
then acts as a point of comparison.
There are several other directions in which the model could be extended. It
would be straightforward to allow for firms and workers to bargain over the terms
of the contract; one could then consider the impact of variations in bargaining
power on the outcomes of contracting. Alternatively, one could incorporate search
effort into the model and consider how changes in the minimum wage or unemploy-
ment benefits affect search incentives when workers have relative income concerns.
Finally, as mentioned in the text, one could allow for unemployment benefits to
be funded endogenously by taxation; this would be particularly interesting, since
taxes would also influence the ability of firms to provide incentives to workers.
These developments, along with others, are left for future research.
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Conclusion
This thesis examines the optimal provision of incentives within firms when wor-
kers’ preferences are characterised by relative income concerns. The aim has been
to provide some new insights which aid our understanding of the design of incen-
tive contracts and their impact on individual behaviour.
We began in Chapter 1 by surveying the existing literatures which consider
incentive provision with two related models of preferences: inequity aversion and
loss aversion. We found that, in either case, introduction of such preferences
typically resulted in two distinct effects due to the reduction in utility associated
with low wage outcomes. First, firms benefit from an increased ability to create
incentives, since a given incentive scheme now induces higher effort. Second,
firms must pay higher wages on average to provide a worker with the same level
of expected utility. The overall implications for a firm’s costs of these incentive
and participation effects were shown to depend on the specifics of the economic
environment.
We also studied the implications of these effects for the structure of the opti-
mal contract. With inequity aversion, we discussed how firms could benefit from
designing wage schemes which are dependent on the performance of others within
the reference group. For instance, depending on the economic environment, it may
be beneficial to eliminate wage inequalities using team contracts, or exacerbate
them through the use of relative performance evaluation or tournament schemes.
When workers are loss averse, however, we saw that studies have mostly focused
on the optimal wage scheme when firms have access to a rich performance measure
and found that payments are typically insensitive to this signal over some regi-
ons, since firms wish to shield workers from losses. Several authors have discussed
how the aforementioned findings are consistent with empirical observations, such
as the fact that real world incentive schemes tend to be simple, less sensitive to
performance than predicted by the standard theory and result in wage compres-
sion within organisations (see Herweg et al., 2010; Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and
Prendergast, 1999, respectively).
Next, in Chapter 2, we began our investigation of incentive contracting when
workers have relative income concerns. Initially considering the problem of a
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single firm-worker pair who take the reference wage as given, we found that the
optimal wage scheme took a simple form and featured either two or three distinct
payments. In the latter case, the contract featured a wage payment equal to
the worker’s reference wage, similar to findings in the context of loss aversion
(de Meza and Webb, 2007). We also showed that, similar to the foregoing cases,
relative income concerns induce a positive incentive effect, which allows firms to
reduce the bonus payment associated with high performance. In our framework,
since workers extract a positive rent, this implies that firms can induce effort at
a lower cost. However, we also discussed a key difference to the cases of inequity
aversion and loss aversion with respect to the participation effect, which we argue
is positive when workers undertake wider social comparisons with others outside
of the firm.
In the latter part of the chapter, we assumed that the reference wage was
determined endogenously by the economy’s equilibrium average income. In this
framework, we showed that the interdependence between the contracting of firm-
worker pairs (via the reference wage) resulted in an externality effect, so that
firms could benefit from collective decision making. Clearly, such effects do not
arise in the cases of inequity aversion and loss aversion since comparisons, social
or otherwise, do not extend beyond the firm. Finally, we were also able to ex-
plore how changes in the underlying parameters of the model affected the wider
economy, by analysing changes in average income and the Gini coefficient.
In Chapter 3, we extended the model in order to study the role of dismissal
when workers care about their relative income. For this purpose, we embedded
the aforementioned contracting framework into a dynamic environment featuring
a frictional labour market and unemployment. We showed that dismissal acts as
a substitute for explicit incentive pay, allowing firms to reduce the average wage
paid to workers in each time period. However, due to the frictional nature of the
labour market, in the event that a worker’s employment is terminated, firms may
spend several periods searching for a new match resulting in a loss of profits. Our
analysis shows that firms trade-off these effects when deciding the frequency with
which to dismiss workers.
Since the size of any incentives created by the possibility of dismissal ne-
cessarily depend on the underlying conditions of the labour market, it is also
interesting to consider the implications of changes in policies pertaining to em-
ployment. To this end, we studied the effects of changes in the minimum wage
and unemployment benefits. We found that a higher minimum wage aids the
creation of incentives via an efficiency wage effect, which allows for a reduction
in the bonus payment. In contrast, unemployment benefits have a negative effect
on incentives so that the bonus payment must be increased. Our framework also
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allows for an analysis of how these changes impact the number of firms active in
the labour market and the steady-state equilibrium rate of unemployment.
In addition to the above, we showed that the effects of such changes are streng-
thened when workers have relative income concerns in comparison to the self-
interested case. One of the reasons for this result is that policies which affect the
average income of workers in the economy have a direct impact on utility, via
the reference wage. This is in stark contrast to the cases of inequity aversion or
loss aversion, where any comparisons are intra-firm in nature and are therefore
unaffected by broader changes in economy-wide outcomes.
When reflecting on the analysis contained in this thesis, a key issue is our
formalisation of relative income concerns. Throughout, we assumed that workers’
preferences could be represented by a piecewise linear function around a reference
wage which is determined endogenously by the average wage in the economy.
This approach is simple, captures the notion of relative income comparisons in
an intuitive way and allows for a tractable analysis of the implications of such
preferences for incentive contracting. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this
thesis, there is some evidence that the average wage in a society does indeed
represent an important point of comparison.
The assumption that social comparisons extend to all individuals in an eco-
nomy seems particularly appropriate in our framework, since all workers were
assumed to be identical. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, many authors have
argued that in environments where salient others are disparate, individuals will
typically focus on those who they perceive as being most similar to themselves. It
follows that, in the presence of heterogeneity, workers’ social comparisons may be
limited to a specific group within society.1 More generally, one could think of in-
dividuals as undertaking comparisons with several different groups, with varying
weights relating to the degree of social proximity. A related issue concerns the
extent to which individuals might compare themselves with others who are in al-
ternative ‘states’; for instance, to what degree does an employed worker undertake
comparisons with those who are involuntarily unemployed, retired or engaging in
home production?
There are similar complexities in dynamic environments. In Chapter 3, we
assumed that individuals were myopic in the sense that social comparisons were
limited to the current time period. In reality, the true nature of intertemporal
1Hecht (2017) conducts a series of interviews with 30 UK-based individuals whose annual
incomes are in the top 1% of the distribution, many of whom are also within the top 1% of the
wealth distribution. She finds that several feel relatively disadvantaged: while they are aware
of their own advantaged economic position within the general population, they undertake wide-
ranging social comparisons with others including entrepreneurs, philanthropists, billionaires and
sports stars. Accordingly, they often find themselves ‘looking up’ and as such do not always
perceive themselves as earning a ‘high income’.
152
relative income concerns is likely to be much more elaborate than this. Workers
may care about long-term inequalities, or about accumulated wealth rather than
income. Clark et al. (2008) discuss evidence that individuals may even undertake
comparisons with their past selves and dislike falling behind previous levels of
income; this notion shares several similarities with reference-dependence and loss
aversion.
Even if one is able to pin down the correct nature of social comparisons in
any given environment, a question still remains regarding which utility function
best represents these preferences. Clearly, our assumption of piecewise linearity
was a simplification, allowing for a parsimonious analysis of incentive contracting.
However, the relationship between relative income concerns and risk preferences is
an understudied issue, so that further development of our model of preferences is
not straightforward. Ultimately, the question of which specification of preferences
is most appropriate in any given environment is empirical. Hopefully, future
studies will shed some light on this matter.
To conclude the thesis we briefly reflect on some promising future directions
for the literature. With respect to the foregoing discussion, increased empirical
evidence for the exact nature of social comparisons will help economists develop
tractable models of preferences which can capture important aspects of individual
behaviour; these models can then be applied to the study of incentive contracting
in complex environments, improving the predictions of the theory. In addition,
Chapters 2 and 3 of this work discussed several possible extensions to our analy-
sis. These include heterogeneous workers, the introduction of bargaining power
and considering contracting in more complex labour market environments. In
particular, future studies should aim to investigate the implications of relative
income concerns for economically interesting variables relating to policy, since a
tendency of the existing literature has been to limit analysis to the parameters of
the behavioural theory; this is consistent with the observation of Ko˝szegi (2014)
regarding the wider behavioural contract theory literature. Chapter 3 of this
thesis provided one example of a development along these lines, but there are
several further possibilities yet to be explored. Finally, it will be interesting to see
if the predictions of the existing literature hold up to empirical or experimental
scrutiny. Such studies represent an important agenda for future research and will
be invaluable for the development of further models which investigate incentive
contracting with non-standard preferences.
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